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Peaceful Transfers of Foreign Policy Roles in International Systems

by

Christopher D. Yung

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Abstract: Peaceful Transfers of Foreign Policy Roles in International Systems

This dissertation addresses the issue of whether the leadership of international systems can be peacefully transferred from one powerful state to another. It examines the prospects for peaceful transfers of foreign policy roles and responsibilities within international systems. Its approach is to examine case histories in which peaceful transfers of roles have taken place, and to examine the conditions necessary for bringing about peaceful change. It looks at examples where peaceful transfers of responsibilities and roles were possible, but ended in major war. This allowed a contrasting of conditions present in the examples of successful cooperation among major powers, with those of unsuccessful cooperation leading to war.

The dissertation formulates a theory of peaceful transfers of roles and responsibilities, which argues: (1) that peaceful transfers of role can take place when the dominant power or powers expand the role of a rising challenger, to match its expanding capabilities; (2) peaceful transfers of role can take place in the absence of the balance of power mechanism in the international system; (3) the earlier a dominant state adjusts the role of an increasingly powerful central actor, the better the chance of a peaceful transfer of role; (4) peaceful transfers of role can occur if the dominant state or states see its (their) relationship with the rising challenger as joint management of the international system; (5) the peaceful transfer of role in international systems involves the process of integrative bargaining in which both parties are said to derive joint benefits from the negotiation; and (6) if there is an absence of significant technological, political, economic, and social change in the international system, statesmen will find it easier to formulate policy that makes peaceful transfer possible.

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Completing this dissertation would not have been possible without the time and scholarly experience generously offered by Professor Charles Doran, my thesis advisor, and without the financial support of the Center for Naval Analyses, with whom I was employed during the tenure of my doctoral candidacy. The dissertation also greatly benefited from the expertise of the members of my Ph.D. committee: Professor I. William Zartman; Professor Ilya Prizel; Professor H. Lyman Miller; and Professor George Romney.

Needless to say, I owe a great debt of gratitude to many friends and fellow students of international relations, too numerous to list individually, but who helped me shape the research, read early drafts of the dissertation, or simply lent me encouragement or advice. To my parents I am thankful for the love and support they have given me over the years to pursue my academic and vocational interests. The completion of this dissertation would not have been possible without the love, understanding, encouragement, and support of my wife, Teresa. Finally, although unaware of it, my infant son Alexander also pressed me on to finish my graduate work. The longer I took to finish the dissertation, the less time I had to spend with him. Furthermore, it was my hope that this scholarly work will help, in some small way, make the task of the Twenty First Century statesman easier to maintain international peace, stability and security—thereby making the world a safer place for my son and future generations of children world wide. Inevitably, these proved some of the greatest motivating factors for actually completing the manuscript and drumming up the courage to defend it. For this reason I dedicate this work to my son, Alexander.

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1. Introduction

At some point in any nation's history, its military, economic and political might relative to other nations will decline.[1] When this happens to a major power that has dominated the international order for decades or even centuries, international relations theorists feel compelled to examine the consequences. Does the major power try to cling to its control over the international order, prompting tension and conflict in international relations? Does the decline of a major power necessarily lead to major war? Or can nation-states transfer the political influence they have possessed in an international order, to other increasingly powerful states? This dissertation is about the peaceful transfer of foreign policy roles within international systems. An undertaking of this kind first requires a definition of what an international system is and then an explanation of what a peaceful transfer of foreign policy role within an international system means.

International systems, control, and influence within international systems, and peaceful transfers of foreign policy role

An international system is defined by Kenneth Waltz and many others before him as having a structure and interacting units.[2] The interacting units are nation-states. The structure is that phenomenon that makes it possible to think of the group of intracting

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1. A distinction needs to be made between "absolute" and "relative" decline. When a nation-state is in "absolute" decline, it has already "peaked" and its productive capacity, and its military capability have already diminished compared with earlier periods of that nation-state's history and regardless of the economic and military capabilities of other nation-states. When a nation-state is in "relative" decline its productive capacity and military capability might still be quite potent; however, these capabilities when compared with other nation-states might not be as potent as they had been at earlier times. A nation-state may be in "relative" decline but could still prove to be quite a powerful member of the international system. See Charles Doran, *Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century's End*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1991, pp. 212-213.

2 Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, published by McGraw Hill, New York, 1979. p. 79.

units as a whole.[3] The structure is also characterized by the organizing mechanism affecting, influencing or defining the behavior of the individual units.[4] To cite a few examples, an international system may be defined as a bipolar balance of power system comprising the United States, the Soviet Union, and their respective allies; or the system can be defined as a multipolar system comprising Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austria-Hungary, Russia and the Ottoman Empire; or the system could be defined as Pax Romana—the Roman Empire's unipolar dominance over a structure comprised of weaker political entities (e.g., Gaul, Carthage, Macedonia, and Egypt). In each of these examples, the defining characteristics of the system were the units making up the structure (the individual states or political entities) and the means (e.g., balance of power, hegemonic rule, etc.) through which order, stability or equilibrium was maintained.

Charles Doran adds to this definition, that "structure is what gives each international system its special character and substance".[5] The essential components of international structures are: 1) the number of actors within the central or great power system; 2) their relative power; 3) the roles assumed by the central actors; 4) the level of polarization in the system; 5) the nature of alliances in the system, and; 6) the nature of the norms and codes of the international system.[6]

A number of international relations theories suggest that, due to their power relative to other nations, and their willingness to use power, nation-states can assert great amounts of political influence over international systems. Thus, we find distinctions between the central sub-system (in which the most powerful states or system units

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[3] Ibid

[4] Ibid, p. 80; see also Charles F. Doran, *Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century's End*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 1991. p. 2.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

interact) and the periphery (in which the least powerful states or system units interact)[7]. We also find references to rules, regimes, and institutions established by the most powerful states, or by others, to help them regulate the international order they created.[8] Finally, we find references in international relations theory to: (1) hegemonic stability[9] (or stability brought about by the firm control over the international system by one state); (2) the international system as a hierarchical structure with the most powerful nations on the top controlling the multitudes of weaker nations at the bottom of the pyramid[10]; or (3) the equilibrium of power and role (stability brought about by the inadvertent result of offsetting strengths and weaknesses of the international actors making up the international system)[11].

Nation-states comprising systems on occasion must adjust who of the central actors exert inordinate influence within the international system, and who does not. Over time, the power of nation-states increases or decreases relative to other states. This uneven growth of the units comprising the system means that nation-states that have assumed control or exerted great amounts of influence, over the international system in

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[7] Charles F. Doran, *Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century's End*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1991, p. 87; I. Wallerstein, *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, Academic Press, New York, NY, 1974; and Bruce Moon, "Political Economy Approaches to the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy" in Charles Hermann, Charles Kegley, & James Rosenau, eds., *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, Unwin Hyman, Inc., Boston, Ma., 1987, p. 36.

[8] Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984, pp. 12-15.

[9] Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 1981 .

[10] A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics*, Knopf Publishers, New York, NY, 1968; A.F.K. Organski, "The Power Transition" in John A. Vasquez, ed., *Classics of International Relations*, Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1986, p. 295.

[11] Charles F. Doran, *Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century's End*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1991, pp. 36-40.

the past might now lack the power to manage or help manage the system. The weakening capabilities of a dominant state may prevent it from fielding the armies necessary to impose order on the system or to contribute to a coalition of powerful states. At the same time, another increasingly powerful state might now have gained the capability to do so. At this point, an ordering mechanism of some kind will come into play— whether it be the balance of power mechanism, the drive for hegemonic domination, systemic war, or the tendency for nation-states to move toward roles commensurate with their power—that eventually reorders who controls or influences the system and who does not, and drives the system to stability or equilibrium[12]. As we will see in chapter two, different scholars of international relations claim some mechanisms are more important than others in bringing the system to equilibrium and thus underpinning world order.

The peaceful transfer of roles and responsibilities within an international system or what we call a peaceful transfer of power within an international systems, means surrendering a significant amount of political influence of an international systems. One state or group of states relinquishes political influence (and to some extent, control) to another state or group of states without war occurring between them. States are reluctant to transfer influence over international systems because they derive benefits (from making, interpreting, and enforcing the rules governing the states of the system) commensurate with some degree of control, never perfect, within an international system. States are also reluctant to transfer influence within international systems because transferrence sometimes requires relinquishing the very means that contribute to state

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[12] Depending on the theoretical ordering mechanism under discussion, the system may take different paths to return to equilibrium. For instance, one theoretical perspective argues that the system must first fall into disequilibrium requiring warfare to bring the system back to equilibrium, whereas another perspective offers that a gradual process of adjusting roles to power is possible and may bring the system to equilibrium. See chapter two.

preservation (territory, military assets, alliances and international institutions, and spheres of influence).

It is this reluctance and fear to transfer control, influence, and roles/responsibilities within international systems that make peaceful change in international systems rare. The millenia of Roman control during Pax Romana did not lead to a smooth transfer of control over Roman territories to an up-and-coming powerful political entity. There was no single powerful political entity for Rome to transfer its responsibilities to. At the same time, even if such a political entity existed, it is likely that the transformation of the Roman system would have been violent in any case.The Roman Empires (East and West) held on to power over their respective systems, and were eventually violently overthrown by increasingly powerful adversaries (the Germanic tribes in the West, and the Ottoman Empire in the East).[13] The Spanish-Austrian dominance of the international system ended after the Thirty Years' War and led to Anglo-Dutch coalition control over the international system.[14] The wars of Louis XIV, ending with the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), marked the end of an international system dominated by France and the beginning of another system dominated by England.[15]

The purpose of this dissertation, then, is to examine the prospects for peaceful transfers of foreign policy roles in international systems. Are peaceful transfers of foreign policy roles possible? Have they taken place in world history? If they have, what conditions were present in the international system to bring about such a peaceful transfer of power? Are these conditions duplicable today? In answering these broad questions,

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[13] Hans Delbruck, *The Barbarian Invasions, Volume II of the History of the Art of War,* University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, Nebraska, 1982.
[14] George Modelski & William Thompson, "Long Cycles and GlobalWar" in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *The Handbook of War Studies*, Unwin Hyman Press, Boston, MA, 1989, pp. 24-34.
[15] Ibid, p. 31.

the dissertation will also develop a theory of peaceful transfers of foreign policy roles in international systems.

The role of theory

As mentioned above, different scholars of international relations conclude that some theories are better at explaining what drives the structure of the international system to stability or equilibrium than others. As a consequence, different theories advocating different ordering or equilibrating mechanisms suggest peaceful transfers of foreign policy role are possible under given conditions, while others suggest they are not. For example, balance of power theorists claim that the system moves toward an equivalence of power among the central actors and if this situation persists, stability and peace will persist in the international system. By extension, some balance of power theorists claim that peaceful transfers of control over international systems are possible if the elements of a balance of power are maintained by the central actors. This is in contrast to Hegemonic Stability theorists who claim that the dominance of one state ensures stability; therefore, the movement of various central actors toward equivalence in power in the system tends to result in systemic instability and disequilibrium.[16] By extension, the movement of a rival state to near equivalence in power to a dominant state (a situation calling for a readjustment of control over the system) can lead to no other outcome than systemic war. Theories arguing for or against certain ordering or equilibrating mechanisms of international systems have huge significance for any theory of peaceful transfers of foreign policy role that is developed here. Thus theories and the ordering/equilibrating mechanisms associated with those theories serve as frameworks or paradigms from which we can assess if central states are more likely (under given conditions) to be cooperative

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[16] These points will be discussed at greater length in chapter two.

or act violently when confronted with the prospects of an increasingly powerful rival state.

Chapter two of the dissertation lays out in detail the different international relations theories that address the question of systems transformation, transfers of power, and peaceful change. Chapter seven summarizes what we learn by examining the case histories of peaceful and violent transfers of power. In this chapter I also make the case for a Theory of Peaceful Transfers of Foreign Policy Role, the conditions that appear to be necessary to bring about such peaceful change, and the policies that statesmen need to pursue to implement peaceful change in international systems.

Case histories

To highlight the conditions necessary for successful peaceful change in international systems, chapters three and four of the dissertation look at case studies in which peaceful transfers of power in international systems were possible, but ended in systemic war. For this purpose, the dissertation examines Great Britain's road to world war with Wilhelmine Germany (1871-1907) and Imperial Japan (1868-1933). Chapters five and six of this dissertation examine rare instances in history in which a peaceful transfer of foreign policy role from one dominant state or states to another, took place. In this case, I looked at British rapprochement and cooperation with the United States in the mid-19th century to the early twentieth century (1840-1903), and the joint management of an international system (over the course of several centuries) by a declining Empire (the Chou dynasty) and a number of increasingly powerful states formerly subordinate to the Chou. I considered the United States-Great Britain relationship and the Chou Empire's relationship with its successors as examples of peaceful transfer of control over an international system, because these international systems were transformed from one international order to another without a systemic war.

Relevance to American Foreign Policy in the Twenty First Century

The inevitable question which arises from this sort of intellectual exercise is: what implications does this research effort have for the United States and its management of the international system into the 21st Century? Most commentators on American foreign policy admit that the United States is no longer in a position of complete hegemony over the system, if it ever enjoyed hegemony over the system. There is a general consensus that American influence and power have declined since the height of American power in the 1960s, and that the United States must learn to manage an increasingly complex international system while other states in the international system are becoming increasingly competitive in economic and technological terms.

The conclusions derived from this research will lend themselves to answering such quesitons as: Are there any potential successor states or rival states that can assist the United States in the management of the international system and toward a peaceful transfer of foreign policy roles within the international system? If there are, what steps must the United States take to encourage or nurture the ascending state to assist the U.S. should a transfer be required? Are there policies that can be implemented now, that would assist in the creation of a peaceful transfer? Finally, can we examine or discuss the possibility of implementing an American foreign policy geared toward promoting a peaceful transfer of foreign policy roles without sacrificing American security, or national interests? These issues will be addressed in detail in the concluding chapter (chapter eight) of this dissertation.

2. Theoretical Underpinnings

Theoretical efforts to examine the prospects for peaceful transfers of power within international systems can be divided into five broad categories: hegemonic stability theory; power transition theory; balance of power theories; theories of accomodation; and power cycle theory. Each makes different proposals on how the international system operates, and as a consequence, each arrives at somewhat different conclusions on how stability in the system comes about (how equilibrium is achieved), what factors lead to an increased likelihood for international conflict, and how and why cooperation between nation-states in an anarchic world is possible (or impossible). Since understanding the prospects for peaceful change in international systems requires an examination of all of these issues, it is necessary for us to discuss these theories in depth.

The Case for Realism

Before going into the specific international relations theories, it is important to point out the author's theoretical biases. This analysis begins with the assumption that Realist theory is the most satisfactory (compared to its alternatives) at explaining outcomes in international relations. The arguments of critics of Realism notwithstanding, the centrality of power in the workings of international systems still holds. The dispatch of a U.S. naval carrier battle group to a crisis still causes adversaries to take pause, and be leveraged by U.S. policy makers; the desire of some Eastern European nations to expand NATO to the East can still be explained by their fear of resurgent Russian power. Power, thus, remains a central explanatory factor in international relations, and understanding the pursuit or preservation of power, can help predict under what conditions nations can cooperate or feel pressured to wage war with one another.

This starting assumption means, of course, that this dissertation will rely on a "black box" approach to examining international relations. That is, the study discusses

international factors which could have an impact on decision makers, provides some discussion of what is going on domestically within specific nations, and makes judgements and forms opinion on the likely policies of states based on the supposition that behind the closed doors of decision-makers come decisions derived rationally, arrived at with the primary purpose of increasing or preserving the nations power, prestige, and status, and arrived at as if all the decision-makers were a single, unitary actor. While such an analysis may touch on a discussion of internal politics or what might be on the mind of a specific statesman, little effort is usually made to discuss bureaucratic competition within nations, domestic concerns, and the impact of non-governmental actors as a motivating force for foreign policy decisions. This said, I now explore the specific theories of international relations which may help explain the prospects and problems of peaceful transfer of foreign policy roles in international systems.

The Hegemonic Stability Theory

Championed by Robert Gilpin, this theory argues that systemic stability is rooted in the power of a single powerful state—the hegemon. Gilpin writes, nation-states:

> will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits.[1]

If there is uneven distribution of economic, technological and military capability, Gilpin writes, it is possible that one state will achieve such an advantage that it will dominate the international system.[2]

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[1] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 1981, p. 10.

[2] Ibid, chapter 3.

Furthermore, not only is the international system a place where one nation *can* dominate other nation-states, it is natural that the international system gravitate toward this situation. Dominant or hegemonic powers tend to impose order and stability over the system. As the most advanced power (technologically, economically and militarily), the hegemon has the greatest interest in an orderly international system.[3] As a result, hegemons impose rules on the other nation-states in the system.[4] These rules tend to advance the hegemon's interests.

Gilpin writes that this situation does not and cannot continue indefinitely. As time passes, the hegemon accrues new and rising costs.[5] As the costs of hegemony increase, the hegemon's economic benefits compared with the benefits accrued by the other nation-states in the system, decline. As power becomes redistributed in the international system, power relations do not conform with the rules established by the hegemon to regulate the system.[6] Gilpin concludes that the only way to redress this inconsistency of power and the rules governing the system is war.[7] The international system then is a never-ending cycle. As Robert Keohane has put it, for Gilpin, "*world history is an unending series of cycles; the conclusion of one hegemonic war is the beginning of another cycle of growth, expansion, and eventual decline*".[8]

The prospects for peaceful change in international systems, then, are slim to none. If the only means by which states redress the disparity between the power they possess and the systemic rules that benefit them and others in the system, is war, then the transfer of control over an international system from one dominant state to another (a transfer of

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[3] Ibid, pp. 140-1.
[4] Ibid, pp. 144-5
[5] Ibid, pp. 168-9.
[6] Ibid, p. 186.
[7] Ibid, pp. 197-204.

foreign policy roles within an international system) must be preceded by violence or systemic war. Gilpin himself recognizes that his theory says nothing about the prospects for peaceful change. Although he provides no answer to the dilemma of peaceful change, he acknowledges that the issue requires examination:

> The fundamental problem of international relations in the contemporary world is the problem of peaceful adjustment to the consequences of the uneven growth of power among states.[9]

Power Transition Theory

The Power Transition theory presented by A.F. K. Organski in 1968 argues that the stability of the international system is based on the degree of assymetry in the relative power positions of the international system's most powerful actors.[10] He argued that the likelihood of major war increases as the capabilities of a rival to the most powerful state in the international system approaches the level of that state.[11]

Organski believed that a nation will fight when it believes it can win. This is true for both dominant power and rising challenger when the two are nearly equal in power . He argued that when a nation is much more powerful than its rivals it is not necessary for it to fight to pursue its interests, and when a nation is much weaker than the dominant state it would be suicidal to fight.[12]

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[8] Robert Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond" in *Neo-Realism and its Critics*, Columbia University Press, New York, NY, 1986, p. 177.

[9] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 1981, p. 230.

[10] A.F.K. Organsky, "The Power Transition" in Vasquez, ed., *Classics of International Relations*, Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1986, pp. 295-6.

[11] Ibid, p. 295.

[12] Ibid.

Wars occur when an increasingly powerful nation challenges the dominant nation and its allies over control of the international system. The conflict is between the dominant state (and its allies) and a challenger that comes close to matching the power of the dominant state. Peace and stability can happen only when the most powerful nations are in firm control of the international system and are satisfied with the international system as it is. Peace is threatened when a powerful nation seeks to change the international system and has enough power to alter the international system through war.[13]

Organski argues that the international system should be pictured as a pyramid with one nation at the top and many at the bottom. Those at the top represent the most powerful states, and those at the bottom the least powerful states.[14] Those nations that are powerful and disatisfied tend to be those nations that have become powerful after the current international system was created and the benefits already distributed among the central states.[15] The newcomers probably played no part in the creation of the international order and the dominant state and its allies are frequently unwilling to grant more than a minor share of the benefits of the system.[16]

The dominant state and its allies will be extremely reluctant to share in the rule of international system. "*To do so*," he writes, "*would be to abandon to a newcomer the preferred position they held.*"[17] The challengers, Organski continues, "*are to be kept in their places*"[18]. The challengers, on the other hand, believe that their growing power should grant them a new position within the hierarchy. They are unwilling to accept a

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[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid, p. 296.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.

lesser position while convinced that dominance would provide them with greater benefits and privileges. [19]

What then are the prospects for a peaceful transfer of foreign policy roles within international systems, according to Organski? While not ruling out the possibility of a peaceful transfer of control over the international system, Organski acknowledges that the paradigm he has created suggests that the likelihood of peaceful change is slim.

> In theory, those who dominate the existing international order could make way for a newcomer and welcome it to the top ranks, giving up some of their privileges in the process. In practice, such action is rare.[20]

Balance of Power Theory

In contrast to the Hegemonic Stability theory and the Power Transition theory, proponents of Balance of Power theory argue that stability of the international system and consequently, peace, is brought about when the central actors comprising the system have rough equivalence of power (either individually or as part of alliances). The balance of power has been championed as a theoretical concept and as a policy prescription by many notable political and scholarly figures. David Hume, British statesmen of the last three centuries, Hans Morganthau, and Henry Kissinger are a small sample of the many scholars and statesmen that have been advocates of this theory. Although there are many writings on the balance of power, the best known and those most relevant to this research work are those argued by Arnold Toynbee, Morton Kaplan and Kenneth Waltz.

Arnold Toynbee

Toynbee argued that in a system of two or more states, nations are likely to regulate changes in relative power through the adjustments of the balance of power

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[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid, p. 297.

process.[21] Nations whose relative positions have improved might take advantage of the situation. It becomes the responsibility of the other central actors in the system to discourage disruptive expansion through diplomacy and, if required, coalition warfare.[22] Since the diplomatic approach to maintaining a balance of power is usually not up to the task of preventing and containing expansion of a central actor which finds its power position increasing relative to the other actors in the system, war becomes the primary instrument in maintaining a balance of power among states.[23]

As the power of the central actors increase or diminish over time, the power balance established at an earlier time becomes out of sync with current political relationships. Tension within the international system increases as the gap between "reality" and "systemic operating priciples" increases.[24] In the end, a single state, usually a continental power attempts to dominate the international order.[25] The threat forces the other central states in the system to choose sides in what Toynbee describes as a struggle to maintain or overthrow the balance of power.[26]

Morton Kaplan

From Kaplan's perspective, states in the international system have exhibited the following behavior which can be set down as rules of the balance of power system[27]: 1) they seek to increase their capabilities, but prefer to negotiate than fight; 2) they fight

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21 Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History, Vol. 9*, Oxford University Press, London, UK, 1954, p. 234-60. See also George Modelski & William Thompson, "Long Cycles and Global War" in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *The Handbook of War Studies*, Unwin Hyman Press, Boston, Ma., 1989, p. 28.

22 Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History, Vol. 9*, Oxford University Press, London, UK, 1954, pp. 251-2.

23 Ibid, p. 252.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid, pp. 253 & 258.

26 Ibid, p. 253.

27 Morton A. Kaplan, "Some Problems of International Systems Research" in Vasquez, ed., *Classics of International Relations*, Prentice Hall, Inc.,

wars instead of failing to increase their capabilities; 3) they cease fighting instead of eliminating an "essential" actor; 4) they resist coalitions or single actors that tend to assume a position of predominance within the system; 5) they resist actors who advocate supranational organizational principles in the international system; 6) they allow defeated essential actors to re-enter the system, or act to bring a *"previously inessential actor within the essential actor classification"*; and 7) they treat all essential actors as potential partners.

Kaplan argues that there are factors that can upset the balance of power system. These are: 1) an actor pursues hegemony; 2) power and capability changes that increase the initial differences between the capabilities of essential actors; 3) difficulties to the mechanism of the balancing process (e.g., an international system that prevents fluid realignment of actors into coalitions); 4) Information failure that prevent an essential actor from protecting its own international position; and 5) conflicts arising from the pursuit of the differnt policy prescriptions of the different rules mentioned above.[28]

Examples of this "balancing" behavior and adherence to the balancing principles listed above are found throughout world history, Kaplan argues. Had Napoleon not made a bid for hegemony of Europe the other European states would have accepted Napoleonic France into the central system. Following Napoleon's defeat, the central states restored the Bourbons and ensured that France was not eliminated as an "essential" actor in the international system. Kaplan points out the pursuit of increased capabilities through the negotiation process, is best illustrated by the activities of the Congress of Vienna and the eventual existence of the Concert of Europe. Finally, Kaplan writes, the

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Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1986, p. 286. Also see Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics*, Wiley Press, New York, NY, 1964.

[28] Morton A. Kaplan, "Some Problems of International Systems Research" in Vasquez, ed., *Classics of International Relations*, Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1986, p. 288.

use of force instead of failing to increase capabilities is illustrated by diplomatic and military history of the 18th and 19th centuries.[29]

Kenneth Waltz

For Waltz, balance of power theory:

> properly stated, begins with assumptions about states: They are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination. States, or those who act for them, try in more or less sensible ways to use the means available in order to acheive the ends in view. Those means fall into two categories: internal efforts (moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, to develop clever strategies) and external efforts (moves to strengthen and enlarge one's own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposing one)...To the assumptions of the theory we then add the conditions for its operation: that two or more states co-exist in a self-help system, one with no superior agent to come to the aid of states that may be weakening or to deny to any of them the use of whatever instrument they think will serve their purpose.[30]

He continues:

> The theory, then, is built up from the assumed motivations of states and the actions that correspond to them. It describes the constraints that arise from the system that those actions produce, and it indicates the expected outcome: namely, the formation of the balance of power. Balance of power theory is microtheory precisely in the economist's sense. The system, like a market in economics, is made by the actions and interactions of its units, and the theory is based on assumptions about their behavior.[31]

For Waltz, then, relative capabilities are the variables of the international system. When relative capabilities change, coalitional patterns and/or patterns of internal effort should be altered as well. Given the conditions for the system's operation (e.g., anarchy and self-help of the nation-states) Waltz concluded that in addition to individual states'

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[29] Ibid.

[30] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, McGraw Hill, Inc., Printed in the USA, 1979, p. 118.

[31] Ibid.

efforts to improve their capabilities, they will also seek to form coalitions which will stabilize into balances of power within the international system. Changes in relative power of nation-states, according to Waltz, either result in shifting coalitions and a renewed balance of power through new alliances, or result in war.

Theoretical implications of Balance of Power theories

In sum, what do the Balance of Power theorists have to say about the prospects for peaceful change in international systems? For Toynbee, the theoretical implications of the balance of power theory are similar to those of the Hegemonic Stability theory and the Power Transition theory—that is, that the increased power of a state rivalling the dominant state and their alliances disturbs the stability of the international system and inevitably ends in a systemic war. Similarly, Toynbee would argue that there is little likelihood of a peaceful transfer of influence, foreign policy role, and control over an international system.

By contrast, Kaplan's balance of power system offers opportunities for the central states in the international system to cooperate and negotiate with up-and-coming challengers. In his "rules of the balance of power", Kaplan explicitly points out that the central powers should welcome formerly "inessential" actors as "essential" actors when their capabilities merit such treatment. However, the remaining "balance of power rules" listed by Kaplan suggests that the welcoming of newly powerful states in the system is a difficult, if not impossible, task. He writes that the major powers should negotiate before they wage war with other major powers. States are also expected to fight rather than cease increasing in capabilities, and they are supposed to coalesce against any one state driving for hegemony. This leaves open the question of how a dominant state and its allies welcome a rapidly rising rival power into the group of "essential" actors while that state

may be increasing capabilities at the cost of the dominant state(s) capabilities and may also be pressing for hegemony over part of or the entire system.

For Waltz, a conscious (on the part of statesmen) peaceful transfer of power, control, or foreign policy roles within an interntional system is conceptually impossible. The increased capability of one nation-state would automatically lead to internal adjustments of the other actors and to shifts in alliances and alignments. In instances in which systemic war does not take place after a nation-state increases in capability, Waltz attributes the resulting peace to the workings of the balance of power mechanism. In instances in which systemic war does take place after a state enhances its capability, Waltz claims that the balance of power mechanism, for one reason or another, did not work. The smooth workings of the balance of power system, then, like the market in macro-economics, brings about a kind of peaceful transfer or adjustment of control over the international system.

Theories of accomodation

So far, with the exception of Kaplan's writings, the international relations theories covered, argue that when confronted with the rising power of a rival state, central states in an international system will seek to constrain or keep down the rival. Those theories that I have categorized as theories of accomodation argue that countering the increasing power of another state is not the only option available to nations. A number of schools of international relations theory argue this point. Of these, the "balance of threat" theory and international relations research emphasizing theories of conflict resolution are of interest here. The former, championed by Stephen Walt and layed out in his *The Origins of Alliances*, points out that when confronted by threat some states choose to "bandwagon" or ally with the threat instead of forming coalitions against it.

Balance of Threat

Walt argues that the concept of the balance of power is too one dimensional and too distorting in its claim that states ally in order to balance off the powers of others. Walt writes that "*states ally to balance against threats rather than against power alone.*"[32] The level of threat facing a state is a consequence not only of the distribution of power in an international system, but also of geographic proximity (neighboring states are more dangerous than distant ones), offensive capabilities, and the perceived intentions of other states.[33] Given these conditions, there are times when a nation-state might choose to accomodate a major power increasing in its capabilities instead of resisting it.

Glenn Snyder, commenting on Walt's work argues that balancing is the more common behavior of states because bandwagoning requires trusting in a powerful state's benevolence. However, states do join aggressors either to obtain part of the spoils or to deflect aggression away from themselves. States are most likely to do this if they are weak, if strong allies are not available for balancing, or if the powerful/threatening state is thought to be "appeasible".[34]

Along the same lines of reasoning, some theorists have argued that "appeasement", "bandwagoning" and "accomodation" may at times be the appropriate response to the increasing power of a rival. E.H. Carr wrote in the *Twenty Year Crisis* that:

> If the power relations of Europe in 1938 made it inevitable that Czechoslovakia should lose part of its territory and eventually her independence, it was preferable (quite apart from any question of justice or injustice) that this should

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[32] Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1987, p. 5.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Glenn Snyder,"Alliances, Balance and Stability" in *International Organizations*, Winter 1991, Vol. 45, Number One, p. 127.

> come about as the result of discussions round a table in Munich than as the result either of a war between the Great Powers or of a local war between Germany and Czechoslavakia.[35]

Theories of Negotiation and Bargaining

If, in our research of the prospects for peaceful change, we find that "appeasement" or "bandwagoning" are not satisfactory in explaining the motives of statesmen engineering a peaceful transfer of control over international systems by accomodating their adversary's demands, we are still left to ponder what did eventually motivate these statesmen. One possibility is that statesmen may accomodate their adversary's demands because they see joint benefit in the relationship with the other state, or see advancement of their own interests through cooperation with the other state. This cooperation, however, does not diminish each statesman's pursuit of his country's interests. This tension between the cooperation of two parties that at the same time pursue their own interests suggests that what we may have described here are the elements of a negotiation. I. William Zartman writes:

> On one hand, negotiators seek to increase common interests and expand cooperation in order to broaden the area of agreement to cover the item under dispute. On the other, each seeks to maximize his own interest and prevail in conflict, in order to make the agreement more valuable to himself. No matter what angle analysis takes, it cannot eliminate the basic tension between cooperation and conflict that provides the dynamic of negotiation.[36]

This suggests that statesmen can arrive at peaceful transfers through a determined process of negotiation and bargaining. We therefore must keep theories of negotiation in mind as we examine the prospects for peaceful change in international systems.

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[35] Michael Joseph Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, LA, 1986, p. 83.

[36] I. William Zartman, *The 50 % Solution*, Yale University Press, New Haven, Ct, 1983, p.9.

Elements of a negotiation process

Of these theories of negotiation and bargaining, the work of I. William Zartman, and Dean Pruitt are relevant to this undertaking. In *The 50 % Solution* Zartman writes that there are recognizable elements of a negotiating process. These are: (1) the mixed motive nature of the process[37] or a positive-sum gain as a possible outcome of the negotiation[38]; (2) the distinct values, interests or demands presented by the parties[39]; (3) negotiated outcomes of the exchange (which I take to mean an outcome arrived at short of unilateral decision by one of the parties)[40]; (4) evidence of mutual movement by parties to a dispute;[41] (5) imperfect knowledge and the controlled exchange of partial information;[42] and (6) the use of power to bring about the eventual outcome without resort to the use of violence.[43]

Notions of Justice and negotiating outcomes

Zartman argues that arriving at negotiated settlements requires understanding different notions of justice. If the two sides can arrive at an agreement on what is just or fair, they can often devise agreements on a wide range of different disputes. He writes:

> In any negotiating situation, each side believes that it represents the just solution , that the best outcome in a perfect world would be the adoption of its position, and that negotiation and compromise are necessary in the first place only because the forces of error, if not evil, have enough power to prevent true justice from being enacted.[44]

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37 Ibid, p. 10.
38 Ibid, p. 7.
39 Ibid
40 Ibid, p. 8
41 Ibid, pp. 13-4
42 Ibid, p. 15
43 Ibid, p. 38.
44 Ibid.

Understanding how parties to a dispute conceive of justice or fairness is important to understanding how parties move from the attitude described above, to an outcome satisfactory to both sides. As a start, Zartman lists different definitions of justice. These are: substantive or partial justice; procedural or impartial justice; distributive justice; and Thrasymachean justice.

Substantive or partial justice essentially defines fairness as an outcome favoring one party's interests over the other.[45] One side is right and therefore deserves the entire outcome. This definition of justice describes a zero-sum gain situation between two parties in a dispute. One party's gain is another's loss and hence, justice is brought about by digging in and defending one's interest, values, or negotiating offer to the other party, as fair.

Procedural or impartial justice is the justice of the concilliator. It is justice that recognizes the claims of both sides to a dispute.[46] Zartman writes that "if substantive justice says one side, or each, is right and therefore deserves the entire outcome, procedural justice—recognizing the claims of both sides—says that the just solution lies in the middle."[47]

The distributive notion of justice suggests that outcomes should be split, but not equally.[48] Outcomes should be split according to need. Zartman writes that distributive justice is "*antithetical to both partial and impartial justice, and its outome is not as immediately obvious as the other two...Since need is vulnerability and weakness, it is the strategy of the weak, and seeks to use weakness as the basis for power.*"[49]

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[45] Ibid, p. 39.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid, p. 40.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid, p. 41.

Finally, Thrasymachean definitions of justice can be summarized as justice recognizing the needs and claims of the stronger. The outcome should be split, according to this definition of justice, *"neither equally nor by need, but according to the parties ability to do without or according to their fallback position, or in other words according to their power."*[50]

I would add one more definition of justice—contributive justice. By this definition, "you get what you put in". If you contribute a certain input, you legitimately deserve a given share of the outcome as a consequence of your contribution.

Integrative negotiations

Understanding if accomodation between two disputing parties resulted from a negotiated process through an arrival at some common definition of justice is important to our understanding of peaceful transfers of foreign policy roles. It suggests a path by which two nation-states can pursue their interests (preservation of the state, assuming a certain degree of status in the international order, gaining access to markets, or expanding territorial acquisitions) but make concessions to the other party in order to preserve their relationship, maintain order and stability in the international system, or jointly manage an international order.

In examining the methods by which two parties can arrive at negotiated outcomes satisfactory to both, theories of integrative bargaining are worth exploring. An agreement is *"said to be integrative to the extent that it reconciles the parties' interests and thus provides high benefit to both of them".*[51] In his *Negotiation Behavior*, Dean Pruitt has written that there are a number of integrative bargaining techniques available to

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50 Ibid.

51 Dean Pruitt, *Negotiation Behavior*, Academic Press, New York, NY, 1981, p. 139.

negotiators. Of these techniques, the most notable are[52]: (1) agreements that reduce the cost to the adversary; (2) agreements that compensate an adversary for his/her concessions; (3) logrolling agreements or an agreement whereby one party concedes on issues A,B, and C, while the other concedes on issues D,E, and F; and (4) bridging agreements or a negotiated agreement arrived at through the creation of a new option or formula that satisfies both parties' most significant needs.

Summary of theories of accomodation

The "balance of threat" theories, then, suggest that peaceful transfer of control over international systems is possible if the dominant state "appeases" or "bandwagons" with the up-and-coming rising challenger. This appeasement should take place under certain ideal conditions having to do with the geographic proximity of the challenging state, the offensive capabilities of the newly emerging actor, and the perceived intentions of the new power. Negotiation theory suggests that two states can accomodate each others' interests if they arrive at agreed upon definitions of justice and formulas of agreement. They can also arrive at a negotiated outcome that serves both their interests and needs. Arriving at that outcome requires the use of certain negotiating procedures and formulae—known as integrative negotiations— that assists the two parties in: reducing the costs of concession, making trade offs, and creating formulas that redefine the pay offs of the outcome of the dispute.

Power Cycle Theory

Four of the above theories of international relations have one concept in common. That is, the concept that structure determines systemic stability and the emphasis on static structural conditions as the causes of peace or war (and hence on the prospects for

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[52] Ibid, pp. 142-158.

peaceful change). The hegemonic stability theory and the Power Transition theory, for example, posited that peace and order came about through one ideal international structure—a strong hegemon presiding over weaker international actors. The balance of power theorists argue that peace and stability was possible only when there existed a general equivalence of power among the central states. "Balance of threat" theorists contend that peace and stability in the international system comes about when nation-states accomodate, appease and jump on the bandwagon with increasingly powerful states under certain ideal conditions in the international system.

Charles Doran's Power Cycle theory and his theory of peaceful structural change argue against the idea that ideal systemic structures lead to stability and "abnormal" structures lead to war.[53] He points out that systems of varying composition have led to peace and war. For example, the well known Singer and Small "Correlates of War" project showed that concentrations of power correlated with war in the 19th century, but low concentrations of power correlated with war in the 20th century.[54] War erupted in 1914 when the Great Powers were evenly matched, and war erupted in the 1800s when Great Britain supposedly had firm control over the international system.

Doran argues that international systems of varying composition are all stable at maturity.[55] How does Doran define maturity and stability? He writes that systemic structure and stability (maturity) are understood in the context of the long-term and continuous evolution of international systems resulting from changes in the various state cycles of power and associated roles.[56] Nation-states typically go through a cycle of rise, maturation, and decline. This cycle is measured in terms of economic or industrial

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[53] Charles Doran, "Power cycle Theory of System Structure and Stability: Commonalities and Complementarities" in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies*, Unwin Hyman, Boston, Ma., 1989, p. 95.
[54] Ibid, p. 96.
[55] Ibid, p. 95.
[56] Ibid, p. 83.

capabilities, the size of population, size of armed forces and other indices of material power.[57] The position of a nation-state on its cycle of power evolves as a consequence of technological change, population increases or decreases, organizational changes within societies, increased access to resources and the increased/decreased power of another state in the international system.[58]

It is not fruitful, therefore, to look at the balance of power as the mechanism that brings about systemic stability because the balance is a short term mechanism to keep all central actors in check, and ignores the idea that the interests and responsibilities of states might change after the relative capabilities of the states in the system have changed significantly.[59] Doran denies the existence of hegemonic control over international systems. He argues that even the most powerful dominant state requires cooperation and assistance from the other powerful states in the system.[60] Stability, then, for Doran is arrived at through joint systemic management of the international order's most powerful central actors, who not only have the power but are given (by other powerful actors in the system) the appropriate responsibilities (roles) to manage the system as a whole.

> Whether systems transformation is peaceful is a direct result of how it is managed by the leading states...Those older members of the system in decline must cede some of their status and responsibilities to the newly ascendant state. Adjustment within the composition and status-ordering of the central system will tend to reduce tensions between the new and old members. Interests and responsibilities can shift without sacrificing the security of individual members...[61]

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[57] Charles Doran, *Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century's End*, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 1991, pp. 44-58.

[58] Ibid, chapters 3 & 4.

[59] Ibid, pp. 123-5, 168-9.

[60] Charles Doran, "Power Cycle Theory of System Structure and Stability: Commonalities and Complementarities" in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies*, Unwin Hyman, Boston, Ma., 1989, p. 94.

[61] Charles Doran, *Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century's End*, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 1991, p. 179.

Doran's theory posits that stability or equilibrium in the international system comes about when a state's relative power is in equilibrium with the role assigned to that nation by the other states in the system. This is the characteristic of a mature international system. This theoretical insight suggests that we must explore if the role-power equilibrium is a contributing factor to successful peaceful change or peaceful transfers of foreign policy role in international systems.

Doran's theory posits that the greatest likelihood for major war exists when nation-states, passing through their cycles of relative power, arrive at "critical points". That is, the general direction a nation-state is heading in (rapid power growth, gradual decline) abruptly changes due to the factors mentioned above (e.g., the quicker relative growth of a rival state, technological change, etc.). Doran argues that arrival at these "critical points" contribute to instability, and increases the likelihood of conflict because the strategic and foreign policy plans formulated by the nation-state are suddenly irrelevant or based on erroneous assumptions of the relative capabilities of all the central actors.

Empirically, Doran supports his theory by examining the power cycle curves of the central actors prior to the major conflicts of the Twentieth Century. He notes that five of the central actors of the international system (Great Britain, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary and France) went through "critical points" in the decade before the Great War. He notes that in this time frame, the United States and Japan also entered the central system as youthful and powerful states, causing some degree of uncertainty and instability in the system. From Doran's theory, then, we must examine if the absence of so-called "critical points" during the interaction of dominant and rival states, contributes to systemic stability and hence improves the prospects for peaceful change and the peaceful transfer of control of international systems.

Doran has written that there tends to be a lag between the time the relative power of nations increase or decrease and the time the international system increases or decreases the roles of the actors in the system—a concept known as "slippage".[62] A declining power tends to cling to its dominant role within the international system, denying the legitimate rising power its role within the system. The longer the system takes to adjust the roles of its component units—the greater the disequilibrium over time. In short, it is possible for the declining major power to have waited too long to constructively manage a peaceful transformation.

> Hence the time to do something about disequilibrium is when the first structural flaws appear, not when the structure of the system is near collapse under the additional weight of fear and divergent understanding accompanying critical change.[63]

This raises the issue of timing. It seems reasonable to presume that there is an optimal time for the dominant or leading state to begin transferring foreign policy roles to the up-and-coming rival, and there are sub-optimal times for such transfers to take place. Intuitively, it would seem to make sense that the earlier a peaceful transfer of foreign policy role between dominant state and rising challenger takes place, the better. But this requires empirical examination.

Doran has written that in addressing the inconsistency of an ascending state's role in the international system with its relative power, the dominant state or states often choose to contain the rising state with a coalition or an alliance. In essence, Doran is arguing that the use of the balance of power as a mechanism to constrain a newly emerging power might actually contribute to instability and disorder because it worsens the role-power mismatch.

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[62] Ibid, p. 102.
[63] Ibid, p. 172.

> By attempting to balance or halt incipient structural decline, the balance of power worsens the eventual outcome of structural change by creating a false atmosphere of apparent power equality and apparent equilibration. The architects of the classical balance (prior to World War I) confused by type of power change occurring in the system, overlooked an even more fundamental rule of international politics: rising power (of a long-term incremental sort) cannot be offset, and such declining power cannot be bolstered. To try either of these futile exercises is to worsen the condition of international politics.[64]

We must inquire whether the absence of a balance of power mechanism in the central system, or a distortion of the mechanism, as conceived by balance of power theorists, would facilitate a peaceful transfer of power from one dominant nation-state to another.

Finally, Doran argues that the relative capabilities of all central actors in the international system impacts stability and equilibrium.

> Although the most central interaction or "dominant game" is that between a dominant state and its rival (or rivals), it is only within the more general and encompassing framework of the full power cycle dynamic that this central interaction can be fully comprehended. The extent of the threat—and hence, equilibrium—depends as much on the positions of the other members of the system on their own respective power cycles in addition to the entrance and exit of states to and from that subsystem.[65]

In examining the prospects for conflict and for stability, it is unhelpful therefore to concentrate only on (1) a dominant state and a challenger rapidly approaching equivalence in power to the dominant state (Organski's thesis); (2) the specific characteristics of the relationship between two states to determine if the situation is ripe for appeasement and bandwagoning (Walt's theory); and (3) the declining capabilities of one dominant power or hegemon (hegemonic stability theory). This implies that while this dissertation concentrates on the prospects for the transfer of control of international systems between

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64 Ibid, p. 150.

two major powers, Doran's theory would suggest examining the roles and impact of the rising and declining capabilities of third, fourth or even fifth parties to the international system.

Testing theories

The prospects for peaceful change in international systems, the conditions and practical policies necessary for bringing about such change, depend on which theory of international relations one adheres to. It is necessary to examine instances in history in which peaceful transfers of power have occurred, and to test the hypotheses of these theories against specific case studies.

As mentioned in chapter one, this dissertation will look at Great Britain's 19th and early twentieth century relationships with the United States, Imperial Germany and Imperial Japan. It will also examine the Chou Empire's relationship with its former vassal states after its military collapse. If we can show that a peaceful transfer of control over international systems did take place in the cases of Great Britain's growing rapprochement and cooperation with the United States, or the Chou dynasty's continued joint management of the inter-state order with its vassal states, this counters the arguments of the Hegemonic Stability Theorists, the Power Transition advocates, and some Balance of Power theorists (e.g., Toynbee) who contend that the phenomenon of peaceful transfers of control and power in international system cannot exist.

Furthermore, we can inquire whether the existence of a balance of power mechanism explained the process through which a peaceful transfer of foreign policy role took place. If we follow Kaplan's definition of a balance of power, we can inquire whether the transfer took place because the dominant state and its allies welcomed the rising power into the "essential" actors club, negotiated instead of waged war, ensured

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[65] Charles Doran, "Power cycle Theory of System Structure and Stability: Commonalities and Complementarities" in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook*

that the power of the dominant states continued to increase, and made certain that the rising power did not pursue hegemony in the system. If we follow Waltz's definition of a balance of power, we can ask if the peaceful transfer of foreign policy role was simply the matter of a realignment of coalitions to match changing power realities?

In testing for the theories of accomodation, we can ask if the dominant state or states eventually appeased the up-and-coming rival. If it is found that the dominant state had no intention of appeasing or "bandwagoning" with the up-and-coming rival, we can ask if the motivations of the statesmen involved acheiving outcomes beneficial to both dominant state and rising challenger through a determined process of negotiation and bargaining? Is the gradual evolution of cooperation between dominant state and challenger characterized by agreement on definitions of justice, and integrative negotiations? .

Finally, to test the hypotheses of the Power Cycle, we can examine if the peaceful transfer of control over the international system took place through the gradual adjustment of roles of the actors in the system; if the absence or the distortion of the balance of power system assisted the peaceful transfer of foreign policy role within the system; if the absence of "critical points" at the time of transfer contributed to peaceful change; if the early cooperation between dominant state and its challenger(s) helped bring about a peaceful transfer of foreign policy role; and if the rising and declining capabilities of third, fourth or even fifth parties played a part in the peaceful transfer.

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of War Studies, Unwin Hyman, Boston, Ma., 1989, p. 107.

3. Japan and Great Britain, 1868-1933

Background

Between the opening of Japan by Commodore Perry in 1854 and the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), Japan undertook a systematic reform of its political, economic and military institutions. These reform initiatives picked up momentum and were institutionalized in Japan with the enthronement of the Meiji Emperor in 1868. The most significant of these reforms were: the establishment of a constitution; the formation of a two house diet; and the reorganization of the Japanese military, modelled after the Prussian Army.

By as early as 1874, the Japanese had modernized their military system enough to make punitive expeditions to other parts of Asia. In that year, Japan sent a military force to Taiwan on the pretext of avenging the death of Japanese sailors killed by Taiwanese. Following this expedition, Japan assumed a protective role over Taiwan and established "the beginnings of a legal foothold in these strategic islands."[1] By 1876, the Japanese had modernized their navy sufficiently to send warships to the Korean island of Kanghwa in order to force the Korean court to sign a treaty permitting Japanese diplomatic, consular, and commercial ties with the Hermit Kingdom.[2]

By the mid-1880s, Japan's economic and commercial capabilities had improved to the point that Japan was then buying modern weaponry from the West; Japan was laying down thousands of miles of railroad track connecting some of Japan's most remote provinces with rapidly expanding urban areas; Japan was acquiring economic interests in the Mainland of China to provide raw materials for its rapidly expanding steel production

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[1] James Thomson, Peter Stanley & John Perry, *Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia*, Harper & Row publishers, New York, NY, 1981, p. 135.
[2] Ibid.

and shipbuilding; and Japan also had growing trade and investment relationships with all of the major powers of Europe.

Japan from the perspective of the Major Powers

Through the first half of the Meiji era (1868 to 1890), Great Britain and the other major powers of the international system viewed Japan as an up-and-coming nation acquiring the attributes and machinery of western progress.[3] The British in particular took note of the evolution of Japan's foreign policy making and its adjustment to modern diplomacy.[4] At the same time, during this period the major powers did not see Japan as a central actor to the international system, and still believed Japanese political institutions and civilization were inferior to those of the West. In the end the Western Powers saw Japan as a nation with great potential, but a nation requiring further tutelage in the affairs of civilized states.

The Japanese View of the Major Powers

Japan had mixed feelings about the Western powers making up the central system. Since 1868, Japan had viewed the United Kingdom with suspicion. As the dominant maritime power, and with the United States recognized as a close second, it was the only European power truly capable of directly threatening Japan.[5] At the same time, Japan believed that it could not afford to be enemies with Great Britain. The Japanese *did* notice in the 1870s and 1880s, that the British were primarily responsible for preventing the

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[3] Ian Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907*, Athlone Press, London, UK, 1966, p. 2.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid, p. 7.

other major powers from carving up China, and noted that the British had encouraged growth and stability in China.[6]

By the end of the 19th century, the Japanese need for British friendship was made more urgent as Russia's influence and interferrence in East Asia was increasing. Russian eastward expansion had accelerated (1857-1861) through the efforts of Nikolai Nikolaevich Muraviev, the governor-general of east Siberia. Muraviev had established outposts in Vladivostok and settlements on the Amur river.[7] Eventually, the governor-general's wide-ranging ambitions for greater colonization of the Russian Far East were not fullfilled because he needed more land and sea transport from European Russia to do so. This problem appeared to be removed in 1887 when the Tsar decided to proceed with the construction of a Trans-Siberian railway. By 1891, the construction of the railway had begun. The Japanese recognized that the Russians now had an opportunity to increase the rate of colonization and bolster their military capabilities in the Far East.[8]

Prelude to modern Japan's wars

In the decade before the Sino-Japanese war, Japan had sought to establish its special rights on the Korean Peninsula. Here, Japan saw its economic interests served by access to Korean raw materials. Japan's Korea policy was also vital because control over Korea by any other major power put Japan's security in the hands of that power. Japanese efforts to make inroads into Korea, however, came into direct conflict with traditional Chinese interests on the Peninsula. The Chinese had for centuries seen themselves as having special interests in Korea. China considered Korea as one of its tributary states—for Korean kingdoms had, for centuries, payed tribute to China's emperors. As a result of this rivalry, tensions between Japan and China increased in the

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[6] Ibid, p. 15.
[7] Ibid.

1880s and the two were on the brink of war in 1885. Somehow the two nations averted war when they signed the Treaty of Tientsin calling for China and Japan to withdraw their military forces from Korea, and to inform each other if either needed to send forces to Korea to handle disturbances.[9]

At the same time, the increased influence of Russia in Asia had become a major concern for Japanese statesmen. These concerns increased in intensity when the Russians made efforts in the mid-1880s to acquire ports and naval bases from the Korean court. In 1885, as the Japanese and Chinese maneuvered for influence in Korea, the Korean king asked Russia to help Korea resist the pressure from China and Japan. Russia agreed to protect Korea, and rumors circulated that Russia demanded in return an ice-free port in southern Korea for her far eastern squadron. The rumor was believable enough that Great Britain, in order to prevent Russian incursions into Korea, sent a naval sqadron to occupy Port Hamilton (an island off southern Korea) on 15 April 1885.

For the Japanese, these incidents were revealing. On the one hand, they were unhappy that the British occupied Port Hamilton. On the other, the British action to prevent Russian interferrence in Korean affairs convinced the Japanese that British interests in Asia were more likely to coincide with their interests than Russian interests were. These events also illustrated to the Japanese that their ambitions for greater influence and involvement in Korea were likely to be blocked by both Russia and China.

The Sino-Japanese War and the Three Power Intervention

The problems and tensions mentioned above, were the foundations leading to war between China and Japan in 1894. For the purposes of this dissertation, we need not go into detail of the military conflict, but it should be noted that Japanese military

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[8] Ibid.

modernization was successful enough to defeat China. On April 1, 1895, Japan presented China with its terms: Japan demanded the territories of Formosa, the Pescadores and most of the peninsular part of Liaotung together with an indemnity of 200 million taels (30 million pounds).

At this point, Russia approached Great Britain, France and Germany in order to offer "friendly advice" to Japan. The friendly advice was meant to convey the point that Japan's acquisition of Port Arthur would be considered an obstacle to the maintenance of good relations between China and Japan, and would be a permananent menace to peace in the far east.[10] Great Britain refused to take part in the protest, but Germany and France agreed to issue a joint protest with Russia. On 23 April 1895, the diplomatic representatives of Germany, France and Russia presented a formal note to Hayashi Tadasu, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, advising Japan to return the Liaotung territory to China. To add credibility to their warning, the Russians put their squadrons in their ports closest to Japan on alert.

In response, Japan first sought to divide the three continental powers. When this failed, they tried to get Russia to change its atttitude, but this also failed. The Russians also warned the Japanese that rejecting Russia's advice was an extremely dangerous path to follow.[11] Next, the Japanese sought assistance from Great Britain, Italy and the United States. All three powers wanted no part in opposing a united Russia, Germany and France. At an Imperial Council on 29 April 1895, the Japanese decided to offer to abandon the whole of the Liaotung Peninsula, except Kinchow, one of the seven districts which she originally demanded but one which also included Dairen (Talienawan) and Port

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[9] Ian Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907*, the Athlone Press, London, UK, 1966, p. 16.
[10] Ibid, p. 29.
[11] Ibid, pp. 29-30.

Arthur.[12] The three powers also rejected this offer. Finally on 4 May, 1895 the Japanese permanently renounced the Peninsula provided China ratified the treaty of Shimonoseki and agreed to pay an indemnity.[13] By early 1896, Japanese forces had completely withdrawn from Korea.

The First Anglo-Japanese Alliance

The "Three Power Intervention" had had a profound effect on Japanese statesmen and citizens. Japan went from elation over its successful war with China, to humiliation at the hands of three powerful western powers. As Ian Nish has written, the Japanese "*felt themselves to be deprived of the spoils of their victory and to be the victim of conspiracy between the diplomats of China and Europe.*"[14] At this point, they wanted revenge against the Russians. They focused on building their navy and armies. They layed out elaborate ten year shipbuilding plans, and expanded military budgets. Most importantly, Japan sought a formal alliance with Great Britain to prevent Russia and other European powers from coalescing to contain Japan.

Japanese anxiety over Russia was heightened in 1901 when Russia pressured the Chinese government to agree to a Russian protectorate in Manchuira. Japan sought the assistance of the other Western powers to protest Russian incursions into China. The Germans offered lukewarm support to oppose Russian moves into China. France had already signed a neutrality agreement with Russia, or promised French assistance to Russia should Russia be embroiled in war with two other powers. Great Britain was reluctant to step in and voice opposition to Russia, but at this time, Lord Lansdowne and the British Cabinet also noted that the only country willing to stand up to the Russians over Manchuria or Korea were the Japanese.

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[12] Ibid, p. 34.
[13] Ibid.

For its part, Great Britain was also concerned with the growing influence of Russia in the Far and Near East. Joseph Chamberlain wrote in September 1900 :

> I believe that [Russia] will ultimately secure North China and that the 'Open Door' will be a mere name as far as this part of the Chinese Empire is concerned. It is certain that we are not strong enough by ourselves to prevent her from accomplishing such an annexation.[15]

On 31 July 1901, Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign Minister, spoke with Ambassador Hayashi and asked the Ambassador what policies the two sides should pursue "*supposing the balance of power in the waters of the Far East to be threatened with serious disturbances.*"[16] Lansdowne worried about Russian expansion in Manchuria, by the increasing Russian influence in Peking, and by the realization that France and Russia could dominate maritime East Asia through their recent agreement.[17]

On 4 September 1901, the First Sea Lord, Lord Selborne, made known the Admiralty's views on the Far East question. He wrote that the Royal Navy could not uphold the two power standard[18] if the United States were to use all of its resources, or if there was a possible British war against France in alliance with Russia.[19] He said that in calculating the value of a Japanese alliance, Japanese naval power in the Far East would allow the Royal Navy to keep its squadron strength in the Far East at a minimum, permitting the overall protection of the empire.[20] The First Sea Lord projected that in a few months time, the Royal Navy would have four first class battleships and twenty

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[14] Ibid, p. 35.
[15] Ibid, p. 92; G.W. Monger, *The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy*, 1900-1901, p. 15.
[16] Foreign Office Japan 563, Lansdowne to Whitehead, 31 July 1901 as appears in Ian Nish, *Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907*, The Athlone Press, London, UK, 1966, pp. 156-7.
[17] Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907*, the Athlone Press, London, UK, 1966, p. 157.
[18] The two power standard was Great Britain's defense policy of ensuring that British naval strength be capable of handling the next two strongest navies in the world.
[19] Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907*, the Athlone Press, London, UK, 1966, p. 174.

cruisers. This force would possibly be opposed by a combined French and Russian fleet of seven first class and two second class battleships and twenty cruisers.[21] Lord Selborne pointed out that these odds would be too great for the Royal Navy unless Great Britain had a Japanese alliance. In 1902, the two seapowers possessed a total of eleven battleships as well as more cruisers than a combined Russian and French fleet.[22]

As a consequence, the First Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty was signed on 30 January, 1902. That the alliance was an attempt to maintain the balance of power in the Far East is demonstrated by the language of the Treaty itself.

> Article I
>
> If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defence of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to *prevent* other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.
>
> Article II
>
> If in the above event any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against the ally, the other High Contracting Party will come to its assistance and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

The Russo-Japanese War

The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 served Japan's purposes. Due to Japan's alliance with Great Britain, Japan's military conflict with Russia from 1904 to 1905 involved none of those countries previously sympathetic to Russian designs in Asia. The

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[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Also see Foreign Office Japan 547, Memorandum by Lord Selborne, "British Naval Policy in the Far East", 4 September, 1901 as appears in Ibid.

alliance effectively kept out France and Germany from the conflict.[23] Within a week of the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Russia asked France and Germany to join her in making a counter-declaration reserving the right to deal with this new alliance in a way that would safeguard their interests. France agreed to enter into an agreement with Russia, but refused to apply these obligations to the Far East. Germany refused to agree to enter any agreement at all. As a consequence of the Russian diplomatic maneuver the weakness of the Franco-Russian agreement was exposed, and with Germany maintaining neutrality, Japan was assured that its flank was protected in a war against Russia.

As was the case with the Sino-Japanese War, we need not go into great detail over the Russo-Japanese War. Less than a year after the war's initiation, Japanese forces had annihilated Russian troops in Mukden and at Port Arthur, and the Japanese Navy had devastated the Russian Imperial Navy at the Straits of Tsushima. Of greater significance was the aftermath of the war. As part of the terms ending the war, Japan got southern Sakhalin, the Liaotung Peninsula, control of the South Manchurian Railway, and the dominant position in Korea.[24]

For the Japanese, the defeat of Russia and the acquisition of further territory, following just a decade after the defeat of China, had a significant psychological impact. From that point on, Japan was considered a regional power and most of the central actors of the international system considered Japan to have entered the central system. Japan's status had been elevated for a number of reasons. First, it had engaged in and defeated one of the members of the central system—Russia. Second, as Michael Howard points out international security relations at this time was in an uncertain state as the major powers assessed the significance of the new technologies of war (e.g., the machine gun,

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[23] Bradford Perkins, *The Great Rapprochement, England and the United States, 1895-1914*, published in London, UK, Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1968, p. 218.
[24] James Thomson, Peter Stanley & John Perry, *Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia*, Harper & Row publishers, New York, NY, 1981, p. 140.

the trench, the torpedo, barbed wire, and the smokeless powder).[25] The eyes of Europe were focused on the lessons to be drawn from the battlefields of Manchuria, for it was in Northeast Asia that some of these new technologies of war were being utilized for the first time. The conclusions being drawn throughout Europe was that the new technologies favored the defensive, but that these technologies could be overcome by the raw courage of the soldiers in the field and the willingness of governments to take heavy casualties—two characteristics the European powers immediately associated with Japan and its military. General A.N. Kuropatkin, the commander of the Russian forces in Manchuria said as much after the war. In his memoirs he wrote that "*in the late war...our moral strength was less than that of the Japanese; and it was this inferiority, rather than mistakes in generalship, that caused our defeats....The lack of martial spirit, of moral exaltation, and of heroic impulse, affected particularly our stubborness in battle. In many cases we did not have sufficient resolution to conquer such antagonists as the Japanese.*"[26]

Sir Ian Hamilton wrote:

> [I]t should cause European statesmen some anxiety when their people seem to forget that there are millions outside the charmed circle of Western Civilisation who are ready to pluck the sceptre from nerveless hands so soon as the old spirit is allowed to degenerate...Providentially Japan is our ally...England has time, therefore—time to put her military affairs in order; time to implant and cherish the military ideal in the hearts of her children; time to prepare for a disturbed and an anxious twentieth century..."[27]

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[25] Michael Howard, "Men Against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914" in Michael Howard, ed., *The Lessons of History*, Yale University Press, New Haven, Ct., 1991, pp. 107-10.

[26] General A.N. Kuropatkin, The Russian Army and the Japanese War (London: 1909) as appeared in Michael Howard, "Men Against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914" in Michael Howard, ed., *The Lessons of History*, Yale University Press, New Haven, Ct., 1991, p. 109.

[27] Ibid, pp. 109-10.

The Russo-Japanese war had a significant effect on the Japanese and their self-perception. The victories of the Sino- and Russo- Japanese wars convinced the Japanese that war benefited those prepared to be the victor. Just thirty years after their quest for modernization, Japan had, through war, secured its borders and buffer zones and now had acquired the skeletal beginnings of an empire. It can even be argued that Japan acheived success too quickly and too easily. The Japanese acquired the appetite of a full-fledged imperial power before the other central powers were willing to recognize that Japan deserved that position.

The Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1905

Despite Russian military defeats at the hands of the Japanese, prior to the end of the Russo-Japanese war, the British still worried that the Russians might refocus their efforts against Afghanistan and pose a threat to Great Britain's India Colony. Similarly, the Japanese remained concerned that the Russians would seek revenge and over the course of time, seek French and German support in such a venture. As a consequence, the two island nations decided to renew their alliance commitments in 1905.

The Second Anglo-Japanese alliance, like the first alliance, reflected the two sides' concerns with the regional balance of power, and also reflected the two sides' efforts to get the other side to commit to action wholly beneficial to their specific strategic concerns. The British were all too aware that they lacked the military power (both in terms of the number of ships in the Royal Navy and in the number of ground forces that could be stationed in India) to provide an adequate defense of India. In a memorandum to the Cabinet, Lord Kitchener, then Viceroy of India estimated that he needed 158,700 men to defend the northwestern frontier against Russia. The Cabinet responded that Britain

could supply only 100,000. [28] As a consequence, the Cabinet decided to raise the issue with the Japanese when renegotiating the alliance, of Japan providing troops to defend India.[29] This decision to use Japan as a crutch appears in the revised Anglo-Japanese alliance in which Japan was asked implicitly to send troops to India in case of a Russian attack there.

Article IV

> Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.[30]

Article VII

> The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in circumstances mentioned in the Present Agreement and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the military and naval authorities of the Contracting Parties who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.[31]

At the same time, the Japanese got the British to commit to supporting Japan against one adversary instead of a coalition or alliance of adversaries.[32] This was primarily directed at

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[28] Ian Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907*, the Athlone Press, London, UK, 1966, p. 316.

[29] Balfour address to the House of Commons on 11 May 1905; British Parliamentary Debates, vol. 146, cols. 62-84; *The Times*, 12 May 1905 both found in Ian Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907*, Athlone Press, London, UK, 1966, p. 317; Bradford Perkins, *The Great Rapprochement, England and the United States, 1895-1914*, published in London, UK, Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1968, p. 230.

[30] Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907*, the Athlone Press, London, UK, 1966p. 332.

[31] Ibid, p. 333.

[32] Bradford Perkins, *The Great Rapprochement, England and the United States, 1895-1914*, published in London, UK, Victor Gollancz, Ltd., p. 230.

Russia, but an argument can be made that the Japanese were also attempting to establish a long-term defense mechanism to deal with an up-and-coming United States.[33]

Article VI

> ...Great Britain will continue to maintain strict neutrality unless some other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against Japan, in which case, Great Britain will come to the assistance of Japan and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with Japan.[34]

The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1905, like the alliance of 1902 should not be seen as a reflection of a deep, common bond between the two countries. There was little commercial activity between the two powers. Sir Ernest Satow reminded Edward Grey, the Prime Minister, that in dealing with Japan, Britain "*must not be under any illusion as to the alliance being of an economic advantage to us*".[35] The succeeding decades showed that Japan could not expand her trade without reducing British trade and investment activities. While British exports to China did not increase by value from 1890 to 1913, Japanese exports expanded almost thirteen-fold.[36] By 1914, Japanese trade with India had experienced a steep climb. Japan's shipping lines enjoyed rights to trade along Indian coasts, but British companies were not permitted to trade along the Japanese coasts.[37]

That the alliance reflected strategic necessity, and little love between the two countries is also reflected in the number of agreements and alliances entered into by both England and Japan with other powers after the Russo-Japanese war. England entered into an agreement with France, and now had an agreement with Russia (although it

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[33] Ibid, p. 230 and 235.
[34] Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907*, the Athlone Press, London, UK, 1966, p. 332.
[35] Foreign Office 800/43, Satow to Grey, 31 March 1906 as seen in Ian Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 10.
[36] Ian Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 10.

remained wary of Russia). Japan also entered into agreements with France and Russia establishing spheres of influence in East Asia. That the alliance represented strategic necessity and not a universal convergence of the two countries' interests in Asia is also reflected by the strains imposed upon the relationship by the two countries' diverging policies toward Korea.[38]

Korea, 1910

The Japanese had wanted to annex Korea since acquiring a foothold there after the Russo-Japanese war. Two factors impeded Japan from doing so: (1) world opinion was clearly against such an annexation; (2) Great Britain was not enamored of the idea because annexation would tarnish British as well as Japan's public image and annexation might endanger in Parliament a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Nonetheless, by 1909, the Japanese Cabinet decided to annex Korea. Japan held off informing Britain of Japan's plan to annex the Korean Peninsula. On 17 December 1909, Komura, the Japanese Foreign Minister gave MacDonald, the British diplomatic representative to Tokyo, ambiguous assurances that "*the government had not the slightest intention of departing from the line of policy they had decided upon, and I might rest assured that the status would be maintained in Corea, at any rate for some time to come.*"[39] On 18 February, 1910, Komura notified all of his overseas ambassadors of Japan's annexation plans, but apparently did not similarly inform the British government.[40]

On 19 May, Komura finally informed MacDonald of Japan's intentions to annex Korea. MacDonald vehemently argued that the time was not right for annexation. The

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[37] Ibid, p. 10.
[38] Bradford Perkins, *The Great Rapprochement, England and the United States, 1895-1914*, published in London, UK, Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1968, p. 229.
[39] Ian Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 33. Foreign Office 371/877 [2688] MacDonald to Grey, 17 December 1909.

Japanese negotiations over treaty revisions might receive a set back in Parliament. It was also a source of potential embarrassment for Great Britain. When asked to review the situation in the Far East by Sir Edward Grey, the Prime Minister, the Cabinet could think of no good reason to object to annexation besides enhanced commerical competition from the Japanese.[41] Convinced that the Japanese were fixed on annexing Korea, the British Foreign Secretary reported that "*we have accepted the principle of annexation of Corea by Japan...we are [however] asking that the present Corean tariff shall remain in force for ten years.*"[42]

The Third Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1911

By 1911, the British need for an alliance to prop up British interest in East Asia was paramount. This is most evident in the discussions on imperial defense at the 1911 Imperial Conference. After several days of discussion on defense of the British Empire, the Committee on Imperial Defence (C.I.D.) reported on 24 March 1911:

> So long as the Japanese Alliance remains operative not only is the risk of attack by Japan excluded from the category of reasonable possibilities to be provided against, but British naval requirements are held to be adequately met if the combined British and Japanese forces in the Pacific are superior to the forces in those waters maintained by any reasonably probable combination of naval Powers.[43]

Grey, after reviewing the CID report argued at the Imperial Conference that if the alliance was abandoned Great Britain:

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[40] Ian Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 34.
[41] Ibid, p. 34.
[42] G.P. Gooch & H.W. V. Temperley, eds. , *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, 1898-1914 as found in Ian Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 34.
[43] British Cabinet papers, 5/2/2/78C, 3 May 1911 as seen in Ian Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 61.

> would have to keep—if we are to secure the sea communications between the Far East and Europe, and also between the Far East and Australia and New Zealand—a separate fleet in Chinese waters...In the interests of strategy, in the interests of naval expenditure and in the interests of stability, it is essential that the Japanese Alliance should be extended.[44]

While the British Cabinet wholeheartedly supported a continuation of the alliance with the Japanese, changes in the strategic environment of Asia led British statesmen to the conclusion that the commitments layed out in the Alliance treaty, not draw Great Britain into conflict with as yet another rising power in the Far East—the United States. While Great Britain had entertained renewing the alliance with Japan, it was also negotiating the contents of an arbitration treaty with the United States covering a wide range of unresolved disputes between the two countries (see chapter five). The British Cabinet did not want to put at risk this arbitration treaty with the United States, and at the same time, wanted nothing in the Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty which might suggest that should the Japanese clash with the United States, Great Britain would be obligated to come to Japan's aid.

Sir Edward Grey had rejected previous Japanese drafts of the new treaty because they implied Britain might under certain circumstances be required to go to war with the United States. He wanted nothing in the treaty that suggested British involvement in hostilities against America. As a result, he suggested inserting a clause which specifically referred to Great Britain's intention to avoid conflict with the United States. The Japanese rejected this proposal because it implied that the alliance was being changed for the sake of the United States, and the Japanese did not want to convey this image. Still, the Japanese accepted British sensitivies to the possibility of getting drawn into a Japanese

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[44] British Cabinet Papers 2/2/2, C.I.D., 111th meeting 26 May 1911, as found in Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972 p. 62.

conflict with the United States. Ultimately a clause was inserted into the treaty that served as a compromise to all concerned.

Article IV

> Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.

As we can see from the above events, by 1911 it was already unclear who the Anglo-Japanese alliance was directed against. In 1902 and 1905, the enemy was clearly Russia. By 1911, the Russian threat had declined. From subsequent actions and statements by British officials, it is safe to say that the British saw the 1911 Anglo-Japanese alliance as a means to keep Japan well behaved and restrained in Asia, while maintaining stability in China. For the Japanese, the alliance was an indirect means of dealing with the potential threat posed by the United States. The Japanese also saw it as a means to make gains in China.

Within months of the signing of the third alliance treaty, however, the understanding between Great Britain and Japan was shaken. The Republican Revolution in China in 1911 changed the political environment and starting assumptions of the two allies. When the Qing dynasty was experiencing agitation and increasing pressure for the Emperor to step down in favor of the formation of a Chinese republic, the two countries promised to be neutral. Gradually however the Japanese favored the establishment of some kind of constitutional monarchy in China. The British on the other hand, wanted the Chinese to work out amongst themselves their own problems. The British, however, did assist the parties to negotiate their differences and to arrive at an armistice. As a result, the Japanese believed that the British had violated their promise by dealing openly

with the Southern Republicans.[45] This criticism became more poignant and bitter after the Qing Emperor abdicated, and a Chinese republic was declared in February 1912.

General tensions over the succession issue in China were followed by diverging China policies of the two countries. The Japanese sought to overthrow or move aside the new Chinese President Yuan Shih-Kai and place a constitutional monarch in his place. The British opposed these attempts and openly criticized Japan. In the commercial sphere, the two increasingly attempted to reassert their special rights in certain spheres in China—the British in the Yangtze valley, the Japanese in Manchuria. This led the two parties to exclude the other commercially from areas considered to be of special interest to that power, up to just prior to World War I.[46]

The Great War, 1914-1918

When England and Germany went to war in 1914, both countries wished to leave Japan out of the conflict. Great Britain had no desire for Japan to get the opportunity to expand further its holdings in Asia. This attitude was to change for the British as they came to realize that German naval assets in the Far East were capable of doing significant damage to British interests. The British Far East Squadron found itself at a disadvantage to the Germans in the summer of 1914, when the battleship *Triumph* was in Hong Kong for maintenance and repair.[47] The German cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, under Admiral Von Spee, captured a Russian auxilliary ship and several merchant ships, while the light cruiser Emden caused severe damage to South China Seas shipping.[48] As a consequence of these events in the summer of 1914, the Admiralty recognized that it

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[45] Ian Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 81.
[46] Ibid, p. 100-5.
[47] Ibid, p. 117.
[48] Ibid.

lacked the naval capability to blockade Tsingtao and police shipping lanes against German raiders.[49]

On 7 August, the Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain, Inouye, learned that the British government:

> would gladly avail themselves of proffered assistance of Japanese Government in the direction of protecting British trading vessels from German armed merchant cruisers...H.M. Ambassador in Tokio has been instructed to inform Japanese Government if they would be good enough to employ some of their warships in hunting out and destroying German armed merchantmen in China. British Government realize that such action on the part of Japan will constitute a declaration of war with Germany, but it is difficult to see how such a step is to be avoided.[50]

Within thirty six hours of the British request, Japan had decided to enter the war in support of her British ally. The Japanese Cabinet had grander schemes for Japanese involvement in the war than the British Government would have preferred. On 9 August 1914, Ambassador Greene was passed a note from Prime Minister Kato:

> Once a belligerant Power, Japan cannot restrict her action only to destruction of hostile armed merchant cruisers, but it will become necessary for her to resort to all and every possible means for attainment of the object common to the allied Powers as far as the Chinese waters are concerned, namely the destruction of the power of Germany to inflict damage upon the interests of Japan and Great Britain in Eastern Asia.[51]

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[49] Foreign Office, 371/2016 [36648] note by Alston, 5 August 1914 as found in ibid.

[50] Nihon gaiko bunsho (Japanese diplomatic documents) Taisho period (1912-25), as appeared in Ian Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 118.

[51] Nihon gaiko bunsho (Japanese diplomatic documents) Taisho period (1912-25), as appeared in Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 120.

After consulting with his Cabinet, Grey was convinced that his government had to reign Japanese ambitions and expansionist policies in. In just less than a decade and a half, Japanese foreign policy aims had changed from desiring a say in what transpired in Manchuria and recognition of special rights in Korea, to outright annexation of the Korean Peninsula, a foothold in Manchuria, and a foothold and possible future annexation of western Shantung and parts of the Yangtze Valley. Also within the range of possibilities that the British Cabinet had to think about was Japanese expansion to German holdings off the continent of Asia and into the western Pacific. On 10 August he told Kato that Great Britain believed that "*acts of war in the Far East will be restricted*" to the sea and that it was "*desirable to maintain this attitude as long as possible.*"[52] Kato responded that he was going to send an ultimatum to Germany demanding that Germany surrender Tsingtao to Japan, and that he hoped the British would issue a joint note with Japan to the Chinese government recommending Chinese reliance on Japan and Britain for protection.[53] Grey accepted Kato's offer to make a joint statement but also proposed that Japan not act beyond Asiatic waters "*westward of the China seas, or to any foreign territory except in German occupation on the Continent in Eastern Asia.*"[54]

The result of these exchanges was a slight souring of the Anglo-Japanese relationship. The Japanese were offended by the British Prime Minister's efforts to restrain Japanese actions in the Far East. The Japanese Cabinet refused to draft a joint statement supported by Grey, and so drafted an ultimatum the British would not accept.[55] The ultimatum was sent on 17 August 1914, and it demanded that Germany withdraw its

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[52] Foreign Office 371/2016 [37691], Grey to Greene, 10 August 1914.
[53] Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 121.
[54] Nihon Gaiko bunsho (Japanese diplomatic documents) Taisho period (1912-25), as appeared in Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 121.
[55] Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 122.

naval vessels from far eastern waters and to hand over the leased territory of Kiaochow to Japan for *"the eventual restoration to China"*.[56] It did not come close to Grey's insistence that Japan set geographical limitations on its operations.

Japan eventually issued a statement giving such promises, but not before the British unilaterally issued a statement saying that Japanese military operations would be geographically limited.

> It is understood that the action of Japan will not extend to the Pacific Ocean beyond the China Seas, except in so far as it may be necessary to protect Japanese shipping lines in the Pacific, nor beyond Asiatic waters westward of the China Seas, nor to any foreign territory except territory in German occupation on the Continent of Eastern Asia.[57]

This statement was issued without Japan's permission and as the historian Ian Nish points out, it did not accurately reflect Japanese intentions. Furthermore, Nish argues that although the Japanese did not protest, Ambassador Kato was angry at the announcement and the unilateral action of the British government. Kato also made the British government aware that he was willing to cancel the joint note to China.[58]

British concern over Japanese ambitions in Asia did not end with this initial outburst of diplomatic correspondence. As Japan planned to seize German held territory in China, the British grew concerned that the Japanese would either seize territory that was not then controlled by Germany, or not return German leased territory to China. The British government arranged to mount a joint military operation with Japan, but significantly tried to "multilateralize" the operation to include France and Russia. On 13 August, the British government suggested to the Japanese cabinet that the cooperation of

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[56] Nihon Gaiko bunsho (Japanese diplomatic documents) Taisho period (1912-25), as appeared in Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 122-3.
[57] Ibid, p. 124.

France and Russia should be involved in the Tsingtao operation.[59] The British argued that this would give the appearance of the complete participation of all the allies, and would avoid giving offense to the other members of the Entente which had troops available in the Far East.[60] This proposal shocked the Japanese and Kato refused to accept Russian and French participation in the Tsingtao operation.[61]

In the months that followed, Japanese actions in two areas raised the concern of British cabinet members. First, despite British participation in the joint military operation against Tsingtao, Japanese troops were also moving into Western Shantung. Second, in the first half of 1915, the Japanese presented the "Twenty One Demands" to President Yuan Shih-Kai. In some respects, it was important for Japan to reach an understanding with the Chinese government over administering Chinese territory capatured by Japan—Tsingtao had been captured in November 1914. However, the demands covered Japanese administration not only of Tsingtao, but of all of Shantung and part of the territory around the central Yangtse River.[62] The British were faced with the possibility of a Sino-Japanese war, but on May 9, 1915, China accepted these demands.

After the presentation of the "Twenty One Demands", Great Britain no longer had confidence in its ally. The historian Nish points out that the British increasingly compared Japan's actions with those of Germany in its invasion of Belgium.[63] Japan apparently was becoming disillusioned with Great Britain as well. On 3 July 1916, it entered into its fourth agreement with Russia. From Japan's perspective Great Britain was treating it poorly after all of its contributions to the alliance. Without any obligation to do so, the Japanese had entered the war on Great Britain's side. Eventually, the

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[58] Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 125.
[59] Ibid, p. 134.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Ibid, p. 153.

Japanese navy cooperated with the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean in 1917 and the use of Japanese squadrons to make up for the reduced Royal Navy presence in the Far East went well beyond the obligations of the alliance.[64] In the Spring of 1918, at the request of Great Britain, Japan sent troops to Siberia. Finally, Japan had throughout the war made supplies available to Russia, assisting that country's war efforts on the Eastern Front.[65]

Despite these contributions to the war effort, the British and also the Americans were convinced that the Japanese had not made as significant a contribution as the Japanese felt they were making. This was mostly due to the fact that the Japanese had refused to send troops to Europe to fight in the trenches. But it was also the result of the perception that Japan was taking advantage of the war to gobble up territory on Mainland China. By 1917, relations between Great Britain and Japan had declined to such an extent that Foreign Minister Balfour spoke of a maritime defense treaty with the United States to manage Japan in the post-war international order.

> The objection to it arises out of our existing treaty with Japan. It is quite true that there is no logical incompatibility between our actual Treaty with Japan and this suggested Treaty with America. Both are defensive. If Japan attacked America, we should certainly, if appealed to, come to America's assistance; while if America attacked Japan, we should be under no Treaty obligation to join in the attack.[66]

This sentiment is reflected in a letter later sent to President Wilson from Foreign Minister Balfour:

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[63] Ibid, p. 155.
[64] Ibid, p. 254.
[65] Ibid.
[66] CAB 23/3/174, Appendix, 'Future naval construction in the United States' as appeared in Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 217.

> The Cabinet were and are profoundly attracted by the idea of any defensive arrangement with the United States. They were clear that with or without a guarantee, popular opinion in this country would undoubtedly force us to go to the assistance of America if she were attacked by Japan.[67]

We have addressed some of the causes for Great Britain's concern over Japan, and consequently, British motivations to enlist the support of the United States to restrain the Japanese. Just as revealing is the British effort to use the United States to maintain the balance of power in East Asia, and more to the point, to prop up British interests in Asia by helping the British maintain that balance.

> The similarity of Anglo-American interests in and round the Pacific, and the growing divergence of Anglo-Japanese aims and outlook..., suggest the intensive cultivation of our friendship with America...I would not of course suggest any precipitate action, such as an abrupt denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which might merely convert Japan's calculating and doubtful friendship into active hostility, or even provoke a Japanese-German understanding...[however]...I cannot help thinking that the present hollow friendhip cannot be continued and must in due course be resolved into some relation at once less intimate and more genuine; and that we might well try to bring in America on our side to redress the balance in the Far East.[68]

For their part, the Japanese did not seem to miss the fact that international relations in the Far East had changed, with Great Britain slowly shifting its allegiance elsewhere. At this time, the Japanese also appear to have believed that the Far East was becoming the battleground for some kind of future imperialistic competition. Yamagata Aritomo, wrote in the summer of 1918:

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[67] Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 217.

[68] Foreign Office 371/3816 [206006], Greene to Langley, 30 August 1917 as seen in Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 220.

> If the war ends in a victory for the Allies, Great Britain can be expected to expand her interests from South Asia, making full use of the power she has developed in over one hundred years of monopolistic control...Whichever side wins, post-war Asia will be exposed either to the aggression of Germany and the United States, coming from east or west, or that of Great Britain and the U.S., from south and north; and Japan will have to face at least one of the two combinations.[69]

The Paris Peace Conference

Great Britain's relationship with Japan went from bad to worse following the end of the war and the convening of the Paris Peace Conference in 1918. Going into Versailles, the issues of crucial importance to the Japanese were: (1) German held Pacific islands, which the British had promised to the Japanese; (2) getting a racial harmony clause inserted into the Versailles Treaty; and (3) ensuring significant Japanese role in the control over Shantung province in China.[70] Unfortunately these were issues that were sore subjects both for the United States and Japan. The United States was opposed to Japanese aims and objectives in all three of the above issues. U.S. security of its holdings in the Philippines and Hawaii called for limiting Japanese possessions in the Pacific. U.S. domestic policy and a history of anti-immigration legislation aimed at the Far East suggested that the U.S. delegates would oppose any kind of racial equality language in the treaty. Finally, American statesmen and the general public long held the view that the Japanese were taking advantage of Chinese weakness to expand Japanese

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[69] Oayama Azusa, ed., Yamagata Iksnsho (Memoranda of Prince Yamagata), (Tokyo, 1966), pp. 374-5. As appeared in Hosoya Chihiro, "Britain and the United States in Japan's view of the International System, 1919-37" in Ian Nish, ed., *Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-52*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1982, p. 4.

[70] Hosoya Chihiro, "Britain and the United States in Japan's View of the International System, 1919-1937" , in Ian Nish, ed., *Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-1952*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1982, p. 3; Nish, Hosoya Chihiro, "Britain and the United States in Japan's View of the International System, 1919-1937" , in Ian Nish, ed., *Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-1952*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1982,, pp. 268-70.

control over the mainland. It was natural, then, that the U.S. delegation should favor limiting Japanese administration and control over Shantung.

Japan's only ally during these proceedings was Great Britain, but for reasons listed above, the British were reluctant to stand up to the very country that it saw as its possible future "crutch" in the Far East—the United States. The British were also senstive to the demands of the dominion states, Australia and New Zealand in particular, which advocated constraining Japanese capabilities. The eventual result was that the German held Pacific islands were not ceded to Japan, but were placed under a Japanese mandate.[71] Also extremely disappointing to the Japanese was the failure to insert a racial equality clause in the treaty. Finally, with regard to Japanese control over Shantung, the British managed to work out a compromise in which the Japanese were "*to hand back the Shantung Peninsula in full sovereignty of China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtao.*"[72] No time table was worked out, so Japan was in actuality handed these territories. On the other hand, the British (primarily Lord Curzon as acting Foreign Minister) let the Japanese know that they questioned the validity of the 1915 "Twenty One Demands" treaty. To the Japanese, Great Britain and the United States appeared to be presenting a united front to deprive Japan of its deserved spoils of war.[73]

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[71] Hosoya Chihiro, "Britain and the United States in Japan's View of the International System, 1919-1937" , in Ian Nish, ed., *Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-1952*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1982, p. 5.

[72] *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, 1919-39, I (vi), p. 565, as appeared in Ian Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 273.

[73] Nish, Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 273.

The post-war period

The Great War and the Paris Peace Conference were a great disappointment to the Japanese. By 1919 we find evidence of young Japanese leaders convinced that Great Britain and the United States were colluding to constrain Japan from attaining the status and international position she deserved. At this time, such leaders as Kone Fumimaro, Nakano Seigo, and Nagai Ryutaro—who eventually played prominant roles in Japan's conflict with the Western Powers—wrote such famous articles as Konoe's "Down with the Anglo-American peace principles".[74] On the other hand, more reasonable and practical statesmen such as Prime Minister Hara advocated playing the two powers—the United States and Great Britain—off each other to attain Japanese foreign policy goals. These goals were the attainment of the appropriate status, role and international position as the Far East's regional power. Hara wrote in 1919:

> In short, the world is now controlled by two powers, Britain and the United States. However, as far as the far east is concerned they cannot exclude Japan. Whether we side with Britain or the US is a matter of great importance for both. Hence, both will try to woo us. As I have always maintained, Japan's security rests upon the cooperation between these three nations: Japan, Britain, and the US. Taking advantage of the present situation, we must adopt the proper measures to acheive our goal.[75]

The theme, that Japan wanted to be treated with respect and to attain a status and role in the international system commensurate with its capabilities, is one addressed repeatedly by British historians. That the Japanese felt that they should be treated by the

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[74] Konoe Fumimorao, Seidan -roku (collected papers about a political view) (Tokyo, 1936) as appeared in Hosoya Chihiro, "Britain and the United States in Japan's View of the International System, 1919-1937", in Ian Nish, ed., *Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-1952*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1982, p. 3; Nish, Decline, p. 6.

[75] Hara Keiichiro (ed.), Hara Takashi Nikki (Hara's Diary), Vol. VIII (Tokyo, 1950), as appeared in Hosoya Chihiro, "Britain and the United States in Japan's View of the International System, 1919-1937", in Ian Nish, ed., *Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-1952*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1982, p. 6.

British no differently than another regional power—the United States—should not be surprising. The Japanese saw their situation as similar to those of the Americans. If the United States had the right to exclude the other powers from interferring in its affairs in the Western Hemisphere, why couldn't Japan work to keep the predatory powers of Russia, France and Germany out of Asia?[76] Did Japan not deserve a Monroe Doctrine of its own? If the U.S. was concerned with keeping order in Cuba, Mexico, and South America, and permitted to use force to attain these ends, did not Japan have the right to use force to maintain order in Manchuria, China proper, and Korea?[77] Of course, this view ignores or diminishes the fact that Japan brutally suppressed and controlled some of these territories—actions which made open-ended support for Japan "policing" the Far East extremely difficult for the British Cabinet. This was a significant concern nonetheless for the Japanese, what with the danger of warlords asserting control over pieces of China strategically important to Japan.

Granting Japanese foreign policy interests equal consideration to those of the United States was the last thing on the minds of British statesmen at this time. Post-war British statesmen were more concerned with protecting British interests in the Far East with declining resources. However, in contrast to previous periods of Anglo-Japanese relations, and for reasons mentioned above, British statesmen did not immediately turn to the alliance with Japan as the answer to propping up British interests in the Far East. Instead, they came to rely on limited construction of new bases in the area, the initiatives of American foreign policy proposals and naval arms control.

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[76] Malcolm Kennedy, O.B.E., *The Estrangement of Great Britain and Japan, 1917-35*, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1969, p. 3.
[77] Ibid.

The Washington Conference of 1921

By the 1920s, the British had begun to move away from the perspective that Japan could serve as a crutch to prop up British interests in Asia. The British government came to increasingly focus on the threat posed by Japan. A document entitled "Empire Naval Policy and Cooperation" and distributed to the dominions layed out the current thinking of Royal Naval Staff. The report argued that "*the worst situation with which the British Empire could be faced would occur if Japan seized the opportunity of aggressive action in the Pacific at a time when the situation at home was threatened from another quarter.*"[78] Following this memorandum the Overseas Defence Sub-committee of the Committee on Imperial Defence recommended the construction of a base at Singapore. The British government also considered increasing naval strength in the Pacific.[79] The Cabinet approved the construction of a base in Singapore, but also concluded that increasing the size of the British naval force in the Far East was not possible at that time. Defense budgets were decreasing and the British government was on the verge of declaring war as unlikely within the next ten years—the infamous "Ten Year Rule". With this British mindset in perspective, it should not be surprising that the British readily accepted the American invitation to a conference in Washington to discuss peace, security and naval arms control in the Asia-Pacific region.

At the turn of the decade, the Japanese were also concerned about their maritime security and began work on naval construction plans. In the summer of 1920 the Japanese started the *eight-eight program* which was a long-term plan to add to their fleet,

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[78] Papers of Austin Chamberlain 26, Hankey to Chamberlain, 16 June 1921, with a report on the Singapore naval base, 7 June as appeared in Nish, Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 319.

[79] Ian Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, pp. 319-20.

through construction, eight first class battleships and eight heavy cruisers by 1928. At the same time, however, the Japanese government did not want to harm its relationship with Great Britain. Despite the souring of the relations between the two countries, and what to the Japanese appeared to be increasing collusion between Great Britain and the U.S., Japanese policy-makers were still of the belief that Great Britain could help Japan manage the growing threat of the United States. With this attitude in mind, the Japanese also voiced interest in attending a conference to discuss peace, security and naval arms limitations in Asia. In March 1921, Prime Minister Kato told the Associated Press that "*should the Powers come to a reliable understanding and agree unanimously to limit their armaments, Japan would limit hers to a suitable extent and would not even insist on the completion of the whole of her (eight-eight naval) program.*"[80]

Despite similar British and Japanese desires to attend the Washington Conference, the delegates of the two countries arrived in the United States with somewhat different objectives in mind. Despite the tensions between Japan and the United Kingdom, the Japanese delegates were to endeavor to preserve the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The alliance was seen as Japan's badge of stature, its link to the most powerful actors in the central system. As a consequence, the Japanese delegates were instructed by the Foreign Ministry to preserve the alliance.

> [I]f, as preliminary to negotiations for a disarmament treaty, other countries unite and call for the abolition of the alliance, there is no objection to your announcing that any clause in the alliance which is regarded as a hindrance to the disarmament treaty need not apply to the signatories of that treaty;....Though Japan's best policy will be to adopt a broadly neutral attitude towards the other powers taking part in the present conference, you should in view of the British alliance and the position in the far

[80] Hora Tomio, Dai-ichi Sekai Taisen (First World War) Tokyo: Jimbutsu Trai Sha, 1966 as appeared in Ian Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 321.

> east be sure to maintain an understanding with Britain...[81]

On the other hand, the British were not above eliminating or altering the alliance. In fact, they sought to mold a new security framework involving themselves, the Japanese and the United States. Lord Wellesley, one of the leading delegates to the conference, therefore, wrote that "*British policy should concentrate on an agreement of these two main issues, viz, a tripartite agreement or declaration of policy between the United States, Japan and Great Britain; and a naval agreement as regards the Pacific.*"[82] Upon arriving to the United States, Lord Balfour discovered that the prospects for a tripartite defense arrangement was an extremely unpopular idea, and efforts to advocate such an arrangement would put at risk agreement on naval disarmaments in Asia. Balfour wrote:

> Adherence to the Alliance in its present form will be very unpopular in the United States of America, and will render the conclusion of a satisfactory and enduring arrangement for the limitation of armaments extremely difficult to negotiate. Further, it is undeniable that, with the collapse of the Russian Empire and the elimination of Germany from the Pacific, the conditions which brought the Anglo-Japanese Alliance into existence have disappeared for the time being, though it would perhaps not be prudent to assume that they will never be re-created.[83]

As a consequence, Lord Balfour sought to work out some kind of arrangement between Great Britain and the United States. He handed Secretary of State Hughes a draft treaty calling for the preservation of peace and maintenance of the territorial status quo in Asia, and one which layed out the responsibilities and limitations of the Powers'

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[81] *Chronology of foreign affairs of Japan and important documents* of the Japanese Foreign Ministry as appeared in Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 360.

[82] *Documents of British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, edited by E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, London, UK, Vol. I (xiv), no. 404, p. 440.

involvement in China. The Secretary of State rejected the drafts immediately—the proposed British treaty did not cancel the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which Americans increasingly saw as an instrument for Japanese expansion on the Mainland. As the British historian Ian Nish describes the events to come, when word leaked out that Balfour had handed Hughes a draft treaty, Shidehara, the de facto head of the Japanese delegation was incredulous that Britain would give America a draft treaty without first consulting the Japanese government.[84]

Eventually the Japanese were brought into the negotiation over what ended up as a Far Eastern consultative pact between the United States, Great Britain, Japan and France. The new treaty was not an alliance. It did not promise joint military action against any potential attacker. It only promised that the other signatories would be consulted should military force be required in the Far East. Despite instructions to preserve the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the Japanese delegates found that the end of the alliance was a fait accompli. The British and the Americans appeared to be in agreement over a consultative pact and the British appeared to have resigned themselves to terminating the alliance. In actuality, the British delegates favored retaining the alliance, but had been instructed that Great Britain needed disarmament more than it needed the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Faced with the possibility of losing a disarmament agreement if Great Britain held out for the alliance, Balfour agreed to end the alliance.[85]

In the end, the Japanese became particularly embittered about the termination of the alliance. At the Washington Conference, the Americans and British again appeared to

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[83] *Ibid*, no. 415.

[84] Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 371. As Nish describes this event, Balfour had actually spoken with Prince Tokugawa, the head of the delegation. Since the Prince's responsibilities were social and cultural he assumed Balfour was only making polite conversation. Balfour on the other hand assumed that since Tokugawa was head of delegation, he would convey Balfour's message of a Three Power Treaty to Shidehara.

be aligned against Japanese interests. In numerous memoranda to officials within the Japanese government Kato stated that he believed the British and Americans were united on most of the issues discussed at the conference.[86] Subsequent biographies of Shidehara illustrate that the Japanese were indeed unhappy with the result of the conference, again related to the belief that the British and the Americans had close relations.

> By her rash and irresponsible actions during the great war, Japan had fallen into international isolation; but she could at least rely on the Anglo-Japanese alliance; at America's insistence the Alliance was "disappointingly abandoned" and it was inevitable that Japan's reaction to the Washington Conference was extremely cool; since the Four Power Treaty contained no provision for mutual aid, Japan was even more isolated and lonely.[87]

Sir Charles Eliot, the British Ambassador to Tokyo, commented that the Japanese viewed the Washington Conference as a secret coalition between the United Kingdom and the United States against Japan's interests.[88] Finally, Lt. General Tanaka Kunishige, the head of the Japanese Army delegation to the conference wrote:

> In short, the conference proved to be an attempt to oppress the non-Anglo Saxon races, expecially the coloured races, by the two English-speaking countries, Britain and the United States...Britain helped the US both directly and indirectly, taking a hostile attitude towards Japan, her ally in the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and finally succeeded in abandoning the alliance, on conditions favorable to

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[85] Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 381.

[86] Taiheyo senso e no michi (the Road to the Pacific War) vol. viii, doc. I, p. 7 Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1963, as appears in Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 382.

[87] Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1972, p. 391.

[88] Hosoya Chihiro, "Britain and the United States in Japan's View of the International System, 1919-1937" , in Ian Nish, ed., *Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-1952*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1982, p. 8.

> themselves. It was a great vicotry for them brought about by crafty British diplomacy.[89]

The road to Shanghai and Manchuria

The decade following the Washington Conference involved the gradual erosion of the Anglo-Japanese relationship. We have seen that to this point the Japanese had been unhappy about being "contained" by joint British-American actions; that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance —the pride and joy of Japanese diplomacy and the very instrument that helped bring Japan to the position of regional power—appeared to be casually discarded by the British; that Great Britain was reluctant or refused to grant the Japanese equal status or role to that of the United States; and that the Japanese were now isolated and on their own with an increasingly powerful and hostile United States just over the horizon. The one area that the British and the Japanese had not come into open conflict over since the Great War was China. This was to change dramatically in the 1920s.

We need not go into the detail of all the events transpiring in China in the 1920s. Suffice it to say that China was characterized by increasing levels of disorder, warlordism, and threats to European and Japanese leased territories in China. From the Japanese perspective, the increasing disorder in China necessitated greater direct Japanese involvement on the Continent of Asia. Just as the United States was permitted to go to Cuba to restore order there, the Japanese felt that it was in their right to restore an increasingly volatile and violent situation in North China to normalcy. The historian Malcolm Kennedy cites the increasingly violent and destabilizing situation in Manchuria as the primary cause of Japanese involvement in China. In the meantime,Whitehall's policy of wait and see was changed to one of active intervention in China for the purpose

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[89] Uehara Yaisaku Kankei Bunsho (Papers related to Uehara), (Tokyo, 1976), as appears in Hosoya Chihiro, "Britain and the United States in Japan's View of the International System, 1919-1937" , in Ian Nish, ed., *Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-1952*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1982, p. 8.

of: (1) protecting and defending British lives and property; and (2) demonstrating to the Chinese that the British supported Chinese efforts at self-determination and to reform and improve themselves.[90] Simultaneously, Whitehall concluded that Japan could no longer be trusted to assist the British to maintain an "Open Door" in China. The Foreign Office wrote:

> Japan is not nearly so concerned as we are in the maintenance of extraterritoriality. She is prepared to utilise the surrender of extraterritoriality in reaching a bargain with the Chinese for the protection of her special interests, especially in Manchuria...We can never count upon the support of Japan, though it may sometimes suit her convenience to work with us.[91]

Shanghai and Manchuria

General British concerns and suspicions of Japanese motives in China changed to anger and British intent to check the Japanese after the Japanese invaded Manchuria in September 1931 and then made incursions into Shanghai in January to February 1932. British reactions were blunt:

> If Japan continues unchecked the British will have to retire altogether from the Far East. If it is decided that we must check Japan certain preliminary measures could be adopted—such as rupture of diplomatic and economic relations—but in the end Japan can only be checked by force. Ultimately we will be faced with the alternatives of going to war with Japan or retiring from the Far East. A

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[90] Ian Nish, "Japan in Britain's View of the International System, 1919-37" in Ian Nish, ed., *Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-52*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1982, p. 35.
[91] *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-39*, series 2, Vol. VIII, no. 1, F.O. memorandum, 8 January 1930, pp. 24-30 as appeared in Ian Nish, "Japan in Britain's View of the International System, 1919-37" in Ian Nish, ed., *Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-52*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1982, p. 36.

> retirement from the Far East might be the prelude to a retirement from India.[92]

The British felt reluctant to openly condemn Japanese actions in Manchuria and Shanghai, but world opinion, led by uncomprising language by the United States, pressed the British to take action. The British sponsored a resolution on 11 March 1932 affirming that Japan's actions in Manchuria went counter to the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations. This move parallelled U.S. Secretary of State Stimson's earlier note to the League advocating non-recognition of the puppet state Japan had created to administer Manchuria—Manchukuo. As to the specific actions to be taken against Japan, the British left to the League of Nation's Committee of Nineteen to rule on Japan's behavior and subsequent actions to be taken by the members of that body. The ruling of the Lytton Commission advocated in 1933, that the League of Nations not recognize Manchukuo. The subsequent vote in the League followed the recommendation of the Lytton Commission. Japan alone voted in the negative. It was the collective decision at the League to the follow the recommendations of the Lytton Commision that led to Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, and subsequently to Japan's estrangement from Great Britain. The act of withdrawing from the League also indirectly pushed the Japanese into the arms of Nazi Germany.

From this point on, Japan, Great Britain and the United States were on a slippery slope toward conflict and world war. In 1902, Japan and the United Kingdom had entered into a full-fledged alliance and the Japanese and British fought side by side in a world war. It would not have been unreasonable to assert that by the early part of the twentieth century Japan was a candidate for peaceful transfer of British foreign policy roles in the sub-system of East Asia. As we have seen this was not to be.

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[92] *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, 1919-39, Series 2, Vol. IX, no. 238, note by Sir J. Pratt, 1 February 1932.

4. Germany and Great Britain, 1871-1907

Background

From the political upheavals and revolutions of 1848, there emerged young European leaders ambitious and eager to advance the interests of their respective states over the collaborative principles and practices created and followed by the statesmen at the Congress of Vienna (1815)[1]. Of these, numbered one Otto Von Bismarck of Prussia who dreamed of making Prussia/Germany a great power in Europe. By the 1850s, Prussia/Germany was the weakest of the Major powers and was broken into two fragments. The question that plagued German statesmen like Bismarck, was how to turn Germany into a strong, independent, and secure state? His answer lay in unifying or consolidating the many German states of central and northern Germany. If these states could be absorbed or brought within Prussia's sphere of influence, the two parts of Germany could be united and access would be secured to the North Sea.[2]

Bismarck realized that these states and especially Austria, , would be unhappy with this arrangement, but he believed that fear of German nationalism and Prussian power would force all the parties to comply with his plan.[3] Bismarck took this calculated risk, because alone Prussia was not strong enough to bring fear and respect from the other states of Europe. If Prussia could unify, and if it could form alliances within Europe, then Prussia would be secure.

In following this strategy, Bismarck successfully absorbed or brought northern and central German states under Prussian influence. Bismarck's strategy also led to quite a few successful military confrontations with some of the other European states. In the

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[1] Gordon Craig and Alexander Smoke, "The Balance of Power, 1815-1914: Three Experiments" in *Force and Statecraft*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1983, p.35.
[2] Raymond Sontag, *Germany and England: Background of Conflict, 1848-1894*, D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, NY, 1938, p. 70.
[3] Ibid.

war of 1864, Prussians seized Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark; in 1866, Austria and Prussia went to war over the spoils Prussia had gained through its previous war with Denmark; finally, in 1870, Prussia went to war with France one of Europe's great powers, and soundly defeated her. The treaty of Frankfort gave Prussia a substantial indemnity and the territory it desired for a buffer zone to its western neighbor France—Alsace Lorraine.[4] By 1871, Prussia had become a unified empire; Austrian influence and interferrence had been rid of; and a loose confederation of German states had been replaced by a strong German state.

Germany from the perspective of the Major Powers, 1871

Since the 18th Century, the other European powers perceived Prussia as a poor country far to the Slavic East. What influence and stature she had by the middle of the nineteenth century were obtained from the military prowess displayed by the great elector Frederick William I and his son, Frederick the Great.[5] Prussia's participation in the coalition that eventually defeated Napoleon as well as the post-Napoleonic political maneuvering of the Concert of Europe, also gave Prussia some stature in the eyes of the major powers of Europe.[6] In the latter half of the 19th Century, England saw Prussia/Germany as a possible alliance partner to balance the alternating threats posed by Russia and France.[7]

At the same time, however, Prussia was still seen as backward—the poor cousin of the Great Powers. Great Power permission for Prussia to enter into the central system,

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[4] Ibid, p. 76.
[5] Eugene Rostow, *A Breakfast for Bonaparte*, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 1993, p. 192.
[6] Ibid.
[7] George Liska, *Quest for Equilibrium: America and the Balance of Power on Land and Sea*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Md, 1977, pp. 41-2. Also see Count Munster to Prince Bismarck, letter dated September 27, 1879, in *German Diplomatic Documents: 1871-1914, volume I*, Methuen & Co., Ltd. London, UK, 1928?, p. 146.

as measured by Major Power tolerance of German colonization had not been realized by the 1870s. The historian Raymond Sontag writes of England's view of Germany that:

> In the English view, a transient political difficulty (the Balkan crisis of 1876) had enabled Bismarck to take mean advantage of Britain for the attainment of a foolhardy ambition (colonization). German imperialism remained something exotic, unnatural; Germany remained a continental power dependent on British friendship for aid against France and Russia. The only impression which remained after the tension (between the two countries) eased was one of irritation with a political friend who, when aid was needed, turned extortionist.[8]

While British perceptions of Prussia were those of irritation and suspicion over Bismarck's motives, French, Austrian, Danish, and Russian attitudes toward Germany were outright hostile. France wanted revenge for its 1870 defeat and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine; Austria sought revenge for its defeat at the hands of the Prussian Army in 1866; the Danes hated Bismarck for having wrested Schleswig-Holstein from them; and Russia was concerned about having a strong, unified German state to its west.[9]

German perceptions of the Major Powers

By 1871, Bismarck knew that many of the Great Powers wanted revenge over Germany's wars of territorial expansion and empire unification. He therefore sought to keep the peace in Europe through the formation of countervailing alliances, war scares, and secret diplomacy. In short, Bismarck sought to use the balance of power to maintain the security and stability of Europe. By 1874, he had forged a league of the three emperors of Europe or DreiKaiserbund involving Prussia, Austria and Russia.

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[8] Raymond Sontag, *Germany and England: Background of Conflict, 1848-1894*, D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, NY, 1938, p.206.

[9] Eugene Rostow, A Breakfast for Bonaparte, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 1993, p.193.

At the same time, German industrialization and commercial endeavors had been successful enough that Bismarck was experiencing political pressure at home to initiate overseas colonies. Bismarck recognized that with regard to colonization he had to tread lightly or he might offend or tread on another major power's sphere of influence. On the other hand, the rising industrial, commercial and financial power of Germany led Bismarck to the belief that Germany deserved colonies as a sign of its new status in the international system. Furthermore, Bismarck reasoned that if he concentrated in areas where the major powers appeared to have paid little attention in the past or had declining interest (e.g., South America, the South Pacific and the southernmost part of Africa), the major powers should have no objection to German colonization.

The Turkey Crisis of 1875

In the summer of 1875, Turkey was faced with internal rebellions and there was a possibility that the Ottomon Empire might fall as a result of the crisis. Here was a situation that all the major powers had an interest. Russia aspired to assert its interests in the Balkans, and intended to turn the Black Sea into a Russian lake by securing Constantinople; Austria saw the Balkans as part of its sphere of influence and sought to check Russian influence in Turkey and the Balkans; France hoped to regain influence in the Meditteranean. France saw its chances of doing this depended on gains Russia or Austria made in Turkey and the Balkans; and Great Britain feared that the increase of Russian power and influence would menace the Suez route to India. Only Germany had no interest in the outcome of the crisis. Bismarck, however, saw this crisis as an opportunity for Germany to serve as the honest broker of the conflict.

In the fall of 1875, Bismarck arrived at what he thought to be the best solution to the crisis. He proposed to the major powers a solution in which everyone had something, no one had everything, and peace would be maintained: (1) Russia would

receive the eastern half of the Balkans; (2) Austria would get the western half; (3) England would be given Egypt; (4) Syria would go to France; and (5) Italy was unworthy of any consideration. The effect would be a balance of interests. Austria and Russia balanced each other in the Balkans; an England in Egypt counter-balanced the Russian gains in the Balkans and French gains in Syria; Constantinople and the Straits would be guarded by a Turkey strengthened by the loss of rebellious subjects. Germany would gain by serving as the honest broker, the glue for the Major Powers of Europe. In short, Germany was seeking confirmation that it was now a major player, a great power of Europe without which major war might have erupted among the dominant players.

In the end, the plan did not work. The powers were too suspicious of Bismarck. In addition, Great Britain and Russia refused to allow Germany to play the role that she desired—honest broker. These two powers saw the center of the European order as existing either in London or St. Petersburg, not in Berlin. They, therefore, rejected Bismarck's proposals immediately. Instead, Lord Beaconsfield (Disraeli) proposed an alliance between England and Germany. In this alliance, the British Prime Minister suggested that Germany be held responsible for the territorial integrity of Turkey while Great Britain promised to keep the other powers at bay. This proposal served two purposes for British objectives: (1) it provided Great Britain its continental balancer in the guise of the Prussian/German state; and (2) it dismantled the Dreikaiser bund, and therefore gave Britain a chance to manipulate one of the three continental states of Austria, Prussia or Russia as its balancer of Europe.[10]

Correctly reading Britain's ulterior objectives, Bismarck rejected the proposal for an outright Anglo-German alliance. At the same time, Bismarck was becoming desperate for a settlement of some kind. Without a settlement, the other members of the

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[10] Raymond Sontag, *Germany and England: Background of Conflict, 1848-1894*, D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, NY, 1938, p. 151 and 158.

Dreikaiserbund, Austria and Russia were quickly coming to blows over Turkey and the Balkan question. Were this to happen, Germany's primary instrument for maintaining stability in Europe and security for itself—the Dreikaiserbund—would have been lost. The British sensing that they had the means to impose a settlement upon all the powers and to get an alliance with Germany or failing that, to play the Continental powers off of one another, threatened the use of force and intervention into the Turkey crisis if Russia intervened. The German efforts to avoid an entangling alliance with England and to preserve the Dreikaiserbund are reflected in a letter from German Foreign Minister Bulow's to the German Ambassador to Great Britain, Count Munster:

> In conversation with Lord Salisbury the Chancellor first mentioned that Germany had but little personal interest in the fate of Turkey, but a very great one in her own enduring friendship with England, Russia, and Austria. This standpoint outweighs any cares regarding our relations toward Turkey. The object touching German policy most nearly was to get over the present crisis, without disturbing the existing good relations with these our friends. We should not willingly abandon their friendship (the Dreikaiserbund) of any one of them, unless she required us, for her sake to become hostile to the other , without ourselves possessing any compelling reason for such a course. It would be asking us to act as mercenaries, a manner of speaking....During this conversation Prince Bismarck took the greatest pains to impress upon the British statesman that England should not rush hastily into war...[11]

In the meantime, Russia was growing impatient with German neutrality. The Czar insisted that Germany declare its intentions. Bismarck sent a message stating that German intentions were to preserve peace. At this point, Great Britain and Russia's refusal to accept Bismarck's balance of interest plan had led the major powers to the brink of war. Germany was caught betwen antagonizing Russia and getting caught in a general

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[11] Bulow, Foreign Minister to Count Munster, in London, November 27, 1876, in *German Diplomatic Documents: 1871-1914, volume I*, Methuen & Co., Ltd. London, UK, 1928, p. 41.

war in Europe. With the encouragement of the British, who now favored a plan to partition Turkey, Germany once again offered its "balance of interest" plan at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. This time the major powers agreed to the plan, but at a significant price to Germany—the Dreikaiserbund. Disraeli said of his efforts during the Balkan Crisis:

> Our great object was to break up, and permanently prevent, the alliance of the three Empires, and I maintain that there never was a general diplomatic result more completely effected.[12]

Bismarck and the diplomatic maneuverings of 1879 to 1883

Following Germany's diplomatic defeat in the Balkan crisis of 1875-6, Bismarck sought to recreate the Dreikaiserbund as a long-term goal and to ensure Germany's safety from a hostile Russia and a hostile France as a short term goal. In August 1879, Bismarck sought two bilateral alliances, one with Austria and the other with England. Disraeli saw an alliance as an opportunity to turn Russian hostility toward Germany.[13] Salisbury negotiated with Bismarck and he promised that if Russia attacked Germany and Austria, England would intervene on behalf of its allies.[14] The Austrians liked the idea of an alliance with Germany, and so entered into one on October 7, 1879. The Austrians then pressed Germany into forming a trilateral alliance with England to counter the Russian threat. This Bismarck refused, observing that a trilateral coalition against Russia would lead to a violent reaction from the Russians.[15]

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[12] W.F. Monypenny and G.E. Buckle, *The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield*, London, UK, 1929, Vol. II, p. 1239.
[13] Raymond Sontag, *Germany and England: Background of Conflict, 1848-1894*, D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, NY, 1938, p. 160.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.

Austria wished for more than a guarantee against a Russian attack. It sought to increase Austrian influence in the Balkans and to obstruct Russian expansion in the Near East. Bismarck informed the Austrians that Germany was not interested in what transpired in the Balkans and suggested that since Great Britain did have an interest in the Balkans, Austria should form an alliance with England. If a crisis arose, Bismarck calculated, he would be in a position to seek a compromise satisfactory to Vienna, London and Moscow. Through the diplomatic maneuverings of 1879, Bismarck had managed to become the honest broker of the Major Powers once again. By forming three alliances —Anglo-German, Anglo-Austrian, and Austro-German Bismarck satisfied his political and strategic objectives. The alliances permitted Germany to be the "spoke of the wheel" without earning the hostility of both Russia and France.[16] Russia, now fearing isolation, sought rapprochement with Germany. By the end of 1879, discussions had begun over the revival of the Dreikaiserbund.

Although the Russians sought rapprochement with Germany, it was still hostile to Austria. Bismarck said to the Russians that he would enter into a Triple Alliance with Russia and Austria, or have no agreement with the Czar. Eventually, Russia conceded. The Austrians were hesitant to become allied with Russia, but by 1880 had fallen out with the British. British Prime Minister Gladstone had apparently given an inflammatory speech over Austrian oppression of its citizens. The Austrians eventually agreed to join the Triple Alliance, because they were convinced that they could only trust Prussia/Germany. In 1881, Germany, Austria, and Russia reinstated the Dreikaiserbund.[17] The treaty bringing back the Dreikaiserbund called for all three powers to confer on any future territorial changes in the Balkans. Since of the three countries,

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[16] Ibid, p. 162.
[17] Ibid, pp. 163-4.

Germany was the only one with no territorial interests in the Balkans, Germay was certain to be the arbiter of any future Austro-Russian dispute.[18]

In 1882, Italy joined the Austro-German alliance. This alliance, therefore, became the Triple Alliance of 1882. Italy had received nothing from the original Turkey Crisis of 1875-6, it therefore joined the Austrians and the Germans to ensure future gains in international disputes. The Triple Alliance was a defensive alliance against Russia and France. In the meantime, Great Britain had made the error of occupying Egypt. Because the French had designs on North Africa and Egypt, this angered them. Germany was now placed in the advantageous position of being able to play the British and the French off one another over colonial questions in North Africa.[19]

By 1883, Bismarck's diplomatic maneuvering and manipulation of the European balance of power had brought about positive results for Germany: Austria and Russia sought Berlin's aid for the settlement of quarrels; Italy looked to Germany for protection and direction of its foreign policy; because Germany's support was needed to manage its imperial competition with England, France now sought German friendship and reduced hostility over Alsace-Lorraine; and England recognized that it needed German goodwill in order to secure colonial interests and to maintain British security. With these foreign policy gains in hand, and German security assured, Bismarck could attempt, through the acquisition of colonies, to turn Germany into a global power.

Germany's quest for empire and colonies

By the 1880s Bismarck had believed that the British were so vulnerable, and that German political relations were so advantageous that the British would have no choice but to grant German requests. Beyond the strategic situation, Bismarck believed that

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[18] Ibid, p. 164.
[19] Ibid, p. 165.

Germany deserved colonies. German industrial growth had been significant and the next logical step, he believed, was to develop overseas markets for German goods.[20] Bismarck was also coming under political pressure from public opinion and the Kaiser to colonize. In November of 1883, he started asking the British if they possessed any claim to Angra Pequena, a port in southern Africa. If they had, Bismarck wanted to know the nature of the claims. England returned with an ambiguous reply which neither confirmed nor denied British claim to sovereignty over Angra Pequena.

On December 31, 1883, Germany requested that Great Britain clarify the issue. The message requested that Whitehall clarify if Great Britain had any rightful claims to the region; and it asked whether England claimed the territory, and what protection foreigners trading with the African natives might expect from the British.[21] In the British government the request was being passed from one office to the next. The Foreign Office sent the request to the Colonial Office which then sent the query to the Cape government, where it remained unanswered. The British were left in a very uncomfortable position. They neither wanted the expense of governing a remote part of Africa, considered wasteland; on the other hand, they did not want this land to fall under the control of anyone else.

On April 25, 1884, Germany announced that the settlements near Angra Pequena were now under the protection of the German Imperial government. The British Colonial Secretary replied that England was not prepared to recognize the German portectorate. In the interim between the German request for British clarification over the status of southern Africa and the German announcement, the Cape Government had requested that all land between the Cape and Angola be annexed. The Colonial Secretary said that he was

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[20] Ibid, p. 173.
[21] Ibid, p. 195.

prepared to grant that request. Not surprisingly, Bismarck was angered over this. In a letter from Bismarck to the German Ambassador Count Munster, the Chancellor writes:

> We should be curious to learn why the right to colonise, which England uses to the fullest extent, should be denied to us. In the particular matter of Angra Pequena, Lord Derby asked Cape Town whether there was any likelihood that the Colony would decide to annex that place. He thus treats it as though it were res nullius. You would have been all the more justified in expressing your astonishment that the right of German subject to trade there was not unconditionally admitted in the House of Lords Speech, and much more so, that the Monroe Doctrine, that monstrosity in international Law, was being applied in favor of England to the coast of Africa. Supposing it be really our intention to establish colonies, how can Lord Granville contest our rights to do so at the very moment when the British government is granting an unlimited exercise of the same right to the Government of the Cape? This naive egoism is in itself an insult to our national feeling, and you will please point this to Lord Granville.[22]

Beyond blunt diplomatic exchanges, Bismarck took action to express his displeasure at the British handling of the Angra Pequena affair. In June 1884, at a conference of the major powers to discuss the colonial management of Egypt, Germany sided with France on some of its colonial disputes with Great Britain. Great Britain, too late, sought to win Germany over to its side by promising to recognize the German protectorate over Angra Pequena. Despite the concession, Germany sided with France on most Anglo-French disagreements regarding Egypt and the Near East.[23]

Supported at home by popular opinion in facing down the British, and convinced that the British were now trying to keep Germany down, Bismarck soon expanded his demands for colonies and overseas interests. The claim to Angra Pequena expanded to

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[22] Prince Bismarck to Count Munster, June 1st, 1884, in *German Diplomatic Documents: 1871-1914, volume I*, Methuen & Co., Ltd. London, UK, 1928, pp. 175-6.

include all of Southwest Africa. In the South seas, Germany now claimed areas as far apart as Samoa and New Guinea.[24] Articles in German newspapers began taking on a decidedly anti-British tone. An article in the Kolnische Zeitung is revealing:

> England is going the same inexorable way that Phoenicia went against the Greeks, the Carthaginians against the Romans, the later Venitians and the Dutch in their contests with the national strength of modern peoples. It seems to be a law of world history that the commercial spirit and the manly fighting spirit cannot long be united in one people, and that unscrupulous diplomacy is substituted, diplomacy which can postpone the national decline for a time, but only for a time. Defy England, and England will astound the world by her cowardice![25]

The British recognized that they were in a difficult position. Russia was posing an increasing threat to the Russo-Afghan frontier. France would only be satisfied with a total British departure from Egypt. In fact, the French wanted British concessions more costly than those demanded by Germany. Furthermore, the Germans and the French were, in fact, working together against the British. At a conference in Berlin at the end of 1884 to address the status of the Congo Basin, France and Germany recommended turning the whole Congo Basin over to King Leopold of Belgium. This threatened the British effort to keep foreign powers out of areas adjacent to British possessions.[26] Ultimately, threatened by encirclement and losses in colonial rivalry, the British conceded to Germany. Through Bismarck's efforts, Germany got part of New Guinea and some other islands in the South Pacific. In Africa Germany added Togo, Kamerun, and part of Zanzibar's territory on the African East Coast.[27]

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[23] Raymond Sontag, *Germany and England: Background of Conflict, 1848-1894*, D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, NY, 1938, p. 196.
[24] Ibid, pp. 196-7.
[25] *Kolnische Zeitung*, January 21, 1885, as appeared in ibid, p. 198.
[26] Raymond Sontag, *Germany and England: Background of Conflict, 1848-1894*, D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, NY, 1938, p. 199.
[27] Ibid, p. 201.

Despite British concessions to Germany on the issue of colonization, the British still considered German overseas expansion and colonization as "childish", "unnatural" and "premature". A respected British diplomat in 1885, wrote of Bismarck's *"childish colonial schemes, which I cannot help suspecting are founded as much on what, for want of a better word, I must call spite against us, as on any real expectation of advantage to Germany:"*[28] In May of 1884, the German Crown Princess (Victoria, the daughter of British Queen Victoria) wrote of the Germans:

> If I may say, the Germans are of an arrogance that one longs to see put down, expecially their tone towards England. Their ideas of colonies I think very foolish and I do not fancy they will succeed, but are as jealous of England as they possibly can be.[29]

The historian, Sontag, furthermore, points out that the British saw German expansion not only as childish or driven by jealousy, but clearly as a bizarre phenomenon. In his book *Germany and England: Background of Conflict*, he points out that:

> Judging the present and future by the past, and seeing in the record of history no great imperial achievements of Germany, it seemed rather more strange to believe that such achievements were beginning, than it would have to expect a resurgence of Spanish imperialism, far more strange than the resurgence of French colonial enthusiasm, which was inexplicable enough to the English. In addition, it seemed madness that the Germans, with jealous rivals on the east and the west, should take on the added burden of rivalry with England.[30]

So while Great Britain made concessions to German colonial ambitions, they made no effort to conceal the fact that they felt German plans for overseas expansion were

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[28] Lord Newton Lyons, *Lord Lyons, a Record of British Diplomacy, vol. II*, London, 1913, p. 342.
[29] G.E. Buckle, ed., *The Letters of Queen Victoria*, 1862-1885 (Second Series) London, 1926-28, Vol. III, pp. 505-6.

premature and beyond Germany's capacities. They therefore made these concessions grudgingly. At this time, however, we also find the English banking on something else. That German-French animosities would heat up again to the advantage of British interests.[31]

The departure of Bismarck, enter Caprivi

In 1890, Germany had a new Kaiser—Wilhelm the Second. In that year, he dismissed Bismarck because he believed that Bismarck was a trouble maker and disrupted German politics.[32] Caprivi was appointed the new chancellor. Caprivi decided to try negotiating with the British. As compensation for reducing German claims in Africa he asked that England surrender the tiny island of Helgoland. The island was essential to defend the Kiel canal, which Germany was constructing at the base of the Danish Peninsula.[33]

Lord Salisbury welcomed the pause from colonial bickering. The German concessions called for Germany departing from the sources of the Nile, and the territories providing access to the Nile from the East Coast, in British possession. Salisbury had desired to keep a passage open from Uganda to the British territories in South Africa in order to maintain an open route for the British planned Cape to Cairo railroad and telegraph line. However, Salisbury also was aware of significant political, geographical and economic impediments for such a railroad or telegraph line from one end of Africa to the other. He therefore agreed to Germany's demand that East Africa touch the Belgian

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[30] Raymond Sontag, *Germany and England: Background of Conflict, 1848-1894*, D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, NY, 1938, p. 206.
[31] Ibid, p. 207.
[32] Ibid, p. 270.
[33] Ibid.

Congo. In addition, to the south he agreed that a long narrow strip, later known as "Caprivi's finger", should jut out from German Southwest Africa to the Zambezi.[34]

Caprivi's efforts at concilliation which included proposals for reduced tarriffs in Europe, and with relaxed restrictions on freedom of movement in Alsace Lorraine began to unravel in 1891. As the British had hoped for, the French were beginning to move closer to the Russians. The French fleet visited Kronstadt in July 1891, with the Czar in attendance. The French fleet also payed a port visit to Portsmouth on its way back to France. At this time, Gladstone and Rosebery (the Foreign Minister) began to retreat from British assurances of involvement in a Russian-France dispute with the Triple Alliance.[35]

Germany was now in a difficult position. It now had two weak allies (Austria and Italy), and was confronted by an increasingly powerful Russia and a rapidly arming France. Tensions between Germany and Russia worsened in 1893. A tarriff war had erupted between the two Imperial powers and Russian ships payed a port visit to Toulon, France. The Germans did not doubt that an alliance between France and Russia was in the making. The French and the Russians *did indeed* enter into a defensive alliance in 1893.[36] As historians point out, Germany had one last hope at this time. England was just as nervous and threated by an alliance between France and Russia as Germanay. A war in the Balkans was sure to bring the English in on the side of the Triple Alliance. This idea was reinforced because the French and the English were then on the brink of war over Siam. Caprivi, felt that Germany's best hope was to invite England into the Triple Alliance, transforming it into the Quadruple Alliance.

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[34] Ibid, p. 271.
[35] Ibid, p. 275.
[36] J.F.C. Fuller, *A Military History of the Western World, Volume III*, Da Capo Press, New York, NY, 1956, p. 172.

The Germans were aware that the British could pursue a strategy of divide and conquer. Instead of joining the Triple Alliance, the British could play the Continental powers off one another. Given what German statesmen considered English "traditional duplicity", it was essential that the Triple Alliance get Britain to commit itself to the Alliance. However, with the crisis over Siam subsided, the British were reluctant to commit themselves. England proposed an informal and implicit cooperation with the Triple Alliance. In February 1894, Lord Rosebery proposed to the Austrian Foreign Secretary that if Austria and her allies promised to hold France in check should England be resisting a Russian attack in the Straits, England would handle the Russian fleet. Rosebery added, however, that England must have assurances that France would not intervene. Austria was delighted with the proposal, Caprivi was less than pleased. He wrote:

> If the British fleet was fighting the Russians—England was to choose the moment for action—then Austria "and her friends" were to hold France in check!Who, he asked was able to restrain France? Austria without a fleet worth mentioning, could not; Italy would risk suicide by challenging France on land or sea. The British Mediterranean fleet was smaller than the French Fleet at Toulon. Once the British went into the Black Sea, probably no threats would deter France from seizing the opportunity to acheive mastery in the Mediterranean....There remains as a means of pressure only Germany, who must show herself ready to mobilize. Whether this threat would not prompt France to join in the war even more readily may be debatable. In any case, a war on two fronts, a war in which we have absolutely nothing to gain, is too serious a business for us to provoke over the Straits question.[37]

Caprivi could barely conceal his disgust over the British proposal. He continues:

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[37] Raymond Sontag, *Germany and England: Background of Conflict, 1848-1894*, D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, NY, 1938, pp. 288-9.

> Under the Rosebery proposal we would allow England to decide when we would become involved in a war in which we would risk our last man and our last mark, and in which our very existence would be at stake, while England would risk only a dozen or so battleships, would probably increase her commerce, and certainly would not endanger her existence. If England wants to make sure of our cooperation, let her make a binding agreement with the Triple Alliance.[38]

Germany eyes Russia

Germany's concern over a Franco-Russian alliance went deeper than a purely military concern of encirclement, or the horror of German statesmen at the prospect of fighting a two-front war. What also was chilling to German statesmen was the prospect of war with an increasingly powerful Russia. Russia's standing army was the largest in Europe throughout the nineteenth century, and it remained the largest on the eve of the First World War. Its population was three times that of Germany's, and the size of its territory made it a significant power in the upcoming century. From the perspective of statesmen of Europe, Russia was the power to contend with in the next military conflict. Between 1860 and 1913, Russian industrial output grew at an impressive rate of 5 percent, and during the 1890s the rate was closer to 8 percent growth.[39] Russian steel production just prior to World War I had overtaken those of France, Austria-Hungary, and were ahead of those of Italy's and Japan's.[40] Furthermore, Russian coal output was impressive up to the eve of the world war, as were its textile industry, chemical and electrical industries and armaments production.[41] Russian power was evident in the growth of Russia's already vast railway system, some 31,000 miles in 1900, to 46,000

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[38] Ibid, p. 289.
[39] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, Random House, New York, NY 1987, p. 233.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.

miles in 1914.[42] Finally, Russia's trade came close to tripling between 1890 and 1914 when Russia became the sixth largest trading nation.[43] From the perspective of Europe's statesmen, then, and Germany in particular in 1893, an alliance between Russia and France (Germany's traditional adversary) posed significant trouble for Germany.

Germany's Empire and Colonies, revisited

Although the Germans recognized that they needed to be on good terms with the British, they still expected their colonial claims to be taken seriously. The British had after all conceded on German colonial expansion after Germany had been at the center of the balance of power system in Europe. For years, the Samoan islands had been administered jointly by England, Germany and the United States. When the U.S. expressed an interest in taking ownership of one of the islands and withdrawing from the joint administration of the others, the Germans asked for a similar arrangement. The Germans felt that these islands could only be used as naval coaling stations, and Britain had plenty of these. Great Britain's statesmen recognized that these islands had little value to British strategic interests, however, the dominion states of Australia and New Zealand objected to foreign naval bases located near their territories. Lord Rosebery, was sensitive to the charge that the British were willing to sell out the dominion states. He therefore denied the German request and insisted on a continuance of joint control.[44]

In addition, despite his earlier agreement with Caprivi, not to establish a girdle around German East Africa, Rosebery sought to do just that. Caprivi had insisted in exchange for German concessions on the territory east of the Nile, German East Africa should maintain contact with the Belgian Congo. On May 12, 1894, England signed an

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[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Raymond Sontag, *Germany and England: Background of Conflict, 1848-1894*, D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, NY, 1938, p. 291.

agreement with the Congo leasing to the Congo Free State territory along the left bank of the Nile, known as the Bahr el Ghazal. In exchange, the Congo leased a strip of territory along the frontier of German East Africa from Lake Albert Edward to Lake Tanganika, to England.

The Bahr el Ghazal was legally part of Egyptian territory. It was barren land without a government. England did not want to undertake the expense of colonizing it or occupying it militarily. However, as long as there was no settled government there, the French were tempted to push their frontiers east to the Nile. Since the Congo was a neutral state whose integrity was guaranteed by all the Major Powers, the British believed that if the Congo could be given possession of the upper Nile, then the French advance would be halted. The eventual effect would be that German East Africa would be separated from the Belgian Congo, one of the basic conditions required by the Germans of the British in their colonial agreement of 1890.

Through their agreement with the Congo, the British had pursued two policies that were legally dubious. First, it was doubtful that a neutral state had the right to alienate or acquire new territory. The Bahr el Ghazal was legally Egyptian, and legally England did not "own" Egypt. England therefore could not legally lease the territory to the Congo. Second, England did not have the right to take the territory between the Congo and German East Africa. The British had entered into a treaty promising to maintain contact between the Congo and the territories of German East Africa.

The German reaction was understandably bitter. The German Foreign Secretary Marschall commented that "*England will learn that she cannot treat us as she pleases, and that our friendship is preferable to anger.*"[45] He demanded that the lease of the land along the frontier of East Africa be cancelled.[46] In response, Rosebery admitted that the

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[45] Ibid, p. 294.
[46] Ibid.

acquistion of the corridor was incompatible with the Anglo-German agreement of 1890 and agreed to abandon the territory. This episode left traces of anger and resentment on both sides. The historian Sontag comments that this episode pushed England closer to Russia and France, and from then on it refused to concede on Samoa.[47]

England, Germany, the United States and the trouble over Samoa

As mentioned above, the Samoan islands had been neutralized under a nominally native government, but actually ruled jointly by the United States, Great Britain, and Germany under a condominium established by the Berlin Act of 1889.[48] Real authority was vested in five foreigners: the Chief Justice of Samoa (a U.S. judge); the President of the Municipal Council, a German; and the Consuls of the Three Powers. When the king of Samoan islands—Malietoa— died in 1898, the stable situation in Samoa became unravelled. Germany immediately insisted on partitioning Samoa. Furthermore, the Germans backed one successor to the throne, while England and the United States backed another.[49] The Chief Justice of the Islands was asked to rule on the appropriate heir. He ultimately sided with the American and English choice for a successor, and this action subsequently led to civil war. When the smoke cleared, the German choice for successor of the Samoan Kingdom was victorious while the British and American successor fled to a British warship for refuge. The German Consul-general along with the victorious successor to the throne then set up a provisional government, which the Chief Justice of Samoa refused to recognize. It should not be surprising that a quarrel broke out between the British and German representatives in Samoa. The two countries' diplomatic representatives were convinced that each was maneuvering to oust the other from the

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[47] Ibid, p. 295.

[48] Charles S. Campbell, *Anglo-American Understanding: 1898-1903*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1957, p. 150. See also G.H. Ryden, *The Foreign Policy of the United States in Relations to Samoa* (Yale University Press , New Haven, 1933).

islands. The Americans sided with the British over this issue which irritated the Germans further.[50]

In March of 1899, U.S. Admiral Kautz arrived at Apia, the capital of Samoa. He took steps to suppress the disorder resulting from the Samoan civil war. Declaring the Samoan government dissolved, he then bombarded areas held by the German backed Provisional Chief, and arranged for combined American and British Marine landings on the islands. The result was destruction of native property and severe damage to the German consulate. The German backed chief fled with his followers and the British and the Americans then crowned Malietoa Tanu (the chief that they had originally backed) as King of Samoa. The fighting did not end here, however. The civil war continued with U.S. and British ships lending aid to the new monarch against the German backed chief.

Despite Germany's anger over American and British behavior during this affair, the three countries agreed in mid-April 1899 to empower a special commission on the islands to enforce an armistice, and to recommend basic changes to the government. Ultimately, joint British and American marines upheld order enough to implement the Chief Justice's original decision and formed a new provisional government. The commission declared the office of king abolished forever and persuaded Malietoa Tanu to abdicate. Peace was now restored and the English and Germans were eventually able to negotiate a settlement satisfactory to the two of them—but not without bitterness between the two nations.[51]

Kaiser Wilhelm II, Tirpitz and Weltpolitik

It should not be surprising that Germany and England should come close to blows over colonial issues in the South Seas. As I have mentioned previously, Anglo-

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[49] Ibid, pp. 151-2.
[50] Ibid, p. 153.

German friction over the colonial issue dated back to the mid-1880s when Bismarck had inquired about British sovereignty over Angra Pequena. Since that time, however, German demands for a "place in the sun" had become much more prominent in the German psyche. In 1895, the German emperor made a speech delivered on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the empire. In that speech the Kaiser said that the German empire had ceased to be limited to the European Continent, and had become global.[52] J.F.C. Fuller commented that

> the Kaiser's new Weltpolitik was the inevitable result of Germany's rapid industrialization since the Franco-Prussian war. Between 1870 and 1895 her population had increased from 41 million to 55 million, and its substence had become increasingly dependent on foreign trade. To support her traders in all parts of the world, it was therefore imperative for Germany to assume the position of world power.[53]

By the late 1890s, however, the British had clearly shown that they were not willing to permit German expansion overseas and the proliferation of German colonies. Moreover, the British remained the dominant maritime power in the world and therefore proved a significant impediment to the Kaiser's plans for global status. At the Diamond Jubilee of 1897, for example, the British displayed one hundred and sixty five warships, including twenty one first class battleships and fifty four cruisers.[54] Furthermore, the uniqueness of the British geographic position offered England immense advantages. Great Britain could impede German maritime expansion by blockading the German fleet

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[51] Ibid, p. 155.
[52] J.F.C. Fuller, *A Military History of the Western World, Volume III*, Da Capo Press, New York, NY, 1956, p. 172.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Paul Kennedy, "Strategic Aspects of the Anglo-German Naval Race" in Paul Kennedy, ed., *Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945*, George Allen and Unwin Press, Boston, Ma, 1983, p. 129.

in its North Sea ports or preventing their exit from the North Sea by blocking the North Sea passages close to British shores.[55]

In response to this strategic dilemma, in 1897, the newly appointed State Secretary of the Reichsmarineamt, Rear Admiral Tirpitz wrote a crucial memorandum to the Kaiser in which he argued that "*for Germany the most dangerous naval enemy at the present time is England.*"[56] He also proposed to develop a challenge to the Royal Navy between "Helgoland and the Thames"and to concentrate upon the creation of a fleet of battleships not only strong enough to defend German coasts, but strong enough to threaten the overall maritime superiority of the Royal Navy.[57] The reasoning behind the so-called "Risk Fleet" was that Great Britain in attacking such a fleet might lose so many warships that the Royal Navy would be inferior to other rivals, particularly a combined Russian and French naval force.

The British response was as can be expected. The Royal Admiralty was convinced, correctly, that Germany's battleship construction was aimed at Great Britain. The larger the German fleet grew, the more ships the British constructed as an answer. The British developed new battleships—the Dreadnought— to meet the German challenge. The British also brought home more battleships from foreign patrols to meet the growing threat from German naval construction. By the early part of the twentieth century, the British had moved away from the perception of the Germans as an annoying but useful country to have around to assist in the balance of power in Europe. Admiral Lord John Fisher, for example, wrote in 1906:

> Our only probable enemy is Germany. Germany keeps her whole fleet always concentrated within a few hours of England. We must therefore, keep a

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[55] Ibid, p. 136.
[56] Ibid, p. 130.
[57] Ibid, p. 132.

> fleet twice as powerful as that of Germany always concentrated within a few hours of Germany.[58]

The road to world war

Great Britain's concern over the German threat extended beyond the naval arms race and the challenge the German Reichsmarine posed to the British two power standard. Germany took the lead in criticizing the British over its South African policy during the Boer War; the expansion of German overseas trade and growth of her merchant navy increasingly came at the expense of British trade and commerce;[59] and the explosion of German economic and population growth from the 1870s to the 1890s certainly convinced numerous British statesmen that Germany posed the most significant threat to British security.[60] In addition, it must be added that problems with Germany lay at the heart of British national security concerns—security of England's home waters and the century long tradition of maintaining a balance of power in Europe. The combination of these factors led the British to join the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904 and sign the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. These secret alliances formally transformed the international system into a bipolar one, characterized by two rigidified alliances in confrontation. The Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance were to face each other in hostile confrontation until war broke out in the summer of 1914.

As we have seen from this case study, Germany was frustrated by England's unwillingness to permit German colonial expansion, and Britain's reluctance to grant Germany a role commensurate with its growing power. This despite, the growth in German economic and military capabilities; the fact that under Bismarck, Germany had

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[58] Fisher to the Prince of Wales, 23 October 1906 as seen in Ibid, p. 142.
[59] J.F.C. Fuller, *A Military History of the Western World, Volume III*, Da Capo Press, New York, NY, 1956, p. 173.

been the central spoke in the Great Power balance of power system; and that Germany sought to colonize where British or other major power interests seemed to be declining or losing steam. We have also seen German attempts at colonization and expanding her roles and responsibilities constrained by Britain's manipulation of the other powers to suit British ends, not the interests of those she was aligned with. Of equal or greater significance, however, was the role of the other powers in Germany's calculus. Beyond the restraint Great Britain had placed on Germany, German statesmen from Bismarck to Caprivi to Bethmann-Holwegg feared the confrontation between Germany and an allied France and Russia. The likelihood of this taking place increased after 1893 when the two countries entered into an alliance against Germany. To add to Germany's uncertainty, the economic and military power of Russia was on the rise.[61] When Great Britain joined Russia and France in the Triple Entente, the stage was set for military confrontation—a confrontation that would lead to one of the bloodiest conflicts in the history of man.

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[60] Gordon Craig and Alexander Smoke, "The Balance of Power, 1815-1914: Three Experiments" in *Force and Statecraft*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1983, p. 42.
[61] Charles Doran, *Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century's End*, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 1991, p. 126.

5. The United States of America and Great Britain, 1840 to 1903

Background

The early years of the nineteenth century were characterized by bitter rivalry between the United States and Great Britain. The United States had fought for its independence at the end of the eighteenth century, and went to war with Great Britain once again in the second decade of the nineteenth century over the issue of impressment of American sailors into British naval service. From the 1820s to the 1840s the two countries competed vigorously for influence in and control over markets in Latin America. The United States still dreamed of annexing Canada and for a substantial part of the nineteenth century made plans and acted to do so. From 1840 to the end of the century, the United States and Great Britain, had a number of outstanding territorial disputes in Oregon, Maine, Alaska, and Minnesota. As a consequence of these disputes, in addition to numerous other disputes involving British assistance to the South during the Civil War, residual British interests in South America, and commercial and trading controversies near Alaska and Newfoundland, the two countries nearly came to blows on many occassions.

America from the perspective of the Major Powers

In the early nineteenth century, the United States was still seen by most of the major powers as a radical experiment whose conduct in international affairs remained questionable. When agitation began to pick up momentum in South America, to the dismay of the continental powers—Spain in particular—the United States encouraged the agitators to form independent republican governments. The continental powers were also correct in their assessment that the United States was an expansionist power, seeking to

expand on the North American continent until sated. The British, in particular, saw this expansion as threatening commercial and trade interests. If the United States attained greater influence in South America, British trade and investments were likely to suffer from the consequent American protectionism inserted in this region.

But if the United States was seen as a dangerous and unpredictable social and political experiment, from the rapid application of new technologies (e.g., the railroad and the telegraph) it was also seen as a wonder of scientific acheivement. If the British grew annoyed that the United States was promoting self-determination amongst the Latin American republics, they slowly grew relieved that the United States was around to police the increasingly violent and chaotic republics or to get rid of the particularly brutal Spanish colonial regimes in the Caribbean.

The Major Powers from the perspective of the United States

Almost from its inception, the United States saw the Major Powers as relics of an old order—as representatives of monarchies and antiquated means of organizing societies and polities. This attitude manifests itself in American efforts to promote the independence and democratic movements in South America. Related to this attitude was the American perception of alliances and the balance of power as outmoded and immoral instruments of foreign policy. Americans believed that the European concept of a "Concert of Powers" smacked of oligopolies and unfair competition. They had also been warned by their first president to stay away from entangling alliances and over-involvement in European affairs.

On the other hand, the United States saw Great Britain as the best of a bad lot. The British were still tied to the European balance of power system, and therefore, helped perpetuate an outmoded international system; however, the British also had admirable political and legal institutions, which the United States had emulated to some extent; and

Americans recognized that in some areas American and British interests converged such as the common interest to keep the other continental states out of the Americas and China.

The 1840s and the Oregon and Maine Boundary Disputes

By the late 1830s, British-American relations were on the verge of military conflict. In 1837 a rebellion against British rule in Canada had failed, but American sympathies and private aid enraged the British.[1] In addition, the British had been engaged in a campaign against the slave trade which led to encounters between American vessels and British boarding parties. These conflicts put Southern statesmen and congressional representatives in an anti-British mood. In Maine, armed clashes broke out between local authorities from Maine and Canadian lumbermen because the Maine-Canada boundary was ambiguously defined and much of territory was disputed. Canadian authorities had destroyed an American steamer—the Caroline—which had been providing supplies to Canadian rebels during the 1837 uprising. The American steamer was in U.S. territorial waters when the Canadians burned the ship. Finally, in 1840, a former Canadian official on U.S. territory boasted to have taken part in the burning of the Caroline. The Americans threw him in jail and indicted him for murder. The British public frustrated by the increasingly bitter relations between the two countries was about to demand war with the United States.

The situation in Oregon was no less volatile. By 1842, American settlers were pouring into Oregon country and demanding that American rule be extended to all of Oregon country. At the same time, California was also experiencing rebellions by American settlers and was on the verge of breaking loose from Mexican control, while

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[1] Robert Kelley, *The Shaping of the American Past: Volume I to 1877*, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1982, p. 229.

Texas had frequently asked for U.S. annexation.[2] Under these circumstances, a new mood overcame the American public. Americans felt that non-U.S. states should be permitted to enter the union. This attitude was to show itself in the doctrine of "Manifest Destiny"—that is, the belief that the United States should provide the opportunity for all the Americas to join the American union. It was at this time, that the U.S. and Great Britain came into conflict over the Oregon territory.[3]

For years, the British had offered to split the Oregon country along the line of the Columbia River which ran along the 49th Parallel then dropped below it to cut the northwestern part of the present state of Washington in half. The U.S. demanded that Oregon Territory be extended all the way to 54° 40', which if accepted, incorporated a huge part of Western Canada. Western Agricultural interests demanded that the border be drawn this way and the country backed this delineation with the famous slogan "54° 40' or fight!" By late 1845, President Polk had asked Congress permission to inform Britain that the U.S. intended to terminate the joint occupation of Oregon. In 1846, the United States and Great Britain were again on the verge of war.

Fortunately for British-American relations, Great Britain had a new Prime Minister—Robert Peel—who had a different perspective on dealing with the United States. In his view the United States should be treated as a vast economic partner from whom the British could trade and pursue their commercial interests. Historians have this to say of Peel:

> [H]e led one of the great reforming governments in British history. In large part his government was inspired by the same outlook on economic affairs, national and international, that had inspired Jeffersonians and Jacksonians in the United States. Peel and his spectacular protege, young William Gladstone, conceived it their task to reshape the

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[2] Ibid, p. 247.
[3] Ibid, p. 250.

> British economy along the lines called for by Adam Smith. Tariffs and monoploies should be eliminated, thus freeing the national economy to be dynamic and opening the nation to free trade with the world.[4]

Peel believed that the United States represented a vast market for British textiles and other finished manufactured goods. Parliamentary committees by 1833 concluded that railroads would soon be granting more access to the grain surplus areas of the American far west. The British reasoned that the economic benefit of complementary trade would probably bring with it new iron production orders for British steel producers.[5] The United States in the early 1800s lacked the steel industry able to produce the steel necessary to construct a vast network of railroads to connect the western states with the rest of the United States.[6]

To deal with the torrent of poor relations between the two countries, Peel sent Lord Ashburton, a banker with good connections in America to initiate the negotiations with the United States. Fortunately for the two countries, the Canadian official jailed over the Caroline Affair had been released as a result of a new alibi.[7] On the issue of the Maine boundary dispute, Ashburton and then Secretary of State, Daniel Webster wrestled with a number of sticky security, economic and colonial issues. The British, concerned over Canadian security, desired to build a military road from Montreal and Quebec to St. John and Halifax. The border, as Americans wished it, would leave this road vulnerable to swift American attack. Similarly, the Americans were concerned about retaining forts constructed in Maine to keep watch of Canadian forces in the East. Also in dispute were some thousands of square miles of Canadian territory that the King of the Netherlands had previously awarded the United States as arbitrator.

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[4] Ibid, p. 230.
[5] Scott C. James and David A. Lake, "The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain's Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846" in *International Organizations*, 1989, vol. 43, #1, p. 16.
[6] Ibid, p. 17.

The Webster -Ashburton Treaty of 1842

The eventual fruit of the labors of Ashburton and Webster was a compromise treaty delineating the Maine boundary. The Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 involved give and take from both Great Britain and the United States. The boundary was set far enough to the south so that it did not block the military road that Britain wanted to build from Montreal and Quebec to St. John and Halifax.[8] The United States got about 7,000 of the 12,000 square miles under dispute. This was about 893 square miles less than the U.S. would have received under the King of Netherlands' award of 1831.[9] The agreement was north of Britain's maximum claim.[10] To the west, the United States got most of the territory at the head of the Connecticutt River, and the border bent enough to the north of the 45th latitude so that it left the U.S. in possession of the fort at Rouses point.[11] The United States received a favorable boundary between Lake Superior and the Lake of the Woods.[12] The treaty set Minnesota's boundary with Canada so that the iron deposits of the Mesahi Range were granted to the U.S.[13] The treaty provided for free navigation of all waters bordering both America and Canada.[14] Finally, both sides promised to maintain a presence of warships off the West African coast to curb the illegal slave trade.[15]

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[7] Robert Kelley, *The Shaping of the American Past: Volume I to 1877*, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1982, p. 230.
[8] Charles S. Campbell, *From Revolution to Rapprochement, Great Britain-U.S. Relations 1783 to 1900*, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, NY, 1974, p. 59.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid, pp. 59-60.
[12] Ibid, p. 60.
[13] The Shaping, p. 230.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.

The Oregon Settlement

Despite the volatility of the Oregon boundary dispute, by 1845 the parties to the dispute had begun to move toward settlement. On July 12, 1845, the Secretary of State, James Buchanan, proposed to London that the boundary along the 49th Parallel be extended from the Rockies to the Pacific.[16] If accepted, this line would have cut across the Southern tip of Vancouver Island. Britain, therefore, was offered any ports she might desire on that tip.[17] This was a significant withdrawal from 54° 40'. The Americans apparently were withdrawing their claims to parts of Western Canada. This meant that only one area was in dispute, the western half of the present state of Washington. This area, however, contained Puget Sound—a valuable military and commercial base in the Northwest Pacific.[18] The British rejected the offer, and out of anger President Polk returned to the original demand of 54° 40'.[19] Great Britain dug in and stuck to its position that the line should be drawn along the Columbia river, which meant that the Western half of Washington State would remain in British control. In reaction to British recalcitrance, President Polk agreed that if Britain made the *proposition "extending the boundary to the Pacific by the 49th Parallel and the Strait of Fuca"* he would submit the proposal to the Senate *"though with reluctance"*. [20]

Polk had originally proposed that the line cut across Vancouver Island. If the boundary went to the ocean around the southern tip of Vancover through the Juan de Fuca Strait, all of Vancouver would be British, and Britain would be assured of control of one

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[16] Charles S. Campbell, *From Revolution to Rapprochement, Great Britain-U.S. Relations 1783 to 1900*, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, NY, 1974 p. 66.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Robert Kelley, *The Shaping of the American Past: Volume I to 1877*, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1982, p. 250.
[19] Charles S. Campbell, *From Revolution to Rapprochement, Great Britain-U.S. Relations 1783 to 1900*, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, NY, 1974, p. 66
[20] Ibid, p. 70.

side of the entrance to the inland waters.[21] This formula seemed to work out the strategic costs to the British by conceding Puget Sound—a valuable naval base— to the Americans. The British, however, asked for one more concession, that Polk agree to perpetual free navigation of the Columbia River by the Hudson Bay Company.[22] Within a few days of this proposal, Polk accepted the offer and submitted the treaty to the Senate for ratification.[23]

The sound of silence: Great Britain's role during the U.S.-Mexican War

During the volatile period of the 1840s it is worth noting that the British did not use alliances and a regional balance of power to manipulate the United States. Just as the British and the Americans were arguing vociferously over the Oregon dispute, the United States was in the middle of an intensifying row with its neighbor to the south. The Mexicans had become increasingly unhappy with rebellions in California, expansion in New Mexico, and problems with American settlers in Texas. In 1846, just as the United States was in deadlock with Great Britain over Oregon, a border clash erupted along the Rio Grande. American soldiers stationed along the river were killed, and the outcry for a declaration of war swept the United States. President Polk, in the middle of heated negotiations over Oregon was not certain that war would not similarly erupt in the Northwest territories. It was therefore an act of faith that he assumed that the difficulties with Great Britain would be resolved, and then proceeded to declare war on the Mexicans in 1846. Fortunately for the President, the British did not take advantage of the sticky strategic situation the United States seemed to be in, and continued to negotiate the resolution of the Oregon dispute.

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[21] Ibid, pp. 70-1.
[22] Robert Kelley, *The Shaping of the American Past: Volume I to 1877*, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1982, p. 251.
[23] Ibid.

The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850

Despite the progress made between the United States and Great Britain over border disputes in Maine and in Oregon, the two countries competed vigorously for influence in South America. The British themselves were uninterested in gaining new territory in South America, but they were intent on preventing the United States from gaining new territories. Furthermore, in the 1830s and 1840s, the Americans had been pressing for the development of an isthmian canal in Nicaragua. This was a serious concern to the British who correctly assessed that an isthmian canal not controlled by the British would place in the hands of the United States the ability to change the maritime balance of forces in the Western Hemisphere. Should a conflict erupt between Great Britain and another continental power, a rival power's access to such a canal from the Far East might lead to a favorable ratio of foreign warships over British during a conflict in the Western Hemisphere. As the historian Charles Campbell has written of such a canal:

> An isthmian canal would transform patterns of world commerce, would modify [British] military and naval strategy, and would profoundly affect the whole international balance of power.[24]

In 1850, the British and the Americans came to a mutually acceptable understanding over their respective roles in Latin America. That year, the British minister to the United States, Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer, and the U.S. Secretary of State, John M. Clayton, negotiated what was later to become the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Despite the contents of the Monroe Doctrine, enunciated close to thirty years previously, both countries agreed that "*Neither Country would ever maintain exclusive control over a canal in Central America or fortify a canal; and that neither would 'colonize' or assume,*

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[24] Charles S. Campbell, *Anglo-American Understanding: 1898-1903*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Md., 1957, p. 62.

or exercise any dominion over...any part of Central America."[25] Both countries agreed that should a canal be constructed, they would guarantee the canal's neutrality. The historian Campbell asserts that in promising not to colonize Central America, the U.S made the sort of commitment that Great Britain was looking for elsewhere on the continental U.S.[26] In agreeing that no major power should dominate South America, Britain effectively promised to back the demands of the Monroe Doctrine with the Royal Navy.

The American Civil War

The Civil War in the United States was an opportunity many in Europe were waiting for. Since the late eighteenth century, the United States had been free to expand in the continent without being checked by a rival power. With the possible break up of the Union, European statesmen correctly recognized a "balancer" in the guise of the Confederacy. Lords Palmerston and Russell, the British Prime and Foreign Ministers respectively contemplated using the Royal Navy to attack the United States Navy in order to neutralize the Union's maritime superiority over the Confederacy.[27] In one of the more extreme policies for consideration, the British Cabinet considered strengthening Canadian defenses and attacking Union cities with the British fleet.[28]

While no such measures were ever undertaken the British did permit and even encourage the production of Confederacy commerce raiders in British shipbuilding yards. One such raider, the Alabama, went on to wreak significant damage on Union property—a point of serious contention between the United States and Great Britain after the war ended. In the end, the British never undertook policies of alliance building with the

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[25] Charles S. Campbell, *From Revolution to Rapprochement, Great Britain-U.S. Relations 1783 to 1900*, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, NY, 1974, p. 81.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid, pp. 103-4.

American confederacy or with the French (as we will see shortly) to keep the United States in check. Despite a clear opportunity to align British naval power with the armies of the Confederacy, the British did not promote a balance of power in the Western Hemisphere as it had done in European affairs. Why?

The most plausible explanation is that upon declaring that the American Civil War was about the end of slavery, the United States had removed an ideological barrier between itself and Great Britain.[29] The United States and Great Britain had signed an anti-slave treaty in April 1862. The Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 convinced the average British citizen that the war was about slavery.[30] As a consequence, there was almost no public support for a British alliance or alignment with the pro-Slavery South.[31] Henry Adams, living in England during the War wrote:

> It [the Emancipation Proclamation] is creating an almost convulsive reaction in our favor all over this country...This state of feeling [in favor of British intervention] existed up to the announcement of the President's Emancipation Policy. From that moment our old anti-slavery feeling began to arouse itself, and it has been gathering strength ever since...[32]

While the Civil War still raged, the French Emperor, Napoleon III, seeking to reassert French influence in the Western Hemisphere installed an Austrian nobleman, Maximillian on the Mexican "throne". The British refused to cooperate in the adventure and offered no support. When the Civil War ended, the American Secretary of State, Seward, placed troops along the Mexican border and informed Napoleon that the United States would not recognize the new regime. Through patient diplomacy and the subtle

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[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid, p. 104.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., January 23, 1863, Worthington C. Ford, ed., *A Cycle of Adams Letters, 1861-1865*, Boston and New York, 1920, vol. I, p. 243. Charles S. Campbell, *Anglo-American Understanding: 1898-1903*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore,Md., 1957, p. 105.

use of force, Seward got Napoleon in 1867 to withdraw those French troops that had accompanied Maximilian to Mexico. Maximillian refused to leave with the departing French troops and he was eventually executed by the Mexicans.[33]

United States-Great Britain arbitration in the 1870s

Shortly after the completion of the Civil War, the United States was enraged over Britain's wartime policy. As mentioned above, the British government had permitted the construction of Confederacy commerce raiders in British shipyards. The Alabama had gone on to disrupt American trade, destroyed Union property and damaged and sunk numerous Union vessels during the war. In the early 1870s, furthermore, a group of Irish-Americans (the Fenians) protesting British rule in Ireland, launched attacks on Canadian soil causing millions of dollars of damage. Finally, as yet another border dispute arose between Great Britain and the United States when the two countries could not agree over ownership of San Juan island between Seattle and Vancouver. These three emotional episodes again nearly brought the two countries into direct military conflict.

Fortunately, the two sides had enough of a history of cooperation that they agreed to go to arbitration to resolve these issues. The San Juan island dispute was put before the German Emperor to settle. He decided to grant the islands to the United States. A tribunal of arbitrators in Geneva awarded Great Britain a sum of U.S. $ 2 million for the damage caused by the Fenians. Finally, the *Alabama* issue was also presented to the tribunal of arbitrators in Geneva. In contrast to the Fenian decision, the arbitrators awarded the United States fifteen and a half million dollars. Through patient diplomacy, a general level of trust between the two Atlantic powers, and arbitration, the United States

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[33] Robert Kelley, *The Shaping of the American Past: Volume I to 1877*, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1982, p. 374.

and Great Britain weathered the most contentious issues existing between them since the end of the Civil War

The Venezuela Crisis of 1895-6

Through the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and the British decision to side with the U.S. principle of allowing no European power to expand their colonies in South America, Great Britain had since 1850 essentially backed the Monroe Doctrine with the Royal Navy as collateral. In 1895 a crisis emerged that was to disturb the Anglo-American agreement on the roles of each in the Western Hemisphere. In that year, the independent republic of Venezuela engaged in a border dispute with British Guiana, a British Colony. The United States insisted that it spoke for Venezuela, and indeed any independent republic of the Americas, as it declared was its right through the Monroe Doctrine. The British insisted that this was an affair between a sovereign state, Venezuela and the government of Great Britain, since British Guiana was one of its colonies. In reaction, President Grover Cleveland promised war if the British did not accept the principle that the United States was responsible for representing all the republics of the Americas. Historians appear to be in consensus that the United States was swept with war fever and that a third war with Great Britain appeared inevitable.

In Europe, in the meantime, the Continental Powers were outraged by American behavior during the Venezuela crisis. The French press was hostile to the United States during this time, as illustrated by many French articles which commented on the poor behavior of the United States in Latin America.[34] Germany and Austria supported the British stand on Venezuela.[35] In general the major powers saw the Venezuela Crisis as an

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[34] LeTemps (Paris) 2 January 1896 as appears in A.E. Campbell, *Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903*, Greenwood Press Publishers, Westport, Connecticutt, 1960, p. 33.
[35] A.E. Campbell, *Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903*, Greenwood Press Publishers, Westport, Connecticutt, 1960, p. 32.

example of the United States taking the Monroe Doctrine too far.[36] Furthermore, as Germany discovered from its failed attempts at expansion in South America and in the South Pacific, the rise of a new power appeared to counter the interests of the established major powers. Great Britain, then, had a clear opportunity to align itself with the other major powers and confront the United States militarily. This, Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister did not do.

South America was seen as marginally important. Salisbury and his colleagues believed that it could be sacrificed. Britain could abdicate responsibility there so long as it did not lead to loss of prestige.[37] As a consequence, the British cabinet reasoned that the other powers should not be brought into the conflict. Great Britain and the United States would handle the affair on their own. The British historian A.E. Campbell surmised that Salisbury was engaging in a long-term calculation over the benefits of coming to a negotiated settlement with the United States. He writes:

> If Salisbury was right, the emergence of the United States as a great Power was in a large sense likely to be advantageous to Britain, with no great interest in further expansion and beginning to feel the pressure of French, German and Russian imperialism. If the United States were not provoked into active hostility, it was a fair British calculation that, given time and encouragement, historical accident would make her policy more favourable to Britain than not.[38]

In 1896, Salisbury and his Cabinet seemed to have already made the concession the United States was looking for. In debates in Parliament he spoke of the Venezuela issue as proceeding "*with entire friendliness on the part of both governments*" and "*the United States has assumed the attitude of the friend of Venezuela, and we have been rather glad to negotiate with the United States rather than*

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[36] Ibid, p. 33.
[37] Ibid, p. 34.
[38] Ibid, p. 36.

Venezuela...[Furthermore]..the United States has shown a disposition to adopt as its own questions affecting many Republics in South America. I do not in the least quarrel with that disposition."[39] In August, 1896, the Foreign Minister, Lord Balfour, remarked that "*the latest proposals of Mr. Olney (the Secretary of State) are still under consideration by the government, and are regarded by them as opening the way to an equitable settlement...The government have every expectation that the pending negotations will lead to an early and satisfactory result* [cheers]."[40]

Even the British public felt that peaceful negotiations with the United States was in the best interest of Great Britain, and even recognizing U.S. preeminence in the Western Hemisphere was good for Britain.[41] Again the British historian A.E. Campbell writes that by the end of the nineteenth century, the British public and statesmen had come to feel comfortable with the trade-off—the Western Hemisphere as America's sphere of influence in exchange for American responsibility for policing that region. He writes:

> On the whole, the American use of that doctrine (the Monroe Doctrine) was hailed with pleasure, even if it had been wrongly introduced into a dispute to which it had no relevance. It was treated, illogically enough, as the American definition of their sphere of paramount interest...the United States would control the Americas, but not stray beyond them. That meant that concessions to the United States would not be merely the first of ever larger concessions. There would be a limit. On the other hand, the new Monroe Doctrine did insist on American hegemony in South America. This implied, or so British opinion held, some degree of responsibility for the behavior of the South American republics, who had an evil reputation for maltreating foreign nationals and not paying debts. It was noted that the United States did not support the extreme Venezuelan claim

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[39] Ibid, p. 39; *The Parliamentary Debates* (Fourth Series), 1896, XLIII, p. 215.
[40] A.E. Campbell, *Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903*, Greenwood Press Publishers, Westport, Ct., 1960, p. 39. *The Parliamentary Debates* (Fourth Series), 1896, XLIV, p. 851.
[41] A.E. Campbell, *Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903*, Greenwood Press Publishers, Westport, Connecticutt, 1960, pp. 39-40.

> and that twice in the course of the negotiations the threat of leaving her to conduct them alone was used to bring Venezuela to reason...
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> From this it was a short step to the idea that American supervision of South American republics would actually be profitable to Britain, which had no important interests there beyond the collection of debts.[42]

In the end the two countries again agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration, but the structure of the eventual agreement had already been created. As a consequence of Britain's recognizing and accepting American suzerainty over the Western Hemisphere, the United States was permitting the British to set the boundary between British Guiana and Venezuela at a location favorable to the colony. All that was left to do was to set the exact delineation of the boundary. An arbitration tribunal consisting of two American Supreme Court Justices, two British jurists, and one Russian jurist, convened and granted an award favorable to Great Britain on October 3, 1899.[43]

The Spanish-American War, 1898

By early 1898, rebellion in Cuba had been going on for three years. Reports of brutality by both the ruling Spanish authorities and the Cuban rebels were common both in Europe and in the United States.[44] All of the major powers except Great Britain sided with Spain over the issue. The United States supported the rebels, and again made the issue of rebellion in Cuba a Western Hemisphere issue not to be interferred with by any of the major powers. As mentioned above, the Continental Powers were growing nervous over American expansion and infringement on the interests of the more mature powers of Europe. Even England had interests in supporting Spain. There was still the danger that the United States might expand to take over both Canada and Mexico; U.S.

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[42] Ibid, p. 44.

[43] Charles S. Campbell, *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, MD, 1957, p. 6.

exports could capture British markets; and Great Birtain had trading interests in Cuba and Puerto Rico—interests that might be lost if the United States were to take over these territories.

Despite these apparent interests, the British sided with the United States and the rebels against Spain. Why? Spain posed no geo-political or strategic threat to Great Britain, nor did its support tip the balance of power in Europe in Britain's favor. So the Cabinet's motives were unlikely to reside in the realm of the balance of power. In 1898, Spain was so weak that its political support was unlikely to prove useful in Great Britain's political struggles with Russia, France, and Germany. More likely, the British viewed American intervention into the Cuban crisis as representative of responsible management of the international system. Recall that part of the British acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine was due to the belief that the United States would responsibly manage the Western Hemisphere. And, in the opinion of the British, Spanish suppression of the Cuban rebellion smacked of irresponsible behavior. *The Times* wrote in 1898:

> We know how, in this country, public opinion has been more than once profoundly stirred by atrocities perpetrated in the Turkish Empire and how these spasms of popular emotion, often heedless equally of fact and reason, have deflected international policy and disturbed international relations. We do not therefore, reproach the American people, in the least, with their interest in the Cuban sufferers by the Spanish misgovernment, or with their impatience at the continuance of evils that are a discredit to the civilization of Spain.[45]

As war between Spain and the United States became more likely, the British took actions that were increasingly in support of America. British newspapers expressed sympathy for the American lives lost as a result of the explosion on the U.S. battleship

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[44] Ibid, p. 26.
[45] *The Times*, April 15, 1898.

Maine.[46] One British newspaper called for a demonstration, in support of the United States, at Havana harbor by the British North American squadron. The article went on to suggest the sale of British warships to the United States.[47]

In the meantime, so as to prevent the fall of a fellow monarchy, the other European powers discussed amongst themselves the possibility of intervening. Austria took the lead in advocating intervention. When Great Britain was approached by Austria to participate in a joint intervention, the British gave a discouraging reply.[48] The Foreign Office, in the meantime, had given explicit instructions to the ambassador to the U.S.—Sir Julian Pauncefote—to inform the U.S. government of any coordinating major power activity, and not to act without permission from the White House.[49]

Despite these instructions, Pauncefote inexplicably met with fellow ministers to the United States. They then drafted a letter expressing the hope of the six powers (Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia) that the United States would work toward a peaceful solution of the Cuba crisis and accept Spain's proposal for an armistice.[50] The agreed upon letter reached the Foreign Office on April 15, 1898. Arthur Balfour, was in charge of the Foreign Office while Lord Salisbury was apparently on leave due to illness. He wrote to Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary:

> I confess to be in great perpexity...The Representatives of the Powers at Washington...appear to wish us to give the United States a lecture on international morality. If Pauncefote had not associated himself with this policy I confess I should have rejected it at once.[51]

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[46] *The Daily Chronicle*, April 7, 1898.
[47] Charles S. Campbell, *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1957, p. 27.
[48] Rumbold to Salisbury, March 29, 1898, as appears in ibid, p. 29.
[49] *State Department, Great Britian, Despatches*, Hay to Sherman, April 6, 1898.
[50] Charles S. Campbell, Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, MD, 1957, p. 34.
[51] B.E.C. Dugdale, *Arthur James Balfour, First Earl of Balfour*, K.G.O.M., F.R.S. Etc. Vol. I, New York, NY, 1937, p. 192.

Balfour rejected the note. The same day he telegraphed Pauncefote stating that while Britain would join the other powers in statements favoring peace, "*it seems very doubtful whether we ought to commit ourselves to a judgment adverse to the United States, and whether in the interests of peace such a step would be desirable.*"[52] Two days later Balfour warned Pauncefote not to display any support for a joint representation of any kind:

> I gather that the President is most anxious to avoid if possible a rupture with Spain. In these circumstances advice to United States of America by other Powers can only be useful if it strengthens his hands, and of this he must be the best judge. Considering our present ignorance as to his views, and extreme improbability that unsought advance will do any good, and the inexpediency of adopting any course which may suggest that we take sides in this controversy we shall, at least for the moment, do nothing.[53]

After the Foreign Office withdrew its support for a Great Power intervention, the proposal of the Washington envoys lost momentum. When war between Spain and the United States did eventually erupt, dramatic events from the conflict illustrated just how close the British and the United States were on numerous issues. When American Commodore Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Harbor, the British were forced to contemplate the sudden prospect of American naval power dominant in the Pacific. While the other major powers were disturbed over the rise in American power, the British, to the contrary, encouraged American expansion. *The Times* wrote in 1898:

> ..if the United States are to become one of the dominant...forces in...the Pacific, it is obvious that

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[52] Balfour to Pauncefote, April 15, 1898, as appears in Charles S. Campbell, *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, MD, 1957, p. 35.
[53] Balfour to Pauncfote, April 17, 1898, as appears in Charles S. Campbell, Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, MD, 1957, p. 36.

> the policy of open trade, to which our transatlantic kinsmen are as much bound as we are in the Far East, will be enormously strengthened.[54]

Great Britain encouraged the United States to annex the Philippines. Ambassador Hay notified the Secretary of State and the President that the British government would express disappointment if America did not keep the Philippines.[55] Furthermore, the British encouraged the United States to annex Hawaii as well. It was the British hope that if the U.S. made a small move out into the Pacific, it would move further out into the Philippines.[56] *The Spectator* wrote in 1898:

> We think America will keep the Philippines, and we heartily hope it. She will govern them well enough, much better than any Power except ourselves, and we have more of the world's surface than we can well manage...The envy we excite is already too great...It would be a relief if another English-speaking Power would take up a portion of our task, and in taking it, perform the duty of repaying something to the world which yields her such advantages. The 'weary Titan', in fact, needs an ally whose aspirations, ideas, and language are like his own in the great American people.[57]

The Alaska Boundary Dispute

The Alaskan boundary had not been challenged by Great Britain, nor by Canada since the United States purchased Alaska in the mid-nineteenth century from Russia in 1867. By as late as 1897 when Americans started building up its territory there, no one in Britain or Canada protested American claims to Alaskan territory.[58] This situation was to

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[54] *The Times*, May 9, 1898.
[55] C.J.S. Olcott, *The Life of William McKinley*, Boston and New York, 1916, vol. 2, p. 135.
[56] Charles S. Campbell, *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, MD, 1957,p. 42.
[57] "The Capture of Manila" and "The Fate of the Philippines" in *Spectator LXXX*, 7 May 1898.
[58] Charles S. Campbell, *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, MD, 1957, p. 105.

change dramatically when gold was discovered in the Yukon territories. At this time, the Canadians saw that there were advantages to having a port on the Canada-Alaska coast readily accessible from the interior. This port they could only obtain by establishing their permanent title to a port along the coast. The possibility of a modus vivendi which granted a port to the Canadians was not possible because Canada did not have possession of any port. However, the ambiguity of the Russo-British Treaty of 1825 gave Canada hope for a claim to a port along the coast. The wording in the treaty was as follows:

> ...[T]he limit between the British Possessions and the line of Coast which is to belong to Russia, as above-mentioned, shall be formed by a line parallel to the windings of the Coast, and which shall never exceed the distance of ten marine leagues therefrom.[59]

The problem with this language was that the coastline was "*indented with long inlets running as much as two hundred miles inland, the most important of which was the Lynn Canal.*"[60] The difference in interpretation of the treaty came down to whether the coastline of Alaska should be regarded as running around the heads of inlets or across their mouths. Historians point out the significance of one interpretation over another:

> In a coast so deeply indented the second interpretation would give Canada access to the sea at the head of several inlets and break American territory into a series of promontories, while the other would deny the Canadians a useful sea exit from the Yukon and give the United States an unbroken coastline.[61]

The Joint High Commission convened between the United States and Great Britain and Canada to resolve the issues of the boundary dispute, Canada-American commercial reciprocity and Alaskan Pelagic sealing issues had proved unable to resolve

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[59] British and Foreign State Papers, 1824-25, (London, UK, 1826), pp. 40-1.
[60] Charles S. Campbell, *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Md., 1957, p. 91.

the boundary issue. The Canadians warned of impending conflict between the parties. The possibility of armed clashes between American and Canadian settlers was increasing day by day. Great Britain urged the parties to resolve the conflict through arbitration, while the United States, confident in its claim, repeatedly rejected the suggestion. The United States was similarly reluctant to submit the argument to a foreign umpire because its decision-makers believed that umpires would compromise the proposals and split the demands of both sides down the middle.

From a stand of no compromise on the issue of sovereignty, the British changed their position and suggested to the Canadians that Canada consider leasing a port along the coasts similar to the arrangement Britain had made with Portugal in which the UK leased land at the Chinde mouth of the Zambezi river. Canada could give up the Lynn Canal to the United States if she were awarded a lease of territory around the canal, with the liberty to build a railway from there to the Yukon territory.[62] The Canadians did not want to accept this formula, unless the lease promised a harbor under Canada's jurisdiction.[63] This raised the difficulty of American navigation laws which prevented foreign vessels from participating in coastal trade.[64] In the end, Canada rejected Great Britain's suggestion. As time passed, the British became increasingly frustrated and aware that the Canadian case was weak. Neither the Canadians, nor the British had uttered a protest to the American claim, and to now contest American sovereignty thirty years after the fact was increasingly seen in Whitehall as questionable policy. In response

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[61] Ibid.
[62] Ibid, pp. 144-5.
[63] Ibid, p. 145.
[64] American navigation laws stated that foreign vessels could not trade along the same United States coast. Therefore, Canadian vessels out of Newfoundland could not fish in American waters then make stops in American ports along the East Coast to make sales. Similarly, American navigation law prevented Canadian fishing vessels from sealing in Alaskan waters and making sales in American ports. If the Canadians were permitted jurisdiction of the harbor, they would engage in coastal trade from the American West Coast up to the Lynn Canal in Alaska. This would have violated U.S. law since the Lynn Canal would still be considered U.S. territory leased to Canada.

to Canadian intransigence, the British Foreign Office sent Canada this bluntly worded message:

> We desire to impress upon your Ministers that whatever arguments may be based on letter of Treaty of 1825, careful examination of United States case for possession of shores of Canal based on continuous uncontested jurisdiction since date of Treaty, and admissions of Hudson Bay Company, Imperial and Dominion governments, shews that it is unassailable.
>
> Delay in settlement highly prejudicial to Canadian interests.[65]

Throughout the discussions to resolve the issue, the Americans had argued that a body of six jurists, three American and three British/Canadian should decide the boundary dispute—the majority decision determining the outcome. The British had resisted this idea, correctly noting that such a formula would probably lead to a deadlock. By the end of 1899, the British agreed to submit the issue to six jurists as the United States had demanded. The British side consisted of: Sir L.A. Jette, then lieutenant governor of Quebec but also a former judge of the Superior Court of Quebec; J.D. Armour, Chief Justice of Ontario; and Lord Alverstone, Lord Chief Justice of Great Britain. The United States chose for its jurists: Elihu Root, the Secretary of War; Henry Cabot Lodge, the Senator from Massachussetts; and George Turner, a retired Senator from the state of Washington. The Canadians correctly argued that none of the American selectees was a legal specialist of any stature. On the other hand, the British and Canadian appointees could all be considered legal authorities.

Ultimately, the arbitration yielded a surprising result. All three American jurists voted for the U.S. claim, the two Canadians voted for Canada's claim, and Lord Alverstone, to the horror of Canada, sided with the United States. Needless to say, the

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[65] Chamberlain to Minto (telegraph) (Secret) 1 June 1899, as seen in Charles Campbell, *Anglo American Understanding, 1898-1903*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore Md, 1957, (p. 341).

Canadian press and Canadian public opinion strongly condemned the agreement. The two Canadian jurists, furthermore, refused to sign the award.[66] The British public and government, on the other hand accepted the decision, noting that it was a relief to resolve a very contentious issue with a friendly power. Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign Minister, summarized the British cabinets perspective on the result:

> It is therefore most fortunate that we should have been successful in removing that question from the path of our diplomacy. The result in the finding of the tribunal has no doubt not been entirely satisfactory to us, and in this respect I do not draw any distinction between the interests of the Dominion of Canada and our interests. The question at issue is a question of the position not merely of the frontier of Canada, but of the frontier of the British Empire, for the defence and integrity of which we are responsible. But, my Lords, I do not think that any one seriously expected that we should obtain a favourable verdict on all points; and I am inclined to find some consolation in the fact that our military and naval advisers tell us confidently that the two islands in the Portland Channel which, under this award were given to the United States, are of no strategical value whatever.[67]

If Canadians condemned the decision, and Britons were resigned to its result, Americans were impressed by the apparent justness of British jurisprudence. Lord Alverstone was held in absolutely the highest regard throughout the United States. Lodge wrote to his daughter of Alverstone:

> So it ends. It has been a great transaction, more momentous perhaps than the world thinks. The decision is a great victory for us, but better than that is the final removal of the one dangerous question from the relations of two great nations. More I will tell you when we meet, & especially of the courage

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[66] Charles Campbell, *Anglo American Understanding, 1898-1903*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore Md, 1957, p. 341.

[67] *The Parliamentary Debates* (fourth series) 1904, CXXIX, pp. 39-40 as seen in Campbell, op cit.

> and fairness of Lord Alverstone, who has had a hard part to play.[68]

The Hay-Pauncefote Canal Treaty, 1903

By the end of the nineteenth century, there was a growing sentiment in the United States that America should construct a transisthmian canal in South America. This was prompted by a number of different forces then in play in the United States: the growing number of overseas acquisitions following the Spanish-American War and the annexation of Hawaii; the writings of Mahan that suggested that sea power was a key to national greatness; and the experience of the battleship Oregon that had to traverse around South America to get to action in the Caribbean. The one obstacle to such an endeavor—and it was a significant one—was the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 which I have mentioned earlier in this chapter. To reiterate the substance of the agreement, the Treaty stated that any isthmian canal should be constructed by the United States and Great Britain in a joint effort. It also set down a variety of regulations for the operational control of the canal once built. The only legal basis the United States had to stand on in getting rid of or modifying the Treaty was that it was an old treaty.

In 1898, President McKinley said in a speech that the United States should embark upon a project to consruct an Isthmian canal.[69] The British had been aware of the American intentions through diplomatic efforts by American representatives in Britian, and through the interactions of Secretary of State Hay with the British Ambassador Lord Pauncefote. British officials had been informed by these U.S. envoys that the President's speech did not mean that the United States was ignoring its obligations to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty—only that the U.S. was making it known that Great Britain and the

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[68] Lodge to his daughter, October 19, 1903, as appears in Campbell op. cit. p. 341.
[69] See Charles S. Campbell, *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903*, Johns Hopkins Univesity Press, Baltimore, MD, 1957, pp. 128-9.

United States should get together to discuss re-negotiating the terms of the agreement.[70] On December 31, 1898, Lord Salisbury authorized Lord Pauncefote to discuss with Secretary of State Hay the possibility of altering the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.[71]

By January 11, 1899, the two statesmen had finished drafting a preliminary agreement modifying Clayton-Bulwer. Of particular note, the document allowed the U.S. to construct a canal without the participation of the British. Unfortunately, the British Cabinet took its time approving the draft. It handed the document over to the dominion states for review and approval, and the result was a delay in approval because the Canadians insisted on linking the the Canal issue with the Alaskan border dispute.[72] Furthermore, the British Cabinet was in no hurry to approve the draft because the security implications of an American built canal still had to be examined by the Admiralty.[73] At a glance, it was clear that the construction of a canal controlled by the United States was certainly militarily advantageous to the United States. The U.S. would be able to concentrate her Atlantic and Pacific squadrons in one ocean where needed without having to send them around Cape Horn, an advantage only it apparently would enjoy.[74] Without an isthmian canal, the British Pacific squadrons possessed a temporary advantage over American naval forces. This would be valuable in war and a canal was sure to eliminate this advantage.[75] Finally, the Joint High Commission, convened to discuss the Alaska Boundary issue, had failed to come to a resolution. The Cabinet felt that it was politically

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[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid, p. 130.
[72] Ibid, p. 132.
[73] Ibid, p. 133.
[74] A. E. Campbell, *Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903*, Greenwood Press Publishers, Westport, Connecticutt, 1960, p. 52.
[75] Ibid.

impossible to accept such a proposal as long as there were outstanding U.S.-Canadian issues still left to be resolved.[76]

In the United States, British Ambassador Pauncefote's view was that a quick decision from London was necessary. If the issue was left dormant too long, it might be captured by those interests in the United States that believed that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty should be rid of completely, and who also believed that it was absurd for Great Britain to receive some form of compensation because it permitted the U.S. to build a canal at America's own expense, and which would benefit Great Britain and the world.[77] Pauncefote's fears materialized when the Hepburn Bill, which called for the construction of an isthmian canal, was proposed in Congress.[78] Some congressmen frustrated with the lack of British action were increasingly prepared to take action on the canal regardless of the existence of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. The bill was adopted by the committees of both houses of Congress, and the American press predicted that a "Nicaraguan Canal" would be authorized by Congress.[79] Both Secretary of State Hay and Ambassador Pauncefote were worried by the mood in Congress and both statesmen urged the British cabinet to sign the draft convention if only to undermine the Hepburn Bill.[80]

By early 1900, the British Cabinet had made the decision to resolve the Canal issue as quickly as possible. In a letter to Ottawa, the Colonial Office urged the Canadians to delink the two issues of the Canal and the Alaska boundary.[81] In the letter, Joseph Chamberlain, then Colonial Secretary, argued that the Alaskan boundary dispute was nowhere close to resolution. At the same time, he pointed out to the Canadian ministers that a failure to sign the canal treaty would offend a friendly power, which had

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[76] Charles S. Campbell, *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903*, Johns Hopkins Univesity Press, Baltimore, MD, 1957, p. 133.
[77] Ibid, p. 134.
[78] Ibid, p. 189.
[79] Ibid.
[80] Ibid, p. 190.

consequences for both Britain and Canada.[82] The Canadians, realizing that the British Cabinet was going to sign the treaty with or without Canadian approval sent their approval in early 1900.[83] At that, Hay and Pauncefote signed the draft convention on 5 February 1900.

The first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1900 withdrew the British insistence in a share in the building and maintenance of the canal.[84] Furthermore, the Suez Canal had been constructed since the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty had been signed, and the Suez Canal had been declared by Britain as "netural".[85] British statesmen and American negotiators as well, assumed that similar neutrality terms of the new treaty should emulate those governing the Suez Canal, and that the other Powers were invited to adhere to it.[86] In the end, the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1900 was a diplomatic triumph for the United States. It had eliminated the most objectionable pact to the United States—the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty—without compromising on the issue of Alaska, or anywhere else.[87]

Surprisingly, the United States Senate rejected the first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty as it was drafted. Specifically, the Senate had problems with the clause of the treaty which invited other Powers to adhere to the ratified treaty. Invoking the European Powers to guarantee a treaty applicable only in the Western Hemisphere appeared to counter the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine.[88] Furthermore, some U.S. senators argued that the "neutralization" of the canal would favor any Power with a navy larger than America's. Teddy Roosevelt pointed out that the treaty endangered U.S. security by giving enemy

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[81] Ibid, p. 191.
[82] Ibid, pp. 191-2.
[83] Ibid, p. 192.
[84] A.E. Campbell, *Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903*, Greenwood Press Publishers, Westport, Connecticutt, 1960, p. 52.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Charles S. Campbell, *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, MD, 1957, p. 193.

ships free use of the canal once they got within the three-mile limit.[89] There were other powerful arguments made against the treaty. The treaty allowed any naval power to effectively blockade the canal against U.S. warships by stationing their warships just outside the neutral limits.[90] The United States would lack the legal authority to prevent larger foreign squadrons from passing through the canal.[91] Based on these arguments, the U.S. senators argued, only against a power like Spain with a navy smaller than America's would the canal be of any military use to the U.S.[92]

In December 1899, the Senate ratified the Treaty with three amendments. These amendments so completely changed the language of the treaty, observers could claim that the Senate amendments really constituted a rejection of the treaty. The Davis Amendment, as it was called: (1) specifically abrogated the Clayton-Bulwer treaty; (2) attached a rider to the "neutralization" rules set down in Hay-Pauncefote, which effectively negated these rules when the United States was in a state of war;[93] and (3) eliminated the clause stating that the other Powers should be invited to adhere to the Treaty.[94] President McKinley now had to decide on what to do with a treaty which he disapproved. He had a number of options to consider as his next move. First, he could communicate the treaty to the British as altered by the Davis Amendment. Second, he could send the treaty back to the Senate, with the possibility that the resubmitted treaty was turned down and that Congress

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[88] A.E. Campbell, *Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903*, Greenwood Press Publishers, Westport, Connecticutt, 1960, p. 54.

[89] Charles S. Campbell, *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, MD, 1957, p. 195.

[90] A.E. Campbell, *Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903*, Greenwood Press Publishers, Westport, Connecticutt, 1960, p. 54.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Ibid.

[93] The text read as follows: "It is agreed, however, that none of the immediately foregoing conditions and stipulations in sections number 1,2,3,4, and 5 of this article shall apply to measures which the United States may find it necessary to take for securing by its own forces the defense of the United States and the maintenance of public order". See Hay to Pauncefote, 22 December 1900, enclosed in Pauncefote to Lansdowne, 24 December 1900: Parliamentary Papers, 1901 as appears in A.E. Campbell, *Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903*, Greenwood Press Publishers, Westport, Connecticutt, 1960, p. 56.

passed the Hepburn bill instead. Eventually, the President decided to forward the amended treaty to the British Cabinet.[95]

Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign Minister, had reservations about accepting the treaty as amended. In a dispatch dated 22 February 1901 to Pauncefote, Lansdowne wrote:

> Under Article I of Clayton-Bulwer, the two Powers agreed that neither would occupy, or fortify, or colonize or assume or exercise any dominion over any part of Central America, nor attain any of the foregoing objects by protection afforded to, or alliance with, any state or people of Central America. There is no similar agreement in the Convention. If therefore, the Treaty were wholly abrogated [as called for by the Davis Amendment], both Powers would, except in the vicinity of the canal, recover entire freedom of action in Central America. The change would certainly be of advantage to the United States, and might be of substantial importance.[96]

On the Second Amendment, Lansdowne commented:

> Were this amendment added to the convention the United States would, it is presumed, be within their rights, if at any moment when it seemed to them that their safety required it, in view of warlike preparations not yet commenced, but contemplated or supposed to be contemplated by another Power, they resorted to warlike acts in or near the canal—acts clearly inconsistent with the neutral character which it has always been sought to give it, and which would deny the free use of it to the commerce and navies of the world...
>
> If it [the new clause] were added, the oblication to respect the neutrality of the Canal in all circumstances would, so far as Great Britain is concerned, remain

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[94] Ibid.

[95] Charles S. Campbell, *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, MD, 1957, p. 211.

[96] Pauncefote to Lansdowne (Private and confidential) 1 March 1901: Lansdowne Papers as appears in A.E. Campbell, *Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903*, Greenwood Press Publishers, Westport, Connecticutt, 1960, p. 61.

> in force; the obligation of the United States, on the other hand, would be essentially modified. The result would be a one-sided arrangement under which Great Britain would be debarred from any warlike action in or around the Canal, while the United States would be able to resort to such action to whatever extent they might deem necessary to secure their safety.[97]

Finally, with regard to the third clause amending the treaty, Lansdowne wrote:

> It deprived the UK of the support of the other Powers in upholding the neutrality of the canal, and turned the Convention into a self-denying ordinance for Great Britain, for it submitted her to an undertaking not to interferre with the canal, an undertaking from which the United States would be exempt by treaty and which other Powers, non-signatory, would be entitled to disregard.[98]

Following Lansdowne's rejection of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty with the Davis Amendment, Secretary of State Hay drew up a revision of the canal treaty in a manner suitable to both American senators and the British Cabinet. On April 25, 1901, Hay handed Pauncefote a draft of a new Canal Treaty.[99] It differed from the old treaty as amended by the Senate in three ways: First, Hay's new treaty provided that the neutrality rules should be binding not upon the two countries, but only on the United States. Great Britain now no longer had to contemplate the circumstances in which she had to declare neutrality while the other Powers (as non-signatories) were free to take hostile action against Great Britain in or around the Canal.[100]

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[97] Lansdowne to Pauncefote, 22 February 1901: Parliamentary Papers as appears in A.E. Campbell, *Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903*, Greenwood Press Publishers, Westport, Connecticutt, 1960, pp. 62-3.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Charles S. Campbell, *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, MD, 1957, p. 228.
[100] Ibid, p. 229.

Second, the un-amended treaty had stated that the "*Canal shall be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace*".[101] If the treaty itself did not provide for its continued application during wartime, then it could be argued that the usual effect of war in terminating treaties, was to permit the signatories total freedom of action.[102] If the United States were at war with Great Britain, it would be relieved of treaty restrictions and thus legally free to act as it wished in the area of the canal.[103]

Hay's new proposal proved acceptable to the British Cabinet. In a memorandum for the Cabinet, Lansdowne urged strong acceptance of the new proposal with only minor modifications.[104] The Cabinet accepted the proposals and signed the Treaty on 18 November 1901. The historian A.E. Campbell writes of the successful negotiation of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty that Pauncefote, Lansdowne, and the Cabinet

> felt that a war with the United States was a contingency so remote that it need not be closely considered, and so disastrous if it came, concessions on the canal would prove of no importance. Except in the single event of war between Britain and the United States, the stronger the grip of the United States on the canal, the better for Britain.[105]

By signing the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, Great Britain had accepted something fundamentally different in its relationship with the United States. It had accepted that the U.S. would serve as the gate keeper to the Western Hemisphere. Furthermore, Great Britain accepted the prospect of numerical inferiority to the United States in naval power in the Americas. In England, no opposition emerged to the treaty and most of the press

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[101] Ibid.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Memorandum by Lansdowne, 6 July 1901 (Confidential)—printed for the Cabinet, 8 July 1901 as appears in A.E. Campbell, *Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903*, Greenwood Press Publishers, Westport, Connecticutt, 1960, p.72.
[105] A.E. Campbell, *Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903*, Greenwood Press Publishers, Westport, Connecticutt, 1960, p.72.

was favorable to the agreement. In fact, the press had been in favor of an agreement with the United States as far back as 1900:

> We want nothing that belongs to America, nor do we claim to interfere with what she considers within her special 'sphere of influence'. Our virtual acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine when we agreed to the Venezuelan arbitration has removed the risk of serious quarrel in the future. Indeed, this acceptance has done more than take away the only dangerous source of enmity. It, and the acquisition by America of a Far Eastern and Asian Empire in the Philippines, have brought us together, and shown us that we have a community of interests as well as of blood. The tie of blood is far the stronger, the essential tie, but the other exists. But we need not labour the point. It will, we think, be admitted by all who take the trouble to look into the matter that the British Empire will benefit greatly by the making of the canal, and that being so, the sooner we come to a frank and generous and sensible understanding with America the better.[106]

Conclusion

The signing of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty represents a turning point in Anglo-American relations. The agreement to permit American construction of an isthmian canal, with all its global and regional strategic and commercial consequences, coupled with the resolution of the Alaskan boundary dispute eliminated the last two contentious issues that could have dragged the two powers into war with one another. Disagreements over "neutrality" rights, fishing rights in Canada and Canadian commercial reciprocity were still to be resolved in the early part of the Twentieth Century, but none of these issues threatened to drag the United States into war with Great Britain. To be fair, by the late 19th century, Great Britain had bigger problems to contend with close to home in Europe, and with its colonies in Africa and business interests in Asia. The Western Hemisphere

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[106] "The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty" in *The Spectator*, 27 January, 1900, pp. 129-30.

was a peripheral concern, and so the British could afford to be generous in its disputes with the United States.

This is not to say that Great Britain's hand over of its foreign policy roles and responsibilities to the United States was inevitable or following a predictable trajectory. As 20th century history shows us, the British were quite reluctant to give up its empire and bargained hard with the United States over this issue during World War II. In the post-War period, during the Suez Crisis of 1956 in particular, we even witness Great Britain and France attempting to assert their interests counter to those of the wishes of the United States; however, many of the patterns or habits of cooperation and conflict resolution between the United States and Great Britain had already been established by the early part of the 20th century.

By 1903, the British had given the United States the right to police the Western Hemisphere as it saw fit, and to maintain a naval force superior to the Royal Navy in the region. In 1850 the British had agreed to jointly manage South America with the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, now in 1903 they had essentially permitted the Americans free reign to manage the hemisphere. This expansion of American roles and responsibilities was to go far in cementing the relations of the two countries. The pattern of cooperation in the areas of economics, politics and strategy, goes far in explaining American participation, side by side, with Great Britain, through two world wars.

6. China's Chou Dynasty, 1122 B.C. to 221 B.C.

Background

The longest dynasty in world history was that of the Chou Empire which lasted from 1122 B.C. to 221 B.C. when it was overthrown by the Ch'in Empire. Between those two dates China underwent a significant transformation from feudal society to that of absolute monarchy; from aristocracy to meritocracy; from barter to money economy; and from warfare with the chariot and bow as the emphasis in warfare, to mass infantry as the emphasis. Of equal importance are the political interactions of this period. In the mid-seventh century B.C., we witness the societal decline and military collapse of the ruling power—the Chou Dynasty—but we witness no effort of the powerful regional states (former vassals of the Chou kings) to seize control over the Chou inter-state system. Instead, we find Chou's former vassal states maintaining order in the system and returning the Chou Kings to the throne. Then over the next two centuries we find the states forming a collective security system, and vowing to preserve the sovereignty and integrity of the Chou's inter-state system. Eventually, over the subsequent three centuries, the states begin fighting one another, seizing the territory of rival states and consolidating possessions with others. Yet for five centuries, these states deferred to the sovereignty of the Chou Dynasty and never questioned that the system was legitimately presided over by the Chou kings. Then, by 221 B.C., the Ch'in seized control over the entire Chinese inter-state system by militarily conquering six other major adversaries and Ch'in Shih-Huangti declared himself the new emperor of China.

This case study addresses some of the theoretical issues discussed in chapter two. That is, in this case study we might find the political, military, and societal conditions conducive to a peaceful transfer of foreign policy role. Since roughly the same political

entities were involved in both the peaceful transfer, the maintenance of the old inter-state order, and the eventual violent transfer of role to a new power, this case study could also aid in identifying what factors led to the violent overthrow of an international order by an up-and-coming state.

Before embarking on this examination, a few caveats are in order. First, this case study is obviously very different from the previous three examined because it does not involve a modern nation-state. To argue that the conditions present in 11th century or third century B.C. China that explain peaceful transfers of foreign policy role in that inter-state system should also apply to late twentieth century nations is a hard sell. However, I argue that while the Chou dynasty can not be considered a modern nation-state, it still represents a sovereign political entity, with relationships with other politically autonomous entities. As we will see, the Chou Dynasty was well aware of its power relationships with other states, and it imposed its will on weaker states as it saw fit or enhanced the political responsibilities of powerful states to preserve the inter-state system. Finally, that we witness the formation of treaties, alliances, and collective security arrangements, open warfare, the formation of bureaucracies, and inter-state trade agreements—behavior similar to today's nation-states— suggests that the Chou Dynasty inter-state system has enough in common with modern international systems to invite comparison.

Second, the case study involves the break up of an ancient empire and the effort by vassals to preserve the order, not the decline of a powerful modern nation-state with other sovereign states seeking to preserve its international order. There is a conceptual difference between a subordinate (such as a vassal) political entity attempting to maintain an order that it may have belonged to for generations, and a nation-state attempting to preserve elements of an international order constructed by an another sovereign nation-state. While this is true, the reader should bear in mind that by the time of the first

collapse of the Chou Dynsty we shall see that the so-called vassal states had become autonomous political units, to which the Chou Emperor could not simply order to take certain actions. In other words, as Richard Walker claims, they had become sovereign themselves. The states imposed tarriffs and customs regulations at their borders, demanded that envoys from other states ask permission to enter the territory of other states, and as mentioned above, they made treaties, alliances, and war with each other.

Finally, in examining a case study that is over three thousand years old, it should be stated up front that I can not be as certain of the empirical evidence of, say, the three previous case studies that are at most one hundred and fifty years old. In short, I rely on the archaeologist's findings that one state was eclipsed politically by another state at a particular time. Furthermore, I can make only generalized power capability comparisons between the political entities. Whereas in the previous case studies I could claim with some confidence that the United States was economically and militarily ascendant relative to Great Britain by the late nineteenth century, I cannot make similarly confident statements about the various states during the Chou Dynasty. I can claim that one state assumed political leadership of the collective security group, or that another state was generally more prosperous than a group of other states, but I cannot accurately chart out where different states lay along a spectrum of power capabilities.

Despite these caveats, the Chou Dynasty case is similar enough to political, economic and military conditions of the modern international system to merit attention for the lessons it offers for the prospects for peaceful transfers of foreign policy role in international systems.

Early history of the Chou Dynasty

The Chou assumed power in 1122 B.C. when they toppled the Shang Dynasty. Before this, the Chou inhabited the northwestern part of North China for centuries.[1] The Chou people, according to the historian Charles Hucker, were allied with and may have had significant interactions, including inter-marriage, with Tibetan tribesmen called the Ch'iang.[2] A chief known as T'ai led these tribesmen into the Shensi basin, and settled in the plain of Chou. T'ai's son married a Shang noblewoman and she bore a son.[3] King Wen (the son) eventually came up with the plan to form alliances with neighboring chiefs to take on and the overthrow the Shang. After nine years as sovereign King Wen's son (King Wu) succeeded in overthrowing the Shang dynasty.[4] King Wu's brother, the Duke of Chou, is given credit for building the institutional foundation for the Chou dynasty.

The Chou empire as feudal order

The Chou political system has been characterized by many historians of ancient China as feudal. In Europe, Feudalism is defined as an economic, political and social system characterized by fiefs and vassalages. Similarly, the economic and political system of Chou dynasty China involved the parcelling out of sovereignty by the Chou king to vassals loyal to the dynasty.[5] These vassals controlled large tracts of land, economies that were agriculture based and whose outputs depended on peasants or serfs.[6] Peasants were supervised by a field bailiff, and their food and clothing were provided by

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[1] Charles O. Hucker, *China's Imperial Past*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca., 1975, p. 30.
[2] Ibid, p. 31.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Cho Yun Hsu, *Ancient China in Transition: An Analysis of Social Mobility, 722-222 B.C.*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca., 1965, p. 110.
[6] Charles O. Hucker, *China's Imperial Past*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca., 1975, p. 63.

the lord of the manor.[7] Small scale commerical activity may have existed in the vicinity of the larger towns, but they most likely entailed barter trade instead of the use of money.[8] The Chinese historian C. Y. Hsu claims that at this time, the manorial economic structure in China was compartmentalized and self-sufficient. He concludes that neither inter-area trade nor specialization was significant in this period.[9]

The Chou inter-state system

Historians claim that the Chou Empire equalled the size of half of the modern province of Shensi, and Honan, Shansi, Shantung and Hopei combined.[10] The area totals more than the combined areas of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands.[11] The overall political system of the Chou Empire was characterized by a network of vassal states spread throughout Northwestern, central and Northeastern China. Many of these early Chou Dynasty "vassal states" were military and political leaders who had assisted the Chou in overthrowing the Shang. The origin of the state of Ch'i, for example, was the result of the Chou desiring to grant a reward to a general who played a major role in the Chou conquest.[12] Many of these states were also led by blood relatives of the Chou kings. The Duke of Chou's son, for example, was granted a fief that eventually became the State of Lu.[13] The state of Wu was first ruled by T'ai-po—the son of an early Chou ancestor—the Duke Tan-fu.[14] In some instances, the Chou gave the heirs to the Shang dynasty their own teritory (the state of Sung) to govern. Naturally, these were watched

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[7] Cho Yun Hsu, *Ancient China in Transition: An Analysis of Social Mobility, 722-222 B.C.*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca., 1965, p. 107.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Herrlee G. Creel, *The Origins of Statecraft in China*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Il., 1970, p. 101.
[11] Ibid, p. 101n.
[12] Ibid, p. 343.
[13] Ibid, p. 357.
[14] Ibid , p. 360.

carefully by loyal "advisors" assigned to the Shang court. Eventually, the Shang heirs proved too troublesome and the Chou kings got rid of them.

The question of whether these states can be considered sovereign has been explored by some historians of ancient China. The Tso Chuan speaks of the protection over and value placed on sovereignty even by the smallest states.[15] The Tso Chuan speaks of the state of Ch'u seeking to provoke war with the state of Sung by sending an envoy to Ch'i through Sung without asking Sung's permission. The historian Richard Walker concludes that it must therefore have been common for envoys to ask permission to pass through the territories of other states.[16]

In the early years of the Chou Dynasty, the continued existence of the vassal state depended mostly on its loyalty and usefulness to the Chou kings. The military power of the Chou kings was greater than that of the individual regional vassal states.[17] Historians of China assert that the Chou king had at least fourteen standing armies, which were stationed in garrisons throughout the Chou empire and dispatched by the king to trouble spots[18]. *The Documents* mentions the king's "Six Armies, and at the accession of King K'ang in 1079 B.C. we find two chief ministers as advising the king to "display and make august the six armies."[19] Recently discovered bronze inscriptions however reveal that in addition to the king's "six armies" the King had access to the old armies of the Shang or the "eight armies".[20] The bronze inscriptions also tell us that a large feudal state had three armies; a smaller feudal state had two and a small state had one army.[21]

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[15] Richard L. Walker, *The Multi-State System of Ancient China*, Greenwood Press publishers, Westport, Ct., 1953, p. 24.
[16] Ibid, p. 25.
[17] Herrlee G. Creel, *The Origins of Statecraft in China*, , University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Il., 1970, p. 54.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid, p. 305.
[20] Ibid, p. 307.
[21] Ibid, p. 305.

Serious disturbances and rebellions were dealt with by royal armies deployed by the king. Barbarian conflicts also were dealt with by royal forces.[22] There is evidence that the regional states assisted in these barbarian campaigns and in some instances vassal states were created by the Chou kings to manage the outreaching territories of the Chou kings. In creating the state of Shen, the Chou king charged the Earl of Shen "to protect the Southern territories."[23] The Tso-Chuan cites a minister of Ch'i as claiming that Duke T'ai (the first ruler of the state of Ch'i) had been charged by the Chou king with policing the eastern portion of the empire, from the Yellow River to the sea.[24] In most instances, however, barbarian wars were dealt with by royal armies. Of the thirty four bronze inscriptions of the early Chou which refer to warfare, only seven refer to feudal lords as playing a significant role in the war.[25] There is, however, one instance in which the king lacked the military power to conduct a mission and relied on the military forces of a feudal lord. This happened when the Marquis of the state of E revolted and led barbarian tribes in an uprising. The King used all fourteen of his armies to resist the invasion, but lacked the forces to sieze the capital of the state of E, and to attack the Marquis himself. This attack was accomplished by the Duke of Wu, who eventually sacked the city and captured the Marquis.[26]

As this last case illustrates, as the centuries progressed in the Chou empire, the Chou king would on rare occasions have to send military expeditions to deal with rebellious regional lords. In addition to the revolt of the Marquis of E, we are told of the military campaign that King Li waged against the Ch'i state in the ninth century B.C.[27]

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[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid, p. 352.
[24] Ibid, p. 344.
[25] Ibid, p. 350.
[26] Ibid, p. 351.
[27] Although historians of ancient China are not certain that the Chou campaign was not conducted with the Ch'i state against barbarians as opposed to a royal military campaign conducted against Ch'i. See

The Duke of Shao, we are told, is given the title of Grand Protector and appears to play a prominent role in putting down uprisings and expanding the territory of the Empire.[28] The Duke of Ai is said to have displeased the King and the inscriptions claim that he was boiled in oil after military defeat by the other feudal lords.[29]

Historians of ancient China point out that the Chou king's use of military force against his regional/feudal lords is a rare event over the course of the Chou reign, and we find more evidence of cooperation and coordination of royal and regional policies to maintain the empire. Writings dated during the Chou times have sounded the theme that the Chou maintained stable and firm rule over its territories without being overly harsh.[30] Historians also point out that for the first two hundred years of the dynasty, no Chou military activity took place against regional states, only against barbarian peoples.[31] Part of the king's "tool kit" for controlling his regional lords, as we have seen, is the granting of titles or responsibilities to his vassals. As mentioned above, we find evidence of the regional lords being hailed as "Grand Protector" or charged with policing the eastern portions of the Chou Empire.

There is evidence that Chou kings maintained peace, order and stability through material rewards and incentives to their vassals. We have already seen that some of the first vassal states of the Chou Empire were created as rewards for generals who supported the Chou kings in their conquest of China. Inscriptions show that the Chou kings practice of rewarding their vassals by granting them or their subordinates with land or fiefs was

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Herrlee G. Creel, *The Origins of Statecraft in China*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Il., 1970, p. 100.
[28] Ibid, p. 359.
[29] Ibid, p. 415.
[30] Ibid, p. 54.
[31] Ibid, p. 101.

commonplace. The archaeological evidence also shows the king bringing presents to feudal lords and their subordinates, as reward for some service rendered.[32]

The stability of the Chou regime was also bolstered by the nature of the relationships between state rulers and the Chou kings. As mentioned above a good many regional states were ruled by relatives of the Chou kings. Of the seventy one states created by the Chou King, royal kinsmen were said to be the rulers of fifty three of them.[33] Chou kings refer to dukes, earls, marquis, and other feudal rulers as uncles.[34] Feudal rulers of the royal surname, historians point out, are referred by the Chou kings as "brothers".[35] Furthermore, marriage between aristocrats of various states solidified the family bonds of the various regional powers.[36] A number of analysts of ancient China point out that if the powerful states and the Chou dynasty were akin to a family, then states were expected to come to each others' aid when necessary.[37] This no doubt shaped the nature of inter-state relations and the relationship between ruling dynasty and its regional territories. As we will see centuries later in Chou dynastic history when the regional states began to make war on each other, the family bonds between states helped avert wars, and prompted rulers to send aid to other states during times of famine.

By far the most stabilizing factor in Chou inter-state relations was the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven (Tien Ming). According to this doctrine, the Cosmos is dominated by an all powerful Heaven (Tien).[38] No ruler is truly sovereign except through the Mandate of Heaven and the ruler is given the responsibility of ruling all things under

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[32] Ibid, p. 415.
[33] C.Y. Hsu, *Ancient China in Transition: An Analysis of Social Mobilization, 722-222B.C.*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca., 1965, p. 53.
[34] Ibid, p. 54.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid, p. 53.
[37] Ibid, p. 54.
[38] Charles O. Hucker, *China's Imperial Past*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca., 1975, p. 55.

Heaven (Tien Hsia).[39] The ruler cannot maintain his primacy over all things under Heaven unless he rules fairly and benevolently.[40] From that moment on, all Chinese rulers were open to challenge, and "any challenger proved the validity of his claim merely by succeeding".[41] This, however, did not lead to constant challenges to the Chou order. By contrast, it helps explain the longevity of the regime. In addition to the overall principle of the Mandate of Heaven, the Chou advanced the idea that the Chinese should be united under a single Son of Heaven, and his control should be centralized.[42]

Furthermore, the purpose of government, Chou writings claim, is to maintain peace and order. It was not common to glorify martial exploits. The historian Charles Hucker writes that:

> From the early Chou decades there existed a clear, forcefully stated and reiterated concept that Heaven willed mankind to live together in harmonious cooperation and in harmony with the cosmic universe. It was the responsibility of the Son of Heaven to see that such a condition was acheived.[43]

It was also the responsibility of his subordinates to see that the order ruled over by the Chou King be maintained. The interests of the dynasty and political order built around that dynasty were paramount. The historian C.Y. Hsu writes:

> When a ruler reigned, he had the Mandate of Heaven or some other holy trusteeship, and he was considered more important than anything else, including his subjects.[44]

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[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid, p. 56.
[44] C.Y. Hsu, *Ancient China in Transition: An Analysis of Social Mobilization, 722-222B.C.*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca., 1965, p. 147.

Herrlee Creel writes that the concept of the Mandate of Heaven was the single most binding force for the Chinese people:

> The Doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven was not merely a force making for responsible conduct on the part of the monarch and cementing the loyalty of his vassals and officials; it has also been the central cohesive force binding together the entire Chinese people, even the humblest. The feelings of the Chinese that they are superior to all other peoples is undoubtedly related to the conviction that they, and they alone, have lived under a government established and supervised by Heaven.[45]

The decline of the Western Chou and the Spring and Autumn period

After over three hundred years of relatively stable rule, historians of ancient China tell us that the Chou went into decline. This decline was partially the result of imperial mismanagement[46], but it also resulted from the rising capabilities of the regional states and the barbarian tribes along the periphery of the Chou Empire. Nonetheless, during the reign of King Yu (781 to 771 B.C.) a barbarian invasion in 771 B.C. led to the destruction of the Chou capital city of Hao.[47] The royal hier and several courtiers, surviving the disaster with the help of several Chou feudal lords, moved the capital city to the city of Loyang (modern day Xi'an).[48] This is a turning point in Chou history. The period just described has been labelled the Western Chou period to distinguish it from the later Chou reign at Loyang.[49] The entire period from 771 B.C. to 221 B.C. is known as the Eastern Chou period, but this latter time period is broken down into two further

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[45] Herrlee G. Creel, The Origins of Statecraft in China, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Il., 1970, p. 94.
[46] The historical records of the Chou Dynasty speak of the incompetence of King Yu, and his infatuation with a concubine permitting affairs of the state to lapse.
[47] Charles O. Hucker, *China's Imperial Past*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca., 1975, p. 34.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.

periods—the Spring and Autumn period (722 B.C. to 481 B.C.) and the Warring States era (480 B.C. to 222 B.C.)—to describe the nature of inter-state relations at that time.

The Spring and Autumn Era and the "Hegemon"

Historians like Charles Hucker point out that the end of the Western Chou period marked the end of the real power of the Chou kings and ushered in "an age when powerful regional states were the main focus of interest on the stage of Chinese history".[50] He comments that the regional states, especially those on the periphery of the Chou empire "had grown into major territorial powers who now had greater economic and military strength than the King, now dependent on a small royal domain around Loyang."[51] While the weakening Chou Empire was still made up of hundreds of these vassal states, the four most powerful states were the Ch'in state made up of remnants of the old royal domain in Shensi; the Chin (pronounced Jin) state to the north of Ch'in; the Ch'i state to the far east; and the semi-Chinese state of Ch'u in the South.

Despite the relative weakness of the Chou, the vassal states helped move the royal court to its new location in Loyang and set about re-establishing Chou rule. Apparently the motive for this somewhat generous act was that the Chou regional powers believed that the reign of the Chou Empire still legitimately belonged to the Chou king. *The Historical Records* say that the heir of King Yu was placed back on the Chou throne "in order that he might continue to offer the Chou sacrifices"[52] to his ancestors. This implies that the Chou regional powers had respect for the Chou ancestors, who continued as spirits to have great power and influence in human affairs. This also implies that the Chou feudal lords still believed that the Chou king had the Mandate of Heaven.

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[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Herrlee G. Creel, *The Origins of Statecraft in China*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Il, 1970, p. 440.

The decline of royal authority left China effectively without a central authority and the states struggled to maintain the status quo. This early era of the Spring and Autumn period has been described by historians of ancient China as one of guarded sparring for advantage. Those struggles that existed were primarily diplomatic in nature, the art of diplomacy was the focus of rivalry between states. It was at this time that historians of China claim that there developed a unique institution called the "hegemon" or "great protector" (pa). Hucker claims that this was a "device developed by the vassal states to offset the ineffectiveness of the Chou kings without challenging their sovereignty". The state of Ch'i was appointed the first hegemon by the other regional states. Ch'i had a stable and strong economy and an effective military.

At the request of his neighbors, Duke Huan, the leader of the state of Ch'i, held a conference of the most powerful regional states in 681 B.C. While there, the former vassal states agreed to form a mutual defense treaty. The treaty was meant to deal with the growing threat of barbarian tribes and the increasing threat from the state of Ch'u to the South. At the second conference the following year, more regional states took part, and the conference was presided over by a representative from the Royal Chou Court. Hucker points out that the importance of the league increased:

> All of the central and eastern states now found it advantageous to join the league, and at a conference in 678 B.C. they formally designated Duke Huan hegemon, to preserve peace and the honor of the Chou king.[53]

Hucker writes that Duke Huan's tenure as hegemon effectively maintained the peace and stability of the Chou inter-state system. He convened conferences periodically when necessary. The league defended the member states from Jung and I tribesmen, and the state of Ch'i deterred the state of Ch'u from encroaching upon the security of other

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[53] Charles Hucker, *China's Imperial Past*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca., 1975, p. 36.

members of the league.[54] In 656 B.C. Ch'u signed a peace treaty with the league and agreed to send regular tribute to the Chou court, thereby agreeing to vassal status in the Chou feudal system.[55]

After the death of Duke Huan the institution of hegemon lost much of its influence. Duke Wen of Chin (r. 637 to 628 B.C.) was named hegemon in 632 B.C. by the Chou king after the battle of Cheng-pu in which the Chin waged a decisive battle against the the Ch'u in what is now modern Shantung province. The reigning Chou king personnally named the Duke hegemon.[56] After Duke Wen, the position of the hegemon alternated among various vassal states until it disappeared late in the fifth century B.C.[57] To reflect the fact that the institution alternated among different regional states, the name of the institution of the "protector" (Pa) was changed to the "five protectors" (Wu Pa).[58]

The continuing role of the Chou Kings

Despite the decline in power of the Chou Empire, the Chou kings continued to play a prominent role in inter-state politics. As mentioned before the Chou king or representatives of the Chou court lent legitimacy to the inter-state political process by attending the league conferences and officially appointing one state or another as the "protector" or "pa". The historian Richard Walker points out that after the initial meetings of the collective security league, it became customary for the Chou kings to have representation at these meetings.[59] The varying heads of these leagues welcomed their attendance because they added legitimacy to the security conference, and their

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[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Richard Walker, *The Multi-State System of Ancient China*, Greenwood Press publishers, Westport, Ct., 1953, p. 116 # 43n.
[59] Ibid, p. 91.

leadership.[60] The Chou kings' approval of the leagues also encouraged smaller states to participate in the league because the continued participation of the Chou king with the Mandate of Heaven suggested to them that the king's "participation insured their continued existence".[61] Occasionally, as states in the Spring and Autumn era began having conflicts with one another, the Chou kings (not the "protectors") were called to serve as arbitrators for disputes.[62] Finally, the Chou kings retained the right to rank the states in their support to the Chou kings. Thus we find conferences in which state leaders (and by implication the states themselves) are ranked as Kung (duke), Hou (marquis), Po (earl), Tzu (viscout), and Nan (baron). As historians claim, the ranking system continued for the first sixty or so years of the Spring and Autumn period, then faded into importance or simply reflected the power positions of the various states.[63]

As time passes, we find the role and authority of the Chou kings in severe decline. By the late Spring and Autumn period, we find evidence of Chou envoys signing covenants at conferences in which state representatives were treated as equals with the Chou representatives.[64] We also have evidence of the states' increasing use of the word Wang (king) to describe their state rulers. Finally, we have previously mentioned the decline of the institution of the "protector" in the fifth century B.C. By that time, the beginning of the Warring States period, the Chou's regional states saw little value in a system that propped up Chou power. As we will discuss below, however, the small number of large, unified states were entering into a rough system of balance of power where no one state could dominate the others.

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[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Ibid, p. 88.
[63] Ibid, p. 26.
[64] Ibid, p. 91.

Warfare in the Spring and Autumn Era

This period in Chinese history should not be seen as a time without conflict between the major regional powers. While the states vowed to protect the Chou inter-state system and to uphold Chou sovereignty, this did not preclude them from making war on each other. There is some degree of disagreement among scholars of ancient Chinese history of how violent warfare actually *was* during this period. Most scholars agree that the first century of the Spring and Autumn era involved diplomatic maneuvering, guarded sparring, and warfare characterized by chivalry. The main points of disagreement exists over the scope and magnitude of warfare as the Spring and Autumn period progressed.

The thrust of some of this historical work is that the Spring and Autumn period was a continuation of the feudal system of the Western Chou. Warfare still determined the fate of states, but the states identified themselves with the Chou feudal system of inter-state relations—and this identification shaped the nature of warfare, the views of state interests, and the states' perspective on maintaining the Chou order. A continued identification with the Chou feudal system meant that states saw warfare as a means to enhance their ranking and status within the system—not as total war meant to completely eliminate adversaries or achieve supremacy in the system. This meant that what was important in inter-state warfare was not only if one defeated one's enemy, but if one complied with accepted rules of Chou feudal behavior. A considerable amount of scholarly writing has discussed the chivalric nature of the Spring and Autumn period. Aristocratic warriors apparently doffed helmets before engaging in battle; subordinate feudal lords apparently permitted adversaries superior in rank (as a vassal of the Chou kings) to escape with their lives;[65] generals apparently refused to attack adversaries mid-

[65] Herrlee Creel, *The Origin of Statecraft in Ancient China*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Il., 1970, p. 259.

stream in crossing their armies through a river;[66] and one feudal lord was quoted as asking another to "permit our knights and yours to play a game" before leading the armies into war against each other.[67] Some scholars of ancient China claim that the price for defeat for the leadership of a regional state was usually not death, but exile.

Furthermore, the strength of the argument that warfare during the Spring and Autumn period was a continuation of warfare during Western Chou times, lies in the common weapons used and the similarity in their actual employment during both of these time periods. Many scholars argue that warfare in the Spring and Autumn period, like warfare during the Western Chou, was centered around the chariot and the archer. Chinese historians claim that in Western Chou times the "main striking force depended on the chariot."[68] The Tso Chuan claims that the importance of a feudal state during the Spring and Autumn era came to be calculated in terms of the number of chariots they could muster.[69] After the state of Chin defeated Ch'i, it demanded that all fields in Ch'i be cultivated with the furrows in an east and west direction so as to aid the entry of Chin's chariots into its territory.[70] The noted military historian and translator of Sun *Tzu's the Art of War*, Samuel Griffith, wrote of warfare in the Spring and Autumn period:

> The illiterate and docile serfs played but a small part in the battles of the time, in which the principal role was reserved to the four horse chariot manned by a driver, a spearman, and a noble archer. The expendable footmen, protected only by padded jackets, were grouped about the chariots. A small proportion of selected men carried shields woven of bamboo or at best more cumbrous ones of crudely tanned ox or rhinocerous hide. Their arms were daggers and short swords, bronze tipped spears, and

[66] Ibid, p. 258.
[67] C.Y. Hsu, *Ancient China in Transition: An Analysis of Social Mobility, 771 B.C. to 221 B.C.*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca., 1965, p. 69.
[68] Herrlee Creel, *The Origin of Statecraft in Ancient China*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Il., 1970, p. 263.
[69] Ibid, p. 263.
[70] Ibid, p. 266.

> hooking and cutting blades tied with leather thongs to wooden shafts. The bow was the weapon of the noble.[71]

The opposing view argues that the Spring and Autumn period was not so chivalrous, and it was not a continuation of the feudal order of the Western Chou. The thrust of this argument is that by the time of the Spring and Autumn period we find an increased use of money and commercial transactions[72], a proliferation of merchant classes[73], and the rise in the importance of the common foot soldier over the aristocratic charioteer. The upshot of this societal transformation is the break down of loyalty to the Chou order and the begining of inter-state relations resembling the classic pursuit of power and supremacy, as a state end. After the earlier decades of the period, the Spring and Autumn era is said to involve continous warfare between the regional states until the time of the Warring States Period. Despite familial ties in the inter-state system of the Spring and Autumn period, scholars point out that many rulers had their territories annexed by kinsmen of stronger states.[74] In some cases the defeated rulers were killed. Furthermore, these historians point out that the historical record shows that the subjects of defeated states were enslaved, or resettled in the territory of the victorious state.[75]

In addition, these scholars point out that if warfare during the Spring and Autumn period can be characterized as chivalrous, this does not seem to mesh with the evidence that as a consequence of warfare, virtually hundreds of regional states were eliminated entirely from the inter-state system. One analyst points out that at the beginning of the

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[71] Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translated by Samuel Griffith, Oxford University Press, published in Great Britain, 1963, p. 32; Herrlee Creel, *The Origins of Statecraft in Ancient China*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Il., 1970, p. 263.
[72] Richard Walker, *The Multi-State System of Ancient China*, Greenwood Press publishers, Westport, Ct., 1953, p. 17.
[73] Ibid, p. 18.
[74] C.Y. Hsu, *Ancient China in Transition: An Analysis of Social Mobility, 722 to 222 B.C.*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca., 1965, p. 59.
[75] Ibid, p. 60.

Spring and Autumn period there was a total of 132 regional states.[76] By the end of the period, no less than 110 states had been extinguished or absorbed by other states.[77] This left a total of 22 states as having survived the period. The historian Charles Hucker points out that the period was marked by a constant shifting of alliances and alignments between hundreds of states seeking to survive or absorb rival states.

The apparent synthesis between these two opposing schools of thought is that the early part of the Spring and Autumn period resembled a more advanced form of feudalism exhibited in the Western Chou period,[78] and that the later part of the Spring and Autumn period reflected wide spread technological, societal and political change which began the transformation of the regional state and its perception of its interests—and hence led to an increased level of inter-state warfare.

In this light, it is interesting to note that while virtually hundreds of vassal states were extinguished during the Spring and Autumn period, a significant number of these eliminations took place after the seventh decade of the Spring and Autumn era.[79] Social scientists who have catalogued warfare during this period, measuring the number of states involved in wars and the duration of these conflicts note that the number of conflicts in the first two stages of the Spring and Autumn period (that is the first sixty or so years) was considerably lower than the number of conflicts in the rest of the period.[80]

The Warring States Period

Whether one is of the belief that the Spring and Autumn era was characterized by the continuation of a feudal inter-state system or was the beginning of vast change in

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[76] Ibid, p. 59.
[77] Ibid.
[78] The historian of ancient China, Herrlee Creel comes to this conclusion. See Herrlee Creel, *The Origins of Statecraft in Ancient China*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Il., 1970, p. 341.
[79] C.Y. Hsu, *Ancient China in Transition: An Analysis of Social Mobility, 722 to 222 B.C.*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca., 1965, p. 58.

Chou society, there is consensus among historians that the last three centuries of the Eastern Chou period, known as the Warring States era or Chan Kuo was a time of vast technological, social, political and military change. In addition, as the name suggests, this was a time when states shed the chivalrous aspects of inter-state relations and warfare. War during this time period meant "total" war. Historians tell us that at the beginning of the Warring States period, twenty two states remained from the Spring and Autumn era and these states waged continuous war for three centuries until the Ch'in state defeated all of its rivals, and finally overthrew the Chou dynasty to claim the Mandate of Heaven for itself.

Political, economic and societal change

Historians of China agree that the Warring States period was characterized by a signficant change from the feudal order of the Western Chou period. As mentioned before the beginnings of the break down of the feudal system took place during the Spring and Autumn period. By the Warring States period, historians note that the decline of feudalism in Chou China was advanced and clearly on its way out. This period was marked by an explosion of inscriptions referring to surnames that were not of royal heritage. This period was also characterized by the shift of ownership of land by aristocrats, regional lords and their subordinates, to ownership by commoners and peasants. Historians surmise that as warfare grew more intense during the Spring and Autumn period, the rulers of states were pressured into granting tracts of land to successful soldiers instead of keeping land strictly for those of noble blood. In short, as survival became the paramount goal of states, instead of rank or prestige, Chou politics was pressured into becoming meritocratic. This is as true of the statesmen as for the Chou period soldiers. We find several examples of political advisors and ministers

[80] Ibid, p. 57.

coming from common stock instead of the aristocracy. Historians also note that the governance of Warring States China was rapidly changing from personal, ad hoc administration of state affairs to routinization, heavily layered bureaucratic administration.[81] The state was apparently becoming more efficient.

Beyond the vast political change in Chou China, the fifth century B.C. was marked by economic change. Agricultural production increased significantly especially after the development of large water-control and irrigation projects which had begun to appear in the 7th Century B.C.[82] By the beginning of the Warring States Period, we begin to see the foundations of a tax system in some of the regional states. In the state of Lu, for instance, the first tax based on the amount of land held was established.[83] What we should take away from this observation is that the peasant was no longer farming for the entire manor, only for a portion of it. The rest, according to C.Y. Hsu, went to his own subsistence[84] and this probably led to vast socio-economic change in Eastern Chou China. By allowing the peasant to substitute tax or rent payments for the labor service of the manorial system, the lord essentially gave up part of his possession of the land to the tenant who was the direct user of the land.[85] As warfare in the Warring States Period intensified, royal houses were periodically decimated leaving the tenant answerable not to a specific manor but to their lord's superiors. Eventually, tenant farmers found themselves answerable only to the state itself, which increasingly demanded payments in the form of taxes, not in land. As the Chou feudal economy was transformed into a money economy, historians note the rise of banking and usury[86], the appearance of a

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[81] C.Y. Hsu, *Ancient China in Transition: An Analysis of Social Mobility*, 771 to 222 B.C., Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca., 1965, pp. 105-6.
[82] Charles O. Hucker, *China's Imperial Past*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca., 1975, p. 39.
[83] C.Y. Hsu, *Ancient China in Transition: An Analysis of Social Mobility, 771 to 222 B.C.* Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca., 1965, p. 108.
[84] Ibid, pp. 108-9.
[85] Ibid, p. 110.
[86] Ibid, p. 114.

range of new classes of merchants, artisans, and entrepreneurs who could operate outside of the manorial economy[87], and the rise of private land ownership as land could be bought and sold.[88]

The intensity of the last part of the Spring and Autumn era also helped transform the economy of the Chou inter-state system. When the Spring and Autumn period began in the 8th Century B.C., there were virtually hundreds of states with local rulers imposing high tarriffs and customs to serve narrow interests. By the time the Warring States period began, the number of states had been reduced to a handful of relatively unified states. A travelling merchant could therefore feel secure within the territory of any state and therefore historians of China suspect that inter-state trade may have been possible in the period.[89] Furthermore, with relatively stable political environments existing within a small number of states, the rulers of these states could construct good highways and water courses to facilitate transportation within and between states.[90]

Warfare in the Warring States period

Along with political, economic and social change, came change in the ways the Chou states waged war with one another. As noted previously, warfare appeared to be losing its chivalrous Western Chou character late in the Spring and Autumn era, and becoming increasingly associated with "total war". As the Warring States period progressed, war was not only becoming less chivalrous, the societal changes mentioned above also appeared to be permitting war on a larger scale. In 722 B.C. for example, the state of Cheng used a force of 200 chariots to engage in battle. By 548 B.C. the Cheng

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[87] Ibid, p. 115.
[88] Ibid, p. 111.
[89] Ibid, p. 126.
[90] Ibid, p. 126.

state invaded Ch'en with an army of 700 chariots.[91] During the Spring and Autumn period, we find evidence of armies numbering in the thousands, but rarely exceeding ten thousand. Historians and archaeologists have found that the armies of the Chan Kuo commonly exceeded ten thousand, and that hundreds of thousands of soldiers were required to seize large cities or besiege them.[92]

As noted above, the early to middle Spring and Autumn period was characterized as aristocratic warfare. The chariot remained the predominant means of waging war, and the common foot soldier or infantry was a secondary factor in war. This changed by the end of the Spring and Autumn period. By the Warring States period, the common foot soldier and infantry was central to Warring States period warfare. In 482 B.C. the King of Wu brought 10,000 foot soldiers with him on his meeting with another state ruler. In the battle between Ch'i and Lu in 484 B.C., the Lu army consisted of 7,000 armored soldiers. The commanding general led a group of 300 foot soldiers, assumed to be commoners, and armed with long spears.[93] The implications for the various states has already been alluded to. If warfare now rested on the common foot soldier, success in war meant that the state had to efficiently support large numbers of commoners with food, weapons, and armor. The morale and happiness of the commoner also was a new element that had to be accounted for by states. The latter meant that land, monetary rewards and perhaps titles had to be made available to commoners. The former meant that the state had to transform itself from a personalized, ad hoc administration to an efficient bureaucracy.

Beyond the increasing importance of infantry, cavalry also appears prominently in the Warring States period. Presumably as a consequence of the increasing threat from

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[91] Ibid, p. 66.
[92] Ibid, p. 68.
[93] Ibid, p. 69.

nomadic tribes adept at horsemanship, the northern states of the Chou inter-state system began incorporating cavalry into their armies.[94]

Inter-state relations during the Warring States period

Just as Warring States China was going through a political, economic and societal transition, so too was the system of inter-state relations going through a transition at this time. As war increased in scope, magnitude and duration, and as the penalty for defeat meant annihilation, the process of state inter-action became less formalized and eventually failed to reflect the niceties of feudal society. The relevance of the "hegemon institution" mentioned earlier, faded in importance by the beginning of the Warring States period. The language of inter-state relations decidedly shifted from such talk as collective security and maintaining the honor of the Chou Kings, to alliance formation, and balances of power.

Balance of power in late Spring and Autumn and Warring States period

Unlike during the early Spring and Autumn period, which was characterized first by the fomation of mutual security leagues, and then by a system of rapidly shifting alliances and rapidly expanding states, the late Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period eventually was characterized by seven already large, unified states forming alliances with each other to hold increasingly powerful states in check. Richard Walker notes that a crude balance of power existed throughout most of the Spring and Autumn period.[95] He continues:

> After Ch'i and Ch'u had begun to emerge as the powerful leaders of the states, such a balancing

[94] Ibid, p. 70.
[95] Richard Walker, *The Multi-States System of Ancient China*, Greenwood Press publishers, Westport, Ct., 1953, p. 49.

> process went on through most of the Spring and Autumn period between the Chou states in the Yellow River Valley and the Southern States in the Yangtze River Valley.[96]

The most serious rivalry, he adds, came after Chin had replaced Ch'i as the leader of the Chou states.[97] Walker adds that as the Spring and Autumn period progressed into the Warring States era, the multi-state (inter-state) system consolidated into a multi-polar system, eventually leading to a rough bi-polar system.[98] He asserts that the state of Ch'in acted as an active balancer starting from the later parts of the Spring and Autumn period. He notes that the state of Chin was about to invade the state of Ch'u (which was having problems of some sort). This invasion was foiled by the state of Ch'in which invaded Chin. In 600 B.C. Ch'in then joins with Chin to attack Ch'u and Cheng because, as the author claims, Ch'in concludes that Chin and Cheng had concluded a binding alliance between them. Most of the entries of the late Spring and Autumn period show Ch'in stepping in to prevent one league or another from assuming ascendancy. He concludes that the later part of the Spring and Autumn represented Ch'in's efforts to consolidate its strength, and grow in power while preventing rivals from attaining supremacy and the unification of China.

The rise of the state of Ch'in

By the time of the Warring States period, professor Walker notes that Ch'in had undergone a significant transformation (which we have alluded to in our earlier discussion about societal and political change during the Warring States period). Specifically, the Ch'in state was in an advantageous position to enact societal and economic reforms, which in turn helped the Ch'in government put together mass armies. By about 356 to

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[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid.

338 B.C. the Ch'in leader Shang Yang initiated a series of reforms in Ch'in which encouraged the development of agriculture.[99] Shang Yang is given credit by historians of China for abolishing the field paths that are believed to be necessary for dividing the lands of different manors. State taxes were also said to be instituted for the first time during his reign.[100] Charles Hucker points out that Ch'in had a number of advantages over the other states. The Shensi valley was said to have the best soil in all of China, and Ch'in was one of the first states to use irrigation systems.[101] Ch'in's annexation of Szechuan provided the Ch'in rulers with an additional agricultural base and provide the Ch'in with excellent resources and lumber.[102] Hucker adds that Ch'in had never been significantly influenced by Chou feudal customs (as had the central states). It was therefore in an advantageous position in the fourth century B.C. to transition its economy from serfdom to free holding.[103] Furthermore, adds Hucker, Ch'in's efficient bureaucracy and ordered military led to a stable and secure environment, this made it attractive to immigrants.[104]

By 333 B.C. the other remaining six states were considerably alarmed at Ch'in's rise in power and the decline of the only possible counter-vailing power to Ch'in— the state of Ch'u to the South.[105] In that year, they formed an alliance (the Alliance of Six Kingdoms) for the purpose of resisting Ch'in.[106] Apparently their efforts to contain Ch'in failed. One century later Hucker writes that when Ch'in's final campaigns to unify China began in the 230s B.C., Ch'in is estimated to then control one third of all land then

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[98] Ibid.
[99] C.Y. Hsu, *Ancient China in Transition: An Analysis of Social Mobility*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca., 1965, p. 112.
[100] Ibid.
[101] Charles Hucker, *China's Imperial Past*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca., 1975, p. 41.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid.
[105] Richard Walker, *The Multi-State System of Ancient China*, Greenwood Press publishers, Westport, Ct., 1953, p. 100.
[106] Ibid, p. 100.

under cultivatation in China and one third of China's population.[107] The historical records show that one by one, from 231 B.C. to 221 B.C. Ch'in conquered the other states, despite the alliances formed against it, and eventually imposed a new type of political control (totalitarian or despotic) on the captured states. Ch'in also destroyed the cultures and the records of the captured states.[108]

In 221 B.C. the powerful southern state of Ch'u had fallen to the military power of Ch'in, and later that year, Ch'i surrendered without a fight to the Ch'in.[109] The Ch'in Emperor, Huang Ti declared himself emperor, claimed that the Chou no longer had the Mandate of Heaven and set about to impose a new political order in China under the Ch'in dynasty.

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[107] Charles Hucker, *China's Imperial Past*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca., 1975, p. 42.
[108] Richard Walker, *The Multi-State System of Ancient China*, Greenwood Press publishers, Westport, Ct., 1953, p. 100.
[109] Charles Hucker, *China's Imperial Past*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca., 1975, p. 40.

7. A Theory of Peaceful Transfer of Foreign Policy Roles in International Systems

This chapter lays out the theoretical implications that can be derived from the four cases just examined. As mentioned in chapter two the purpose of examining the cases of China's Chou dynasty (1122 B.C. to 221 B.C.), Great Britain's relationship with the United States (1840-1903), its relationship with Imperial Germany (1871 to 1907) and its relationship with Imperial Japan (1868 to 1933) is to identify and flesh out the relevant conditions leading to an effective peaceful transfer of foreign policy roles and to discuss those conditions that appear to play little or no role in peaceful change. It is from this discussion that we derive a theory of peaceful transfer of foreign policy roles in international systems, identify what conditions need to be present to bring about such peaceful change and make a case for what statesmen need to do to bring about a peaceful transfer of roles in international systems.

Peaceful Transfers of Foreign Policy Roles are possible

The first significant finding of the case studies examined, is that peaceful transfers of foreign policy role in international systems have occurred in history, and hence are possible. In chapter 5 of this dissertation, the British had moved from direct competition with the United States over influence in Latin America to acceptance of American suzerainty in the Western Hemisphere, formally accepted the validity of the Monroe Doctrine, accepted total American control over the Panama Canal, encouraged American annexation of Hawaii, the Philippines and Cuba, through negotiations ceded thousands of square miles of Canadian territory to America, and accepted American naval dominance in the Western Hemisphere. By the turn of the century the British had in fact transferred

predominant influence within the Western Hemisphere and to the Eastern and Central Pacific to the United States without waging a systemic or major war.

Remarkably, this transfer of political responsibility over an international sub-system took place despite obvious signs to Great Britain that the United States was in ascendency and could pose a significant security challenge to British foreign, defense and commercial interests. As we have seen Great Britain was well aware of the rise of American naval power, and the negotations over the Panama Canal Treaty reveals in stark detail that the British were conscious of the fact that an Isthmian canal joining Atlantic with Pacific, placed the United States in the position of tipping the balance of military forces either for or against Great Britain in a naval conflict with other European powers. American influence in Latin America was correctly perceived by British statesmen as challenging their commercial access to markets in this area, and American efforts to promote independence of Latin American republics from Spain posed security risks to Great Britain as the European states lined up with Spain to "teach the Americans a lesson".

The Chou dynasty case also illustrated that peaceful transfers of foreign policy role have taken place in world history.The Chou empire was comprised of hundreds of vassal states answerable to one king. These states came into existence and operated as functioning political entities at first only as a result of the wishes of the Chou king and his court. Over time they were transformed into a group of autonomous, powerful states who maintained the existing "inter-state order" after the Chou kings lost the power to maintain the system themselves. At the time of the collapse of Chou power in 771 B.C., the vassal states had a prime opportunity to make a bid for supremacy of the inter-state system. Instead, they helped the Chou king relocate his capital, and set about reorganizing the system of state relations of the former Chou vassal states into a new inter-state system.

The existence of examples of peaceful transfers of control within international systems has two significant implications for international relations theory. The first is that the hegemonic stability theory does not appear to be valid. As I pointed out in the second chapter of this dissertation, the elements of hegemonic stability theory (stability in international relations results from a preponderance of power in the hands of a hegemon and that hegemon's ability to impose order on weaker actors) argues against the possibility that a powerful, hegemonic state could or would successfully cooperate with a rising power, encourage an erosion of its own preponderant role and responsibility, and do this without throwing the international system into instability and major war. The specific example of Great Britain cooperating with the United States over time, assisting in the adjustment of its foreign policy role relative to the U.S. and accomplishing this all without resort to major war with the U.S. should cast doubt on the hegemonic stability thesis. Similarly, the examples of peaceful transfer of control within international systems casts some doubt on Organsky's Power Transition Theory. Recall that the thrust of Organsky's argument is that the international system is like a pyramid with the most powerful nations at the top, and the weaker nations and middling powers positioned below. The nations at the top make the rules and their security and prosperity depend on the nations of the international system complying with those rules. As I mentioned earlier in this dissertation, Organsky himself doubts the likelihood of the nations at the top making room for an up-and-coming challenger. Yet the case studies should emphasize that such situations have taken place.

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to caution that the specific historical context of the cases studied more than likely had an impact on the ability of decision-makers to cooperate with apparent or potential rivals. In the case of the Chou dynasty, cooperation and transfers of foreign policy role took place after the dominant power had been savaged militarily. The dominant power, therefore, may have had little choice but to

cooeprate with its former subordinates. The Chou dynasty case, then, may be more appropriate to understand cooperation during those instances when a dominant power is on its last legs and on verge of military collapse. By contrast, Great Britain's cooperation with the United States was initiated when no such savaging of the British military had taken place. Later on in the 20th century, Great Britain's military defeats suffered at the hands of Germany and Japan help explain the accelerated pace of Britain's transferrence of its major foreign policy roles to the U.S., but the initial patterns of cooperation had taken place before the British had suffered any cataclysmic, "empire ending" military defeats at the hands of its adversaries. The U.K.-U.S. case, then, might be useful in explaining cooperation between major powers before crises emerge or collapse is imminent. It may be most appropriate in helping the international relations scholar understand cooperation during times of peace and prosperity.

This being said, these case studies examined call into question the Hegemonic Stability theory and the Power Transition Theory. If the case studies examined in this dissertation call into question two theories of international relations that have as their emphasis the relationship of power to state behavior, what do the cases tell us about another theory emphasizing the relevance of power to state behavior—the balance of power?

The Balance of Power

From the case studies examined in chapters three, four, five, and six it is apparent that the existence of a balance of power either played no direct role in making a peaceful transfer of power come about, as illustrated by Great Britain's experience with America in the Western Hemisphere, or the Chou dynasty's experience with its vassal states in 771 B.C. and shortly after. In fact, the overt use of the balance of power as an instrument of foreign policy may even in some cases have contributed to instability in international

relations and thereby served as an impediment to peaceful change. This is illustrated by Great Britain's experiences with Imperial Germany and Japan. In attempting to contain the rising power of the Ch'in kingdom, the six remaining kingdoms of the Warring States period apparently only succeeded in forestalling their inevitable violent overthrow by an up and coming challenger.

Great Britain and the United States

As we have seen, Great Britain appeared unable to establish a balance of power in the Western Hemisphere. Britain and France both recognized that the ultimate aim of American policy was expansion on the American continent; however, both countries were unable to agree on issues outside of the Western Hemisphere, and could not ally themselves to check American expansion. Great Britain, for example, gave France no assistance in its bid to put Maximillian on the "throne" of Mexico. Although an opportunity to establish a balance of power in the Americas arrived with the American Civil War, Great Britain did not ally itself with the Confederacy because support for secessionist movements set bad precedents, and because Great Britain was morally opposed to slavery.

Of equal significance, was the finding that Great Britain *actively* prevented a balance of power developing in the Americas. Great Britain purposely kept the other European powers at bay while it dealt with the United States on a bilateral basis. When in 1898 the United States seemed on the verge of going to war with a much weaker Spain, Germany, France and Italy approached Great Britain to issue a joint condemnation of American actions in the hope that the United States would be deterred. Great Britain refused.

The absence of a British policy deliberately meant to keep U.S. power balanced, constrained, or contained meant that a broader relationship between the two powers could

develop. As we have seen from chapter 5 the relationship between the two involved trade and broader economic interests, and a political bond eventually developed. As I will argue below, this led to other positive developments between the United States and Great Britain. The deliberate British effort to avoid a policy of containment or balance against the United States also permitted the British to carefully manage its bilateral relationship with the rising power without the interferrence of the other major powers. This approach meant that the United States had less opportunity (if it was so inclined) to manipulate the balance of power to further its own ends against British interests (as Bismarck was able to do in the latter part of the nineteenth century), and this approach also meant that the British could make important concessions to the U.S. without having to go to alliance partners (balancing American power) for approval or consent. Great Britain could act in its own interests to promote international system management through cooperation with the United States, without worrying about whether France, Germany, or Spain blessed the policy.

Great Britain, Japan and Germany

By contrast, the balance of power featured prominently in Great Britain's relationships with both Imperial Japan and Germany. Great Britain's initial cooperation and eventual alliance with Japan resulted from both countries' efforts to keep an expansionist Russia in check in Asia. When the Russian threat disappeared in Asia, Great Britain and Japan held onto the alliance. For Great Britain it needed a partner in Asia to keep Germany in check once the Great War had begun. For Japan, the continued existence of the Anglo-Japanese alliance served as a hedge against both Russia and the United States. As Great Britain grew worried over Japanese incursions into Manchuria and Mainland China, and Japanese naval power, it sought to constrain Japanese actions through the balance of power mechanism. It invited France and Italy into joint British and

Japanese operations against German holdings in Shantung as a means to constrain Japan's seizure of territory in China. Finally, it sided with the United States in opposing Japan's claims to a special position in Manchuria and Mongolia.

Similarly, the balance of power mechanism was also a feature of Great Britain's relations with Imperial Germany, and as we have seen, a major factor in Germany's dissatisfaction with the international system dominated by Great Britain. From Chapter 4 we witness Bismarck's skillful use of the balance of power to advance foreign and defense policy goals in Europe; however, we also witness Great Britain's efforts to keep Germany from expanding to the African continent and the South Pacific through its alignments with the other European powers; we recall Disraeli's use of Russian and Austrian animosity over the Balkans, and Britain's central balancing role to keep all the European powers divided from one another, as a means to smash the Dreikaiserbund; finally, we witness Great Britain's naval arms race with Germany as a manifestation of the balance of power mechanism at work.

The British effort to contain or balance both Germany and Japan seriously disrupted any chance for peaceful transfer of control of British responsibilities to either imperial power. First, the British effort to either constrain these nations or use them to constrain others led to resentment in these countries and just as significantly, eventual suspicion of British motives to cooperate when Great Britain went into further decline. Thus, at a time when Germany could have allied itself with the United Kingdom against Russia or France in exchange for colonial holdings or other benefits, German decision makers were highly suspicious of the motives of the British foreign policy elite. In addition, while British motives to dissolve the Anglo-Japan alliance may have been rooted in the British belief that disarmament and naval arms control was the best means to ensure British colonial security, Japanese statesmen only saw Anglo-American efforts to contain Japan's ambitions. As I have argued in chapter 3, this came about as a result of previous

efforts by the British to contain Japanese ambitions on the Mainland of Asia. Second, the British use of balance of power policies indirectly contributed to tensions between the UK and Germany and Japan. Bismarck was able to manipulate the balance of power to serve German interests against Britain, forcing increased competition in European relations. Japan used its alliance with Great Britain to counter other powers from interfering with its ambitions to carve up China and annex Korea. Great Britain's use of Japan to counter or balance Germany in East Asia eventually led to tension between Great Britain and its Asian ally as Japan sought to seize German holdings on the Chinese mainland. Finally, I have argued that the British focus on balancing Germany and Japan led to a narrow, strategically focused relationship with these powers. Instead of trade and economic interests developing broadly between these countries, Britain looked upon them only in light of how they affected British security and supported the perpetuation of British power. These countries, similarly, looked upon Great Britain only in terms of what British power could do to contribute to German and Japanese security and power. It should not be surprising, then, that as British power declined, Germany and Japan saw an opportunity to expand power or increase their security, not a time to help an old friend in need.

The Chou Empire and its Vassal States

As was the case with Great Britain and the United States, the peaceful transfer of power between the Chou kings and their vassal states seemed to have nothing to do with an active balance of power policy of the Chou kings prior to the collapse of Chou power, nor to the de facto existence of a balance of power among the vassal states. The historical and archaeological evidence says nothing of an active effort by the Chou kings to balance some of the vassal states against others. There is no archaeological or historical evidence of the Empire's effort, for example, to construct and build up the military power of the

Ch'i state to offset the growing power of the state of Sung. As mentioned in Chapter Six, the Chou kings occasionally had to send armies to deal with rebellious states which suggests that the Chou kings at times employed a policy of "containment" when necessary. However, the historical record also tells us that this occurred very rarely and for the most part the Chou kings used material rewards (e.g., land), expanded the roles and responsibilities of state rulers, and most importantly, the Mandate of Heaven to maintain control of subordinates.

Furthermore, the possibility of a balance of power existing among the Chou vassal states in the 8th and 7th centuries B.C. does not seem to serve as an explanation for the peaceful transfer of foreign policy roles either. By the mid 8th century B.C. the Chou empire still consisted of hundreds of vassal states. There is no evidence to suggest that prior to the Chou dynasty's collapse these hundreds of states coalesced into discrete alliances, alignments, or networks against other alliances or networks in order to pursue their narrow interests. Neither do we have evidence that the states identified as the most powerful had formed alliances or networks against one another.

Prior to and just after the Western Chou collapse, some degree of threat existed from barbarian tribes, so it may be argued that the vassal states all formed an alliance or coalition against an external threat—hence developed an overall balance of power. While the threat from Turkic or Mongolian tribes was certainly significant (one of these tribes successfully defeated the Chou armies), the historical records show that it was not until at least one century after the collapse of the Chou capital at Hao that the vassal states formed a collective security organization or an alliance against a significant external threat—the semi-barbarian state of Ch'u.

In sum, the absence of a balance of power policy to constrain the Chou dynasty's vassal states probably led to important conditions conducive to a peaceful transfer of control within an inter-state system: (1) continued loyalty of most of the Chou vassals to

the dominant power (the Chou dynasty); (2) the evolution or development of alternative means of controlling the system (e.g., increased role and status of Chou vassals, the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven); and (3) the unconstrained growth, prosperity, and autonomy of the Chou vassal states, and consequently, a situation in which vassal states believed role, responsibilities, and benefits accorded with power.

The late Spring and Autumn, and Warring States Eras

By contrast, the years progressing toward the Ch'in overthrow of the Chou dynasty in the third century B.C. can be characterized as involving an active balance of power policy by the regional states and a de facto existence of a balance for the later part of the Spring and Autumn period and all of the Warring States period. As mentioned in Chapter Six, as warfare grew in scope and magnitude, the states began forming alliances. Chapter Six pointed out that from the later part of the Spring and Autumn a balance existed between the states aligned with the Ch'i state and those aligned with Ch'u; as the Spring and Autumn progressed into the Warring States era, and as Ch'i power declined, the balance shifted to between those states aligned with the state of Chin and those aligned with the state of Ch'u. Finally, in the last stages of the Warring States period, we find a balance of power existing between the up-and-coming state of Ch'in and the remaining six kingdoms—a balance that apparently lasted for one century before the Ch'in took control of all China in 221 B.C.

In contrast to the early part of the Spring and Autumn period, the persistence of balance of power policies in the latter part of the period and the Warring states period contributed to a very unstable and anarchic inter-state system. As the purpose of vassal state policy moved away from maintaining Chou sovereignty, toward ensuring state survival through alliances and balance of power policies, the latter Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period experienced erosion of the common bond of a feudal

code and was replaced by a code emphasizing military and economic effectiveness over chivalry. This eliminated common definitions of justice and appropriate vassal state behavior (the implications of which I discuss in further detail below) and led to an inter-state system further characterized as zero-sum or winner takes all. It should not be surprising, then that the process by which rising vassal states determined which states should dominate the new inter-state order, would be a violent one.

Theoretical implications: the Balance of Power

The case studies that I have examined inform us that the balance of power does not appear to be a useful concept in explaining successful cooperation among major powers. The concept of balance of power appears to be useful in illustrating that the "balance" has been misinterpreted and misapplied through the centuries, the consequence sometimes being systemic instability and war. The cases that I have examined appear to illustrate that when confronted with the prospect of significant alteration of power relations in an international system, major powers sometimes seek in the name of balance of power to maintain stability and security by applying a "short-term solution" to a long-term problem. That is, they deal with the rise of an up-and-coming challenger by forming an alliance, improving upon their own internal capabilities relative to the rising power, and keeping that power constrained. The problem appears to go away for a short while as the rising power is kept from assuming greater roles or deriving greater benefits from the system; however, the problem eventually reemerges and becomes exaccerbated as the gap between the power of a rising state and its roles, responsibilities and benefits from participating in the system, widen.

The Balance of Power has probably survived as a theoretical concept because it cannot be shown that the concept is useless. When threats to national security or to the international order emerge due to the threats from another country or the build up of

military capabilities of hostile nation, the major powers have to act to constrain those threats. It is only logical that under these circumstances, the major powers would seek to maintain the status quo, and constrain a nation that presents a "clear and present danger" to the international order. In contributing to systemic stability the balance of power, however, only applies in this specific assistance. Balance of Power theory would make sense as a general theory of international relations if stability, peace and security in international relations always involved providing for the security of the same major powers against rising challengers who always had hostile intentions against the current order. In other words, Balance of Power only makes sense if power relations did not change over time, or if nations did not legitimately grow more powerful relative to their neighbors. If the case studies examined are accurate, that long-term stability comes about through policies meant to divide up roles, responsibilities, and benefits among major powers commensurate with capabilities, then it is easy to see why reliance on a mechanism meant to always keep others' interests in check or held hostage to the whim of the most powerful, would frequently represent a recipe for disaster. Before examining in detail those theories which do make the argument that stability arises from an equilibrium of power and role, I will examine other elements of a successful peaceful transfer of control within international systems.

Accomodation Theories: Appeasement, Bandwagoning & Integrative Negotiations

Appeasement and Bandwagoning

Accomodation between Great Britain and the United States undoubtedly played a role in bringing about the peaceful change from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana. But accomodation should not necessarily be defined as "bandwagoning" or "appeasement". Notwithstanding the historical essays of Sir Michael Howard who argues that British appeasement was standard British foreign policy from 1870 to 1938, British motives for

cooperation with the United States go much deeper than simply attempting to avoid war with the emerging American power.

As has been mentioned previously, British cooperation with the United States began early enough (well before evidence of British decline and American ascendancy) that it can be argued that the British would have no reason to appease or "bandwagon" with the United States in the 1840s and 1850s. Furthermore, Anglo-American relations from the mid-nineteenth century to the turn of the twentieth century cannot simply be characterized as a pattern of consistent surrender of British foreign and defense interests to the United States. Within this time frame, the British nearly came to blows with the United States on several occasions.

As chapter six showed, the Chou dynasty's treatment of its vassal states prior to its collapse cannot be remotely characterized as "appeasement" or "coddling". We have shown that the Chou kings occasionally led military expeditions to put down rebellious states, some of whom (e.g., the state of Ch'i) went on to play prominent roles in the Spring and Autumn period, and the maintenance of the Chou inter-state system. In some instances the Chou punishment of transgressions by its vassals was quite harsh (e.g., the Chou king boiled Duke Ai in a cauldron of oil). Furthermore, short of material awards such as the granting of land to loyal subordinates there is no archaeological or historical evidence that the Chou kings practiced appeasement as a means to control the vassal states. We find no evidence, for example, of the Chou kings "buying" off rebellious states, only military expeditions launched against them .

Integrative Negotiations

British actions in this time period did not reveal a willingness to sell out British interests simply to avoid a conflict with the United States, but reflected a bargaining and negotiation process whose end it was to further British foreign policy *and* preserve the

Anglo-American relationship. As chapter 5 illustrated the interplay between British and American statesmen show a process of integrative negotiation. In chapters five and six, we find evidence of some clever formulas developed to manage the transfer of control of the international or inter-state system. These formulas resemble closely the integrative bargaining techniques mentioned by Zartman and Pruitt in chapter two. For example, to enable the two sides to agree to a Panama Canal treaty, seemingly contradictory language was incorporated in the treaty permitting the signatories to both declare the canal "neutral" in peace and in war, and the explicit right of the United States to use the canal for military purposes. As referred to in chapter two, the use of new concepts or methods of doing things to bridge apparently divergent views on an issue is known in the literature as "bridging". Similarly, to bring about agreement to the Alaskan boundary dispute, the British proposed that the Canadians abandon sovereignty over certain territory (which satisfied American interests) in exchange for Canada receiving a perpetual lease for that territory and the right to construct railways to other parts of Canada (which satisfied some of the Canadian commercial interests). While this formula ultimately did not resolve the Alaska boundary dispute, it shows that the parties to the disputes were thinking along the lines of resolutions that were satisfactory to all parties.

To agree on an appropriate boundary between Maine and Canada, the British and the Americans employed a negotiation device known as "log rolling". The British were concerned with Canadian security and clearly sought to draw a line that would not threaten a military road from Quebec to Halifax. The Americans were primarily concerned with the economic benefits of the deal. Both sides conceded on issues of lesser importance to themselves and arrived at a resolution. The Americans agreeing to draw the boundary far enough to the south so as not to threaten the British military road, while the British and Canadians conceded thousands of acres of territory that were rich in minerals and deposits and had easy access to fishing. A similar technique was employed

during the Venezuela Crisis of 1895. The British were concerned more with the security implications of drawing the British Guianan colony's boundaries as demanded by Venezuela. The Americans were concerned with continued British interferrence in the Western Hemisphere. The British conceded that they would not interferre in the Western Hemisphere and agreed to American domination of the region by accepting the American demand to speak for all South American countries. The Americans gave the British what they wanted by drawing the British Guiana-Venezuela boundary according to British demands.

The use of clever formulas to negotiate the transfer of control of an international system was also evident in the Chou dynasty case. To maintain peace, security and order in the early part of the Spring and Autumn era, without encroaching upon the sovereignty of the Chou kings the vassal states and the Chou court created the institution of the "Protector" or "hegemon" whereby the most powerful vassal state was authorized by the Chou king to act as policeman of the system. This stretching of the definition of sovereignty can be considered an example of "bridging" mentioned previously. To reflect the reality that a number of states were growing in power and deserved credit for helping maintain the system at different times, the name of the institution was changed to the "five protectors" or "Wu Pa". That the most powerful vassal states alternated in assuming this prestigious title is reminiscent of what the negotiation and bargaining school of thought calls "alternating". That is, since the wanted commodity—the prestige associated with a title or position—was scarce and coveted by the most powerful states, the vassal states alternated in their assumption of the title. Finally, the Chou kings were given the right to act as arbitrators for political disputes between the various states, and the Chou kings retained the right to rank the various states according to their compliance with Chou feudal customs. This is somewhat reminiscent of the integrative negotiation technique of cutting

the costs of the parties' concessions, but this example has greater significance—it shows that the negotiating parties had common definitions of justice.

Justice

That the British/Americans and the Chou kings/vassal states were able to think up clever formulas to arrive at negotiated settlements of the transfer of control over international or inter-state systems is in large part related to the common definitions of justice that the dominant and subordinate powers shared. This is immediately apparent in the case of the Chou Empire and its vassal states. The historical evidence that all Chou vassal states shared the belief that the Chou kings had the Mandate of Heaven, the right to be sovereign over the inter-state system, meant that the parties shared a "partial" definition of justice. That is, the Chou kings believed that since they had the Mandate of Heaven, they deserved 100 percent of the negotiated outcome when the issue under discussion was continued sovereignty of the Chou kings. The vassal states apparently agreed with this concept for close to five hundred years more. It is clear from chapter six, in addition, that the vassal states and the Chou kings also eventually shared a common definition of justice that can be defined as "contributive justice"—that is, the more one party contributes the more that party should expect from a transaction. As it became increasingly apparent that only the leadership of the Ch'i state during the mid-7th century B.C. could keep the Chou inter-state system together, the parties created the institution of the "hegemon" or "protector" to reflect the greater contribution of the Ch'i state.

The same is true of chapter five and the British relationship with an up and coming America. The principle that the two parties should split the outcome down the middle otherwise known as "impartial justice" was shared by the United States and Great Britain when both sides agreed not to colonize South America, both sides agreed to build an isthmian canal together, and both sides agreed to patrol the western coast of Africa for

illegal slave trafficking.[1] Both sides shared a sense of "partial justice" that is that the United States deserved 100 % of the outcome of the Alaskan boundary dispute when, due to Canada's poor legal claim, the British jurist sided with the Americans over Canadian objections to grant the United States the Alaskan boundary it had demanded all along with its dispute with Canada.

"Systems management" as motive for cooperation

If motives for accommodation are not to be found in British or Chou appeasement nor the desire to bandwagon an increasingly threatening power, what were the motives of the dominant power in seeking out cooperation of the up and coming powerful subordinate? Chapter 5 illustrates that the prime motivation for British foreign policy makers was the joint management of the international system. The belief that the Americans could help Great Britain maintain stability, political order and peace in the international system was rooted partially in the shared Anglo-Saxon heritage, partially in common political beliefs and traditions, and partially in shared international interests. This motivation led British statesmen to seek to preserve the relationship, and hence, to pursue integrative negotation solutions to some of the stickier problems of Anglo-American relations. This motivation also led British statesmen to do something else, to expand the role of the United States in the international system as American power grew. This point is illustrated first by the British belief that the United States would "police" the Western Hemisphere and help provide stability for that part of the world. It is also

[1] Even though the United States in effect reneged on this deal fifty years later when it sought to get rid of the Clayton Bulwer treaty. By this time, however, the British and the Americans had agreed on another principle of justice. That is the more one contributes, the greater benefit one should derive from that contribution. The British were of the belief that if the United States constructed the canal, and eventually policed the region, it should have the right to use the canal for military purposes. Review chapter five and the isthmian canal treaty.

illustrated by British encouragement to expand American territorial possessions in the Pacific and British support for American takeover of Spanish colonial possessions.

The same motivations can be said to have been present for the Chou kings and their vassals. In chapter 6 I showed that the Mandate of Heaven was a core belief among all the major powers of the Chou inter-state system. This belief proved central first in the vassal states efforts to preserve the Chou Empire after total military failure and then in efforts to establish political and military institutions to preserve the Empire. The motive to preserve the Chou inter-state system is also evident in the language of treaties drawn up by the regional powers to "preserve the honor of the Chou kings" by keeping the peace and protecting the whole inter-state system.

Conclusion: Theories of accomodation.

I have shown that "appeasement" did not appear to be the underlying motives of the dominant powers in their cooperation with rising challengers. In the Anglo-American case, cooperation began far too early in their relations to suggest British fear of American power. What does appear to be a significant factor partially explaining cooperation, is the existence of common interests, common values and beliefs and common definitions of justice. From a theoretical perspective the case studies suggest that the argument over the relevance of norms and regimes to international relations, favors those who have argued that norms do affect outcomes in international relations over those who argue that norms have no relevance. In the case studies I examined, common norms help explain how the major power(s) entered into a relationship with a rising power that can be characterized as one meant to jointly maintain or manage the international system. It is much more likely that two powers will see each other as mutually maintaining an international order, if both nations have similar beliefs over what ensures prosperity (e.g., free trade versus mercantilism), what constitutes legitimacy (e.g., maintaining Chou sovereignty), and

what constitutes security (e.g., keeping the major powers of Europe out of the New World or a collective security system comprised of Chou vassal states to counter barbarian incursions).

Common norms also partially explain the success of integrative bargaining techniques. The ability to arrive at innovative formulas to bridge very different positions of a dominant major power and a rising challenger is greatly assisted if the two parties have common definitions of justice or fairness. These common definitions of justice may arise from common political experiences, common definitions of security, similar histories, common definitions of the rights of man and the proper relationship of man to the state. In sum, the ability to engage in integrative bargaining arises from commonly held definitions of justice, which in turn, are derived from common norms or beliefs related to the political sphere.

Principles of Power Cycle Theory

The case studies examined in chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 illustrate that Doran's hypothesis that expanding the role of an emerging central state to match its relative power can bring about a peaceful transfer of foreign policy roles in an international system, is essentially correct. Similarly, his argument that the dominant power's efforts to constrain an emerging central state, despite its level of relative power generally leads to systemic instability and major war, also appears to hold true.

Containment versus the expansion of state roles/responsibilities

As we have seen from chapters 3 and 4 British efforts to use the balance of power to maintain the status quo kept peace—but on a temporary basis. The British temporarily kept Wilhelmian Germany out of Africa and out of the South Pacific, but this policy of containment later led a frustrated German nation to demand Helgoland. Disraeli

successfully used the balance of power to smash the Dreikaiserbund and to negotiate an English dictated settlement, but this led to renewed efforts on Bismarck's part to renew the three emperor alliance and to align Germany with Russia and France to bring about England's isolation; English shipbuilding efforts were able to keep apace with German battleship production, but this also reinforced the German perception that Great Britain was seeking to prevent Germany from realizing its greatness.

Similarly, the Japanese became frustrated by British containment efforts. As illustrated in Chapter 4, the Japanese saw their nation as the regional power of Asia. They were of the opinion that Japan merited equal respect with the United States and they wanted a Monroe Doctrine of their own. This was not to be. Even while in alliance with the Japanese, the British sought to constrain the Japanese from acquiring too much of China. Japanese aspirations were dashed when the British sided with other European powers and the United States in denying Japan its territorial demands at the conclusion of World War I. The abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and Britain's cooperation with the United States to block recognition of Japan's special position in Manchuria and Mongolia exacerbated Japan's frustration with Great Britain and the international system.

By contrast, and as has been argued in this chapter, British enlargement of the American role in the international system gradually eased the tension between the two powers. Theoretically, Doran posits that mature international systems tend to be stable—and a mature system is characterized by the equilibrium of the relative power possessed by its components and their respective roles. Great Britain recognized both America's right to expand in the continent (Manifest Destiny) and its right to represent the entire hemisphere (the Monroe Doctrine). Great Britain essentially recognized America's de facto role as the guardian of Britain's south Atlantic flank when it signed the Panama Canal Treaty, and essentially approved of America's involvement in the Far East when it encouraged the United States to annex Hawaii and the Philippines. This created a kind of

understanding in which Great Britain left the Western Hemisphere to the management of the United States. Once this principle was understood between the two powers, it enabled them to work through and negotiate a number of significant conflicts existing between the two of them.

As chapter six showed the effort of the Six Kingdoms to contain the rising power of the Ch'in state forestalled the violent takeover of the inter-state system by one century, but the historical record suggests that over the course of that century, Ch'in appeared to be a determined rising power to assume control over the entire inter-state system. By contrast, the Chou Empire's efforts to expand the roles and responsibilities of rising vassal states is directly related to the continuance of the Chou inter-state order. The creation of the institution of the "protector" provided an increased role and responsibility for the states of Ch'i and Chin in the early part of the Spring and Autumn period—both vassal states dutifully sought to maintain Chou sovereignty over the system for over two centuries.

Early cooperation

As stated in chapter two, Doran's Power Cycle Theory also posits that changes in the capabilities of nation-states are often followed by a lag in systemic reassignment of roles to those nation-states. An early reassignment of roles in the international system is more likely to lead to systemic stability, and a tardy readjustment of roles to systemic instability. Chapter 5 illustrated that British statesmen recognized early the importance of developing a rapprochement with the United States and cooperating fully with America to manage the international system. We find indirect evidence of this type of thinking in the British cabinet as early as the1840s. We find direct evidence of this attitude in the latter half of the nineteenth century with British statesmen calling for the two peoples to manage the vagaries of the anarchic international environment. As mentioned earlier in this

chapter we also find Great Britain arriving at treaties laying out the foundation for cooperative Anglo-American relations as early as the 1840s and 1850s.

Early cooperation had a number of "stabilizing" effects on Anglo-American relations. Early cooperation broadened the relationship between the two countries and gave the two parties a wide range of issues to "trade off" with one another during the process of integrative negotiation and bargaining. Early cooperation enabled British and American statesmen to give each other the benefit of the doubt because the record of cooperation had been so long. When deciding whether or not to sign the Panama Canal Treaty, the British Cabinet approved the treaty because they assumed war would not occur with the United States—an assumption based on the long record of cooperation.

Britain's cooperation with the United States and its willingness to increase the role of the U.S. in the international system before Britain's decline became pronounced, provided another stabilizing effect to international relations: Great Britain was in a position to allocate the benefits of the international system with the United States while it still enjoyed the dominant position in the system. As mentioned previously, the Royal Navy had prevented the other European powers from intervening in American affairs. This gave the United States a virtually free reign to manage the Western Hemisphere absent interferrence from continental powers. Britain's early cooperation with the United States also provided the U.S. with greater influence in the South Pacific. Finally, Great Britain was still economically vibrant enough to repeal the Corn Laws, virtually opening up the markets of the British empire to American exports.

By contrast, late adjustment of roles for the rapidly emerging powers of Germany and Japan led to systemic instability and ultimately war. By the time Great Britain began offering Germany colonies in Eastern Africa or full-fledged alliances against Russia, Germany had already been engaged in a naval arms race with Great Britain and was convinced that the only reliable means to advance its interests was to challenge Great

Britain and the international status quo. Because Russia threatened Germany's eastern flank, British statesmen's efforts to get Germany to cooperate with Britain in the containment of Russia in the Far East was met with a tepid response. British offers to informally assist the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria and Italy) against Russia and France was met with hostility and suspicion because Great Britain had in the past skillfully used the balance of power to advance its interests while leaving its partners "holding the bag".

In addition, that Great Britain was late in cooperating with Germany heightened the instability of the system because Great Britain had few benefits to provide Germany after it had entered into significant decline by the end of the nineteenth century. It offered Germany territory in southern Africa but had to renege on the terms of the agreement because it was feeling strategic pressure from France. It offered to enter into an alignment with Germany, Austria, and Italy against Russia and France but the German Prime Minister Caprivi correctly rejected this offer because he recognized it as a means to protect British interests from the French and Russian threats, while the Germans and the Austrians took the greatest risks. Despite German demands to be given sole control over some of the Samoan islands, Great Britain could only advocate the continued joint management (Germany, Great Britain and the United States) of these islands because the dominion states of Australia and New Zealand did not want these islands controlled by Germany, and by this point England desperately needed the support of the dominions.

Similarly, the late adjustment of Japan's role in East Asia by Britain impeded the prospects for peaceful transfer of foreign policy roles in the Asian international system. By the time Great Britain entered into an alliance with Japan, it was desperate for the support of a regional power to prop up British interests in the region. Japan was hungry for a European ally to help Japan advance its interests in Asia. The late cooperation between the two countries, then, was based on the narrow, strategic calculations of the

balance of power and this was reflected in the language of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty. Relations deeper than the strategic and security oriented never developed between the two island powers and the two governments assessed the relationship in balance of power terms. As British power continued to decline and Japanese capabilities to rise, British requests for cooperation were increasingly and correctly seen by the Japanese as an attempt to "use Japan as a watch dog" to prop up the British empire in Asia. Like Imperial Germany, Japan was convinced that the only means to advance its own interests were through the balance of power and, as British power declined, to challenge the status quo established by Great Britain.

As was also the case with Germany, Britain's tardy cooperation with Japan also encouraged instability in the system because Great Britain increasingly could not provide the benefits to Japan for propping up the international status quo. Despite Japan's loyalty during World War I, Great Britain could not grant all of Japan's territorial requests in East Asia at the Versailles conference following the Great War. Competition between the major powers in China and Great Britain's increasing weakness in East Asia meant that England could not ensure Japan's special interests on the Chinese Mainland—Japan found itself increasingly on its own to protect Japanese interests. Finally, by the 1920s Great Britain found itself so weakened as to depend on the cooperation of the United States to help it manage the international system. It therefore could not afford to alienate the United States, and for this reason it took steps leading to: the end of the Anglo-Japanese alliance; the signing of the Four Power Treaty; and joint Anglo-American condemnation of Japanese actions in Manchuria and Mongolia—all of which led to Japan's disatisfaction with the international system under Britain's leadership.

There is some evidence of early cooperation between the Chou kings and their vassal states. This evidence involves the early assignment of powerful vassal states to police the peripheries of the Chou empire, and giving subordinates such titles as "Great

Protector". The historical record also shows, as pointed out in chapter six, that the Chou kings must have developed early cooperative relationships with their vassal states because no Chou military expeditions to suppress the regional states are recorded in the first two hundred years of the Chou empire.

"Critical points"

Doran argues that peaceful transfers of power are more difficult to bring about and the likelihood of major war is greater as nation-states arrive at "critical points" along their power curves. As I discussed in chapter two, these "critical points" are often brought about by the changing power positions of rivals, vast technological, political and societal change, and some new element entering the calculus of the political interactions of the major players of the international system.

While this dissertation does not employ the detailed methods Doran uses to empirically determine if a nation-state has actually reached a "critical point" along its power curve, it took note if the factors listed above played a role in the strategic calculus of the powers undergoing or failing to undergo a peaceful transfer of foreign policy role. As the cases in chapters 3 to 6 show, "critical points" did appear to play roles in obstructing the peaceful transfer of control over international systems, and their absence may partially explain (in conjunction with all the factors already discussed) the success of major powers to transfer control of international or inter-state systems.

From chapter six, we find that the political, technological and societal order established by the Chou kings continued well into the Spring and Autumn period. The Chou Empire is characterized as a feudal order, and this order carries over into the early part of the Spring and Autumn period. Warfare in Western Chou times heavily emphasizes the chariot, as is also the case in the early part of the Spring and Autumn period. Government, political system and economic interactions are, in both time

periods, characterized by feudalism. There is also the absence of rapid rise of a challenger to the Chou king. As chapter six illustrated, the state of Ch'i was not appointed the "protector" or "hegemon" until one century after the fall of the Western Chou. Sovereignty of the system still belonged unquestionably to the Chou kings in the later part of the Western Chou dynasty and this extended into the Spring and Autumn period, and the status and prestige of states in both the later part of the Western Chou dynasty and the early part of Spring and Autumn was determined not by power positions, but by decisions made by the Chou court. If Doran's point is that rapid change in a state's capability relative to its rivals brings about "security dilemmas", and complicates the statesman's ability to work out strategic problems rationally, no such dilemma seemed to exist during the Western Chou dynasty and early part of the Spring and Autumn period—when a peaceful transfer of control occurred, and when increasingly powerful, up-and-coming rising states continued to maintain the old inter-state order.

By contrast, the presence of rapid technological, political and social change is obvious in the later part of the Spring and Autumn period and even more so in the Warring States period. During these times the Chou inter-state system underwent a transformation from a feudal economy to a money economy (which involved the transfer of land ownership from the manors to free holding tenants); the political systems of the Chou vassal states were transformed from aristocracy to meritocracy; armies increased from a few thousand to over ten thousand soldiers on average; and warfare centered around the chariot shifted to warfare centered around the mass army. As historians of ancient China inform us, this was a time when the sovereignty of the Chou kings was called into question and rival states undergoing significant internal reform found it less advantageous to answer to the Empire. As mentioned above, Doran argues that changing political, economic, technological and social conditions impact the relative power positions of states and therefore rapidly changing conditions impede the ability of states to

work out conflicts peacefully among themselves. Such conditions appeared to exist in the later part of the Spring and Autumn period and during the Warring States period. The historical evidence suggests these periods were rife with military conflict, the extermination of states, and the formation of alliances to overwhelm opponents. The changing nature of warfare may also have left states uncertain where they stood relative to the capabilities of other states. It must have come as a surprise to the state of Ch'i, for example, long dominant in the military field because of the large number of its chariots, as the mass army and the use of infantry began to overtake the chariot in military importance.

A similar theme applies to chapters 3, 4, and 5. Great Britain's cooperation with the United States began in the 1840s before technological, military, economic and political change swept over the landscape of international relations. By the middle of the nineteenth century the United Kingdom remained dominant in sea power and still retained the advantage in the economic sphere when it chose to cooperate with the United States. This left Great Britain and the United States free to work out bilateral trade, boundary and military issues between themselves over a relatively long period of time (fifty years). By the time significant change in the areas of technology, economic relations, military power, and the internal organization of states, arrived in the late nineteenth century, Great Britain and the United States had had over half a century to work out matters between them, to develop an understanding for the positions of the other leadership, and mechanisms (arbitration, mediation or integrative negotiation) for working out political difficulties.

The same cannot be said of Great Britain's relationship with Imperial Japan. By the time Great Britain began cooperating with this power, the British Empire had begun its long slide into decline. The origin of the British alliance with Japan is rooted in British weakness in the Far East, and British efforts to "contain" Russia. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was formed three years prior to the Russo-Japanese War, and matured in the throes of massive technological and military change in Asia. Japan had just defeated the

Russian Empire in the Russo-Japanese war, and the Japanese had shown themselves adept at mastering the new techniques of warfare involving the machine gun, the trench, the torpedo, and the mine. The early part of the twentieth century, furthermore, when the British began cooperating with Japan has been described by historians as the birth of nationalism in Japan resulting from Japan's rapid industrialization, colonization of Korea and Taiwan, and increasing military capabilities. In short, Japan appears to have reached a "critical point" just as Great Britain attempted to cooperate with Japan to manage the international system of Asia. To the Japanese this rapidly changing international environment suggested that cooperation meant that the British should lend legitimacy to Japanese efforts to colonize and expand the territorial holdings of a rapidly rising Japan. To the British, this changing environment meant that the Japanese should help the British prop up British control over Asia, during a time when the British were uncertain of their own capabilities relative to Russia, France and Germany. These conflicting notions of cooperation led to rising tensions between the two countries and the eventual rift in 1933, and world war in 1941.

As chapter four illustrated, British cooperation with Germany came late in the relationship between the two countries. For most of the later part of the nineteenth century, the British either treated Germany like a "poor cousin" or actively sought to "contain" German aspirations. When cooperation did take place it was out of strategic necessity of the British (to contain France or Russia) and during times of technological, military and economic change in international relations. As mentioned in chapter 4, the German population had increased rapidly between 1870 and 1895. The German military had access to new kinds of weapons of war, the submarine, the battleship, the torpedo, the mine, the machine gun, etc. While Germany was experiencing this change, it was also experiencing uncertainty over its capabilities compared with its neighbor to the East. Chapter 4 discussed in detail the dilemma German military planners faced in confronting a

rapidly rising Russia. In sum, technological, political, economic and societal change pervaded international relations in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century. This change bred the uncertainty which made cooperation and peaceful resolutions of political conflicts difficult and contributed to the onset of World War I.

The Theory of Peaceful Transfers of Foreign Policy Roles in International Systems

The preceding discussion leads us to some broad theoretical implications, not just as they relate to a theory of peaceful transfer of power, but to international relations theory in general.

Norms

The first is that when states share values, definitions of justice, or norms this tends to temper, influence, or have an impact on outcomes in international relations. Cooperation amidst anarchy, and consequently, peaceful transfer of control within international systems, is made easier when the nations involved share common core beliefs. I have shown in chapters five and six and in the preceding pages that this was the case for Great Britain's relationship with the United States, and the Chou dynasty's relationship with its vassal states. Shared values, notions of justice, and norms led to situations in which both the dominant power and the rising challenger(s) could perceive their roles as cooperating to jointly manage the international or inter-state system. Shared values, definitions of justice, and norms also enabled dominant power and rising challenger to engage in integrative bargaining in order to resolve serious disputes. This was possible because the parties started off with roughly similar understandings of what consituted just or fair solutions to a wide range of disputes.

The significance of Balance of Power

The second implication is that systemic stability is not necessarily defined by a "balance of power" or a "preponderance of power" of the major state actors. Power is not necessarily perceived by all nation-states all the time as something to be balanced, checked or countered. As we have seen, the United Kingdom did not react to the rise of American power by attempting to contain or balance her. Instead it broadened its trade and economic relations with the U.S., it submitted a number of ongoing disputes with the U.S. to international arbitration, and averted efforts by other powers to counter or balance the U.S. To the contrary, when great powers sought to manage changing power relationships in the international system through balance or constrainment, as the United Kingdom sought to do with both Germany and Japan, the result was an unstable international system, a frustrated rising power, and a major power increasingly incapable of maintaining order. As Charles Doran puts it, the balance of power mechanism can at times be a short term remedy inappropriately applied to a long-term problem.[2]

From the cases examined, the balance of power had other negative effects making it difficult for the major powers to cooperate and carry off a peaceful transfer of control or responsibility within an international system. First, the balancing or countering policies of the major actors encouraged vigrorous competition in the system, and discouraged efforts to explore solutions suitable to all parties. Recall that in chapter 4 Bismarck attempted to arrive at "integrative" solutions but was countered by the maneuverings and policies of the other major powers—Britain and Russia in particular.

Second, in the cases studied, balance of power policies tended to narrow or focus major state relations on the strategic, military, and security issues to the detriment of other issues (e.g., trade, investment, cultural exchange). This had the further negative effect of

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[2] Charles Doran, *Systems in Crisis: Imperatives of High Politics at Century's End*, Cambridge University Press, 1991, New York, NY, p. 149.

depriving the states involved of issues that could be traded, exchanged, or sacrificed for more valued issues (e.g., econonomic concessions for security interests or vice versa). Most importantly, from the cases that I have examined, the narrowing of relations resulting from the pursuit of balance of power policies tended to give inter-state relations a zero-sum character. That is, when balance of power policies were pursued the foundation of relations between major power and rising challenger was survival, enhancement of security and power. Little else seemed to characterize their relations. When the major power experienced decline there were no intervening or alternative issues to dissuade the rising challenger from exploiting the major power's misfortune. Japan exploited British decline to increase its territorial holdings on mainland China and Korea. Germany exploited British decline to expand its territorial holdings in Africa and the South Pacific.

Third, balance of power policies tended to erode trust between major powers and rising challengers. After experiencing frustration and constraint, rising challengers will not be inclined to trust the intentions of major powers doing the constraining and balancing. This is true even when there appears to exist possible benefits from cooperation with the dominant power. After an unpleasant relationship with Great Britain during World War I and in the aftermath of that war (e.g., the Versailles experience) in which Japanese ambitions were consistently checked by Great Britain and the other major powers, Japan was highly suspicious of British motives when Great Britain suggested dissolving the Anglo-Japanese alliance in favor of naval arms control agreements.

The vigorous pursuit of a balance of power policy may involve a number of states in a coalition against a state or group of states. This tends to subject major power decisions to the whims of consensus and the specific interests of all the coalition partners. This makes granting concessions to an up-and-coming challenger much more difficult, complicates any effort to negotiate with that challenger, and could hold all the major powers hostage to efforts by a single coalition member to cling to its traditional role and

responsibilities (as we saw almost happened with Spain just prior to the Spanish-American war). Similarly, in many of the cases explored in this dissertation, a balance of power policy was preferred by one powerful actor and consequently, forced upon the others. This was the case with Great Britain's management of the European system in the 1870s and 1880s. This suggests that the ability of the international system to transfer roles and responsibilities to an up-and-coming challenger rests mostly on the most powerful, dominant actor of the system. That actor may or may not choose to manage the rising power through a balance of power policy; the dominant power may choose to manage the rising power bilaterally, isolating the rising power from the influences and the reach of other major powers; and the dominant power may choose to work with the other powers to integrate the rising power into the major power system.

Equilibrium of power and role, and appropriate balance of threat

The case studies seemed to show that the relevance of power to stability in international systems is that it: (1) determines which of the state actors deserves to be numbered among the mighty; (2) determines or measure what a particular state believes its role in the system deserves to be; and (3) determines the level of threat or the extent of the countering response if a particular nation is deemed to threaten a particular nation state or the current international order. We have seen examples in this dissertation of instability and conflict arising when a major actor or rising challenger perceived its expected role in the international system (#2) as exceeding its assigned role. I have also provided examples of instability arising when dominant powers in decline seek to cling to past glory and long-held roles in the international system, when their actual power relative to other states suggested either a reduced role or a departure from major power status (#1). Finally, this dissertation has shown that when states ignore points # 1 and 2, and are quick to label a rising power a threat to the international system, a threat that needs to

be countered in the name of the balance of power (#3), this tends to contribute to systemic instability and major war.

It makes sense that to bring about a peaceful transfer of control within international systems, then, the dominant state or states would find balancing techniques, or an international system characterized by the effort to hold other powers perpetually in check as counterproductive. On the contrary, in the cases that I examined, when dominant powers correctly recognized that the rising power of a possible challenger (with similar values, and core beliefs) deserved measures meant to increase the roles, responsibilities, and status of that challenger, this resulted in international systems stability and created the conditions to facilitate peaceful transfers of control within international systems.

Early Cooperation

If the hypothesis that international systemic stability and the possibility of peaceful transfers of control within international systems come about through a deliberate and careful division of international roles and responsibilities commensurate with the capabilities of the major powers, two other factors may contribute to the ability of the actors in the international system to bring about stability and a peaceful transfer: Early cooperation and the absence of rapid political, economic and technological change. Early cooperation is important because it permits a broadening of the relationship between the major power and the rising challenger. This broadening of the relationship allows a wide range of interests to develop between the two parties. These interests can be traded or sacrificed for more important interests as the two powers wrestle with difficult issues affecting their security, prosperity, and benefits as major powers. In short, early cooperation may provide the issues or interests that can be used in integrative bargaining. Early cooperation also appears to make sense because a major power can provide the

benefits or the perks to a rising challenger while the major power still has the economic, political , and military power to provide the benefit. As I have shown from the cases, Great Britain had to renege on benefits promised to both Germany and Japan because it lacked the economic, political and military muscle to resist pressure from the other major powers to withdraw the benefits promised to these imperial powers. Contrast this with the economic benefits the British provided to the United States by opening British markets to American farmers by as early as the middle of the nineteenth century. Finally, if peaceful transfer of control within international systems can happen as roles are adjusted to power, then, as Doran points out, it makes better sense to make the adjustment while the system is not stressed to the breaking point due to competition from increasingly powerful and frustrated challengers.

The absence of rapid change in international relations

The absence of vast and rapid political, economic and technological change also contributes to stability and the likelihood of a peaceful transfer of control in international systems. It would be difficult for the major powers of a mature international system to cooperate with each other, if sudden changes were taking place in the international system. For example, if Japan were to have developed computer software or some form of technology that made the communications systems of America's armed forces useless, this would certainly increase the uncertainty and "insecurity" of the United States and the rest of the major powers. Were cooperation among major, established powers, and former allies difficult amidst vast change, how less so would be cooperation between major power(s) and a rising challenger under these same uncertain conditions? It would therefore be unreasonable to expect a major power to contemplate expanding the roles, responsibilities and benefits of an up-and-coming challenger if the major powers were uncertain of their long-term positions within the system. The upshot of this analysis is

that gradual, incremental change in the international system is more conducive to stability and a peaceful transfer of control, than is rapid, revolutionary change.

Conclusion

What have the case studies and the preceding discussion told us about the likelihood of peaceful transfers of power in international systems and what have we concluded about the necessary steps to be taken by statesmen to make such a transfer possible?

Conditions for a transfer of role and authority need to be present

Taken for granted throughout this dissertation, is that some international systems are capable of a transfer of order maintenance responsibilities. Others may not be open to such transfers. Throughout this dissertation, the term "control" really meant "the responsibility for order-maintenance". The cases examined in this dissertation represented situations in which the international system was experiencing a shift in the power positions of the major powers. This shift was taking place either rapidly or gradually; it involved either the rapid rise of a new power or powers or the decline of an established power; it could also involve a gradual improvement of a number of states relative to a dominant power. A shift in the relative capabilities of the major powers, then, needs to be apparent before we can address the issue of transfer of control within international systems. In addition, as far as the issue of transferring control to a single rising challenger or a group of challengers are concerned, the existence of a rising challenger or challengers has to be apparent. An increasingly powerful state or states with increasingly economic, political, and military clout needs to be identified as a possible entrant(s) to the major powers' club before consideration of transfers of power can be entertained.

Conditions leading to violent transfer or failed transfer of role

Once it is apparent that power positions within the international system are changing, a combination of state policies in reaction to the changing situation, and underlying conditions already at work within the international system help determine if the transfer will be violent and involve major power war. These are: the occurrence of rapid economic, technological, and military change in the system; the persistence and prevalence of a balance of power in the system; a determined effort by the major powers to pursue balance of power policies with each other and with potential rising challengers; zero-sum or competitive behavior detrimental to efforts to come up with integrative solutions; "slippage" or a situation in which the major powers allow the gap between systemic roles and the power possessed by all the major actors to widen; narrow or strategically fixated relationships among the major powers, which serves to erode or diminish broader interests among the major powers—broader interests that can be traded off or exchanged; a history of little cooperation among the major powers or cooperation only after major power decline has set in; and major differences in norms and definitions of justice or fairness.

Conditions for peaceful transfers of order-maintenance responsibility

For a peaceful transfer to occur, certain conditions also need to be in place. These conditions are not subject to being shaped or influenced by the policies of the major actors. An international system is either characterized by these conditions, or it is not. These are: the existence of commonly held norms and definitions of justice among the major powers or actors; the absence of rapid economic, technological and military change in the system; and broad or non-security oriented relationships existing among the major powers and rising challenger(s). The absence of these conditions does not necessarily

doom an international system to violent transfers of foreign policy role; however, their absence makes state action to promote cooperation and peaceful transfer of control, very dificult.

State policies to promote peaceful transfers of role and responsibility

If the underlying conditions, mentioned in the previous paragraph, are present when an international system is poised for some form of transfer of role, the specific policies of the major actors and the rising challengers will make or break the prospects for a peaceful transfer of control. A major power statesman can decide to balance or counter the rise of a potential challenger or can decide to constructively work with the statesmen of that rising power to expand that state's roles and responsibilities. I conclude, therefore, that an almost sufficient condition leading to a peaceful transfer is the choice of statesmen to follow such a policy. The dominant power must rely on the information at hand to determine if the rising power poses a security threat to the international order, not by virtue of the increasing relative power of that state, but by that state's history, recent foreign policy statements and actions, and personal interaction with that state's leadership.

If the rising challenger does pose a threat to the international order, then the major power(s) are justified in forming a coalition to deter that threat or wage a defensive war to deal with the threat. Again, the verification that a threat exists comes about in examining a rising challenger's recent actions, declared policy, history, and professed norms, not simply on the power possessed by the challenger. If the decision makers of a major power conclude (due to shared norms and core beliefs) that the intentions of the rising power do not appear to involve a threat to the international order then the decision-maker can embark on a path to forge a cooperative, working relationship with the statesmen of the rising power. Hopefully this cooperative relationship will be initiated well before the major power experiences serious decline, so that the major power(s) and the rising

challenger(s) have had decades to broaden the interests that they share between them, and to engage in integrative negotiations to resolve their disputes. It cannot be overemphasized that the process of bringing about a peaceful transfer of foreign policy role is essentially a negotiation process in which a dominant power bargains hard for its interests, as does a rising challenger, but they come to an agreement on their roles and responsibilities satisfactory to both.

To conclude, a theory of peaceful transfers of power in international system should have the following components: 1) peaceful transfers of role can take place when the dominant power or powers expand the role of a central actor to match its increasing capabilities; 2) peaceful transfers of role can take place when there is an absence of the balance of power mechanism in an international system or when the dominant power purposely rejects the use of a balance of power policy and manages the rising challenger ; 3) the earlier a dominant state or states adjusts the role of an increasingly powerful central actor and the earlier dominant states cooperate with a potential rising challenger, the better the chances of a peaceful transfers of role; 4) peaceful transfers of role can occur if the dominant state or states see its (their) relationship with the rising challenger as joint management of the international system; 5) the peaceful transfer of role in international systems involves the process of integrative bargaining in which both parties are said to derive joint benefits from the negotiation; and 6) if there is an absence of significant technological, political, economic and social change in international relations, statesmen will find it easier to formulate policy that makes peaceful transfer possible. In chapter 8, the final chapter of the dissertation, I examine the implications of this theory for peaceful transfers of role in the twenty-first century.

8. Prospects for Peaceful Transfers of Power and the World Order of the Twenty First Century

Who are the major powers going into the twenty first century?

Before embarking on an examination of what policies American statesmen and the statesmen of the other major powers should pursue going into the Twenty First Century, it is necessary to briefly examine who the dominant or major powers are likely to be in the next century. This is not to say that American policy should ignore a range of pressing foreign policy issues involving the Third World. This thesis only proposes that American foreign policy directed at the question of international order management, requires understanding who the major players in the next century will be.

The United States of America

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has emerged as the dominant power of the international system. It has become as some scholars of international relations have phrased it, the only superpower presiding over a "unipolar international system".[1] While the Cold War was characterized by a bipolar international system in which American military, economic and political might was matched and balanced by Soviet power, the post-Cold War period is marked by: (1) American defense expenditures approximately equaling the combined defense expenditures of the other four major powers (China, Japan, Germany, and Russia)[2]; (2) the United States having

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[1] Zalmay Khalilzad, "Losing the moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War" in *Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1995, p. 87.

[2] *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1995*, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, table 1, pp. 74 to 99.

enough naval power (in terms of numbers of surface ships) to combat the next four largest naval powers in the world (Russia, Great Britain, Japan, and France);[3] (3) the United States is the only country on the planet capable of fighting two simultaneous major regional conflicts against "upstart" regional powers[4], and (4) the United States still has the world's largest economy with a GDP of U.S. $ 6.8 trillion, which exceeds the combined national products of Germany, Japan, Russia and China.[5]

The United States is also the only country trusted enough world wide to be regarded as the honest broker holding together some regions, while preventing the members of the international system from engaging in an arms race. This security role allows others to design frameworks for economic and monetary union. No other nation enjoys that status. No other nation, furthermore, has enough conventional military capability, enough trust expressed by the other major powers, and sufficient weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to be considered the trustee of nuclear deterrence. Japan, and the European states rely on the United States to provide them with a nuclear umbrella against threats of nuclear destruction from potential adversaries.

Despite these observations, two trends have emerged that suggest that while American dominance is likely to continue into the next century, the continuation of a unipolar international system could be short lived. The first is that despite American military power, the United States' capability to maintain order without the assistance of other countries (the other major powers) is questionable. For example, the United States required financial, political, logistical, and military support from a coalition of countries to push Iraq out of Kuwait. The second trend is the rise of alternative to U.S. power centers

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[3] *The Military Balance, 1995-6*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, published by Brasseys, London, UK; also see A. David Baker, III, ed., *Combat Fleets of the World*, 1995, United States Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Md., 1995. Refer to those sections covering the fleets of Russia, France, Great Britain, Japan and the United States.

[4] *The Bottom-Up Review*, Report of the Secretary of Defense 1993.

[5] *The World Factbook*, 1996, Central Intelligence Agency, 1996, pp. 101, 180, 244, 398, and 501-2.

measured in economic, political and to some degree, military, terms. The two most obvious alternative power centers are those residing to the east of the Atlantic Ocean and those in the Western Pacific.

The EU and Germany

Taken as a whole, the European Union can already be considered a superstate. With a total population of over 320 million, and a total EEC output that exceeds that of Russia, the EU has the potential to be a major player in world politics. In terms of raw military power, the NATO participants (excluding the United States) of the EU make up close to a quarter of the world's total military power.[6] The total number of men under arms for the four largest NATO militaries (Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy) exceeds the size of the United States Army.[7] Despite the raw power that the combined countries of the EU seem to display, the community cannot be considered a great power in the sense that it could as a single entity and over a sustained period of time, establish, defend and extend major political interests within the international system. The size of an EU military conceals the fact that the men under arms making up the military are part of national armies of varying quality. In addition, these armed forces though part of one European Union speak different languages and would have problems coordinating large operations together. Finally, the nations making up such a political entity are not of one mind on a range of foreign policy and defense policy issues. Germany and France, for example, have very different policies and attitudes toward "out of area" operations. Thus, even if all of the command and control, and standardization problems mentioned above had been sorted out, it is unlikely that the EU could act in unison to manage issues outside of the European area.

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[6]*World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1995*, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, table 1, pp. 74 to 99.

Although the European Union as a whole may not, in this author's opinion, be considered a great power in the classical sense, this does not preclude its members from becoming extremely important players in the international system. One nation-state in Europe that has the potential to do so is Germany. Although the absolute size of the German economy is smaller than those of other major powers (e.g., the German economy is half the size of Japan's), Germany's characteristics make it at least an anchor state around which the European international order can find stability. Germany is a manufacturing and financial center of power. Germany's national output of U.S. $ 1.3 trillion ranks it as one of the most economically powerful in the world. Germany is a member of the Group of Seven and has participated in some of the most visible major power policy decisions since the end of the Cold War (e.g., economic aid to Russia from the West, and U.N. intervention in Bosnia). German goods and capital are already playing an important role among the former Soviet satellites and Baltic states. Germany has also taken steps to increase its responsibilities and role in international order maintenance. It sent troops to Bosnia-Herzegovena and played a major role in shaping the U.N. intervention in that war-torn region. In this light, Germany's armed forces have been growing steadily larger, first to manage more territory resulting from unification, and second, to handle out of area operations such as those in Bosnia.

Japan

On the other side of the world, Japan's status as a world power is well deserved. With a GDP of U.S. $ 2.8 trillion, Japan has the second largest national output in the world behind only the United States. Japan is the leading manufacturing state with exports totaling U.S. $ 361 billion in 1993 (97 percent of those exports are in

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[7] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, Random House, New York, NY, 1987, p. 472.

manufactures of machinery, motor vehicles and electronics).[8] Japan continues to run a large trade surplus, U.S. $ 120 billion in 1993, with its trading partners, the majority of whom come from Southeast Asia or the United States. Japan is a member of the G-7, and like Germany has been invited to discuss and decide upon major post-Cold War power policies involving the central system. Even with their reluctance to expand their military capabilities, the Japanese have a very efficient military force. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) is the largest indigenous navy in the Asia-Pacific. The capabilities of the Japanese Kongo class destroyer, for example, is easily the match for any single ship in China's surface fleet. Finally, the Japanese have gradually expanded their direct participation in international military operations. The Japanese, for example, sent medical teams and other support units to assist in the U.N. operations managing the Cambodian transition to democratic rule. The short of it, then, is that Japan appears to have the economic power, the political support among the other major powers, the foundation of military capability, and the grudging willingness to increase its role in international security affairs to be such that it can be considered a great power.

China

The size of China's economy is presently under dispute. Using the purchasing power parity method of calculating a nation's output using a basket of goods produced within the economy being examined, the World Bank in 1992 declared that China's national product far exceeded the official figures of U.S. $ 250 billion. More likely, the report concluded, that China's GNP approached U.S. $ 1 trillion. With 15 years of 8 percent growth behind it, and expectations of 8 percent or higher growth over the next decade or so, it is projected that by the first decade of the twenty first century, China's

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[8]*The World Factbook*, 1996, Central Intelligence Agency, 1996, pp. 101, 180, 244, 398, and 501-2.

economy could be larger (in absolute terms) than that of the United States.[9] World Bank reports of the early 1990s have asserted that by 2010 China could have an economy almost 2/3 the size of all the OECD states combined. China's trading status has leaped from its relative isolation of the 1960s and 1970s to become the 10th largest trading nation in the world.[10] Chinese policy makers and academics speak of continued Chinese economic growth well into the twenty first century, and quickly make predictions of Chinese standards of living equivalent to medium sized European powers by the middle of the next century.[11]

China is also given status as a major power, potentially competing with the United States for control and influence within the international system because of its potential to dominate one of the most economically dynamic regions of the world. China could dominate the Asia-Pacific[12] and would possibly be the center of a Sino-centric Asia were the United States out of Japan, Korea and Singapore.[13] The argument that China would naturally dominate the Asia-Pacific region were the U.S. to withdraw or reduce its presence is related to China's continued contribution to its military capabilities (Some estimates range as high as U.S. $ 140 billion, but most put Chinese defense spending at around U.S. $ 30 to 50 billion), the increasing size of China's modernized power projection forces, and the sheer size and geographic position of the Chinese Mainland

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[9] "The Titan Stirs", in *The Economist*, May 1992. These projections and others like them are straight line projections. They presume that past and current economic performance will continue for a given period of time. For a critique of this methodology see Charles Doran *Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century's End*,Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 1991, pp. xiv-vi.

[10]."The Titan Stirs", in *The Economist*, May 1992.

[11] Xu Yimin, "The Strategic Situation in East Asia and China's Place and Role", in *International Strategic Studies*, # 1, 1996, Beijing, PRC, p. 22.

[12] China's ability to dominate the region depends to a large degree on Japan's reaction to the hypothetical U.S. withdrawal. Japan could seek accomodation with China, but another equally likely outcome would be Japanese rearmament and "nuclearization". In the latter's case, China's domination of Asia would not be a fait accompli.

[13] U.S. military forces in the Asia-Pacific region are located in the Republic of Korea, Japan and Singapore. There is a small U.S. Navy presence in Singapore conducting logistics and supply functions.

relative to the other countries of Asia. Should the United States withdraw from Asia, the region would likely be marked by a competition between a China dominated coalition and a Japanese dominated coalition.

Russia

Despite Russia's declining fortunes since the end of the Cold War, Russia should still be considered a great power at the end of this century. There are three reasons for this:

The first is geographic. Russian territory is still adjacent or in the vicinity of many of the developed countries of Europe (Western and Central), the near and middle east (Turkey, Afghanistan, and Iran), and the far east (China and Japan in particular). Even if Russian military and economic might never reach Cold War levels, the Russian proximity to many of the "hot spots" of the world and territory of strategic and economic interests to the major powers would make Russia a player in international affairs. Related to this point, were the major powers to withdraw or decrease their influence or presence in certain parts of the globe, the Russians would most certainly move in to exert their influence. For instance, were the United States and the NATO countries not so intent on forming close ties and links with the countries of Central Europe and former Soviet states in the Balkans, Russia might dominate these countries.

The second is military. Although Russia's armed forces are a shadow of their former selves, Russian military power should not be taken for granted. Were NATO to be dissolved and the United States were to withdraw from Western Europe, the Russian Army would be the largest single army in Europe.[14] It is true that the Russian armed forces are currently struggling with such issues as obsolescing equipment, recruitment

[14] *The Military Balance, 1995-6*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, published by Brasseys, London, UK.

and retention problems, and declining defense budgets; however, I assume that as Russia's economy gradually improves and becomes integrated into the world economy many of these problems will have been resolved. Finally, it should not be forgotten that Russia is still the only country in the world that has the capability of obliterating the United States, any other country in the world, and possibly the entire globe itself, with nuclear weapons.

The last is political. Despite its loss of the Cold War, the Russians still retain some clout with former Soviet clients or allies (e.g., Cuba or the People's Republic of China) , continue to maintain contact with significant Third World countries through Russian weapons sales (e.g., India and Iraq), and continue to have a significant voice in international political affairs through instruments and organizations held over from the Cold War (e.g., a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council).

Even if we consider Russia at the end of the Twenty First Century, a major power center to be dealt with, we should probably not expect Russia to take on increasing responsibilities and roles as a major power, and in fact, we might even expect Russian decline to worsen. The break up of the Soviet Empire did much to reduce the relative power of Russia. While there are signs that the Russian economy has bounced back from a dismal spiral of depression, recession, inflation, and devalued currencies, there is no evidence to suggest that the Russian economy will ever attain relative levels equivalent to early Cold War production. It would be extremely optimistic to speak of Russian production, trade, and investment on par with the other major powers before the Yeltsin Administration or whoever follows it, has managed the massive export of Russian capital, the still high levels of unemployment, the role of the black economy in obstructing the development of the Russian free market system, and continued unstable prices throughout the Russian economy. Similarly, it would be premature to speak of a return to Russian

dominance of the Balkans, the Caucuses, and Central Asia, as long as the Russian political system remains volatile and the fragility of Russian democracy remains apparent.

In fact, quite the opposite argument can be made. Russian economic, political and military power are likely to decline globally relative to the other major powers. Russian ability to police its Far Eastern borders has become a major concern of the Far East provinces, as Chinese and Mongolian immigrants have streamed across the border to settle or sell goods. The United States and the NATO countries have effectively ignored Russian objections to the expansion of NATO, and have essentially pushed Russian borders as far back as they had been delineated 300 years ago. If the Baltic states are not invited to become part of NATO they at least have, in effect, drifted to the Western camp in a de facto anti-Russian coalition. In the meantime, the Russian military can by no means consider "foreign adventures" while it is substantially pre-occupied with keeping order within the Russian federation. In short, the current international order is marked by a Russia that appears to be going into steady relative decline.

Relative power and superpower succession

The American statesmen of the late Twentieth Century along with their major power colleagues, appear to be faced with a dominant American power sharing the responsibility of international order management with a select few major or important powers. The once competitor to the United States—Russia— appears to be in relative decline (preceded by absolute decline in the 1991-1997 period), and the redistribution of the roles and responsibilities of the international system (e.g., the expansion of NATO) to a much less prominent role for the Russian state appears to reflect this absolute decline. Three of these major or important powers—Germany, Japan and China— appear to be in important positions going into the twenty first century, perhaps even in positions capable

of succeeding the United States as a dominant superpower, although this is far from certain.

A number of theories suggest that these powers will not have the raw capability to succeed the United States in its dominant role. Charles Doran's Power Cycle Theory rejects the validity of linear projections, pointing out that the far more likely scenario for Japan, Germany, and China is a flattening out of rising power and a falling off of rapid rise as these countries "reach inflection points on their power cycle curves".[15] The flattening out of Japan's rising power has already been apparent as illustrated by the Japanese recession over the last several years, the slow down in growth rates of the Japanese economy comparable to the countries of Western Europe and the United States, banking and home-loan credit crises involving trillions of yen, and the projection of growth rates as low as 1% for Japan going into the next century.[16] . The gloomy forecasts of slower Japanese growth list a number of factors. *The Economist* argues that (1) the graying of the Japanese population will lead to a smaller labor force and this means smaller output unless output per worker is improved;[17] (2) the money to help improve labor productivity will be scarce as a rapidly aging Japan and a more western oriented Japanese youth consumes more and saves less[18]; (3) there will be extreme pressure on public sector debt as the government has to spend to take care of aging Japanese citizens, pay for medical care support, and increase defense expenditures to take on a greater role in international affairs.[19]

Similarly, the German economy seems not poised to overtake the U.S. economy and has apparently slowed down to "catch its breath". The German economy has

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[15] Charles Doran, *Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century's End*, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 1991, p. 238, 245-52
[16] "A Survey of Tomorrow's Japan" in *Economist* , July 13, 1996, survey page 9.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.

suffered from low growth rates over the last twenty years, and has grown less than its western power colleagues. Since 1979, productivity in German businesses has risen half the amount of average productivity in the rest of Europe.[20] In 1996, the German government forecast that western Germany would grow at a rate of 1 % per annum.[21] Germany has created proportionately fewer jobs than most other major powers, and unemployment reached 4 million in 1996[22], placing German unemployment figures at the worst they have been since 1945. Finally, Doran points out that even an economy of a unified Germany will be towered over by the economies of the United States and Japan.[23]

At present there is some evidence to suggest that Chinese economic growth could falter and fall off relative to the growth of the other major powers. What evidence there is, points to the fact that continued high levels of economic growth will necessarily bring high rates of inflation and drastically reduced standards of living for Chinese citizens (an unacceptable situation for the Chinese leadership). There is the skepticism that China will be able to overtake the United States in economic size, because to do so it must grow over ten times its current size. Arguments for continued Chinese growth require that the rest of the developed world be willing to continue running up significant trade deficits with China. There is uneven economic growth between the coastal provinces and those provinces in the interior of the nation, thereby breeding conditions ripe for tearing the country apart. Finally, as China industrializes and develops its poor infrastructure, a slowing down of China's rapid economic growth is possible as returns on investment decline. Beyond these theories, however, many economists still project that China's high economic growth will continue well into the next century.

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[20] "Restoring Germany's Shine" in *Economist*, May 4, 1996, p. 11.
[21] "Redesigning the German Model" in the *Economist*, January 27, 1996, p. 41
[22] "Redesigning the German Model" in the *Economist*, January 27, 1996, p. 41.
[23] Charles Doran *Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century's End*,Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 1991, p. 248.

In terms of pure economic forecasts of the three potential successor states, Germany and Japan do not appear to have the capability to assume America's role as dominant power. There are no economic predictions around that claim that by the middle of the next century, Germany's or Japan's economy could exceed that of the United States. There are several projections today that claim that China's economy could outgrow America's. There are also emerging economic forecasts that claim that China's rapid rise could falter. Either perspective could be correct, so it would be prudent at this juncture of the analysis to assume the only nation with the economic capacity to succeed America's role as a hegemonic power is China.

Technological, political, and economic change in international relations

Whether a successful peaceful transfer of leadership roles within the current international order is feasible depends in part on whether the central actors feel relatively secure and are able to adequately protect their interests in the international system. We have mentioned above that revolutionary changes affecting how nations measure power or calculate their power positions relative to each other have adversely affected the major power(s)' ability and willingness to transfer leadership roles to other central actors. In the current situation, this point could apply to the recent academic discussions on the revolution in military affairs or the arrival of the information age.[24] Those who argue that the world is experiencing radical change most often point to the vast changes in the way societies, corporations, and advanced militaries, collect, process and disseminate vast amounts of information.[25] This argument is sometimes used to partially explain the U.S. led coalition's victory over Saddam Hussein's Iraq during Operation Desert Storm. The

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[24] For example, see Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare" in *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1996; also see Joseph S. Nye, and William A. Owens, "America's Information Edge" in *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1996.

Western Coalition's ability to survey the entire battle field with JSTARs and AWACs, and to get satellite imagery and other intelligence information to battlefield commanders was crucial in defeating Iraq.[26] The ability to rapidly get information to military end users is also often cited as one of the causes of the Soviet turn to perestroika and glasnost in the late 1980s.[27] Apparently Russian military and strategic observers of western military and technological trends concluded that the Russians could not keep up with the advances the western countries were making in information and surveillance technologies, and therefore urged an opening up of Soviet society lest the Soviet Union be left hopelessly behind in technology.

While the world is certainly changing due to the explosion of information available to governments, private organizations and citizens alike, this change is not of the nature that would change the way nations calculate their power and their positions vis-à-vis other developed and rising, major powers. It may be true that an information revolution has arrived. It is also true that carrier battle groups, air wings, and armored divisions are still considered the currency of military power in today's world. The arrival of the information age coupled with the fact that conventional militaries still count for something, may be due to the fact that, as Eliot Cohen has written, it takes years to turn technological innovations into anything meaningful on the battlefield. It takes years of organizational change, doctrinal adjustments, training, experimentation, and eventual application to turn what seems to be a revolutionary idea into a militarily useful one.[28] Furthermore, new revolutionary ideas diffuse quickly and rivals are able to adopt them, sometimes even more effectively than the originator. The short of this is, that although

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[25] Joseph S. Nye and William A. Owens, "America's Information Edge" in *Foreign Affairs*, March/April, 1996, pp. 22-4.
[26] Ibid, pp. 23-4.
[27] Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare" in *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1996, pp. 39-41; Joseph S. Nye and William A. Owens, "America's Information Edge" in *Foreign Affairs*, March/April, 1996, p. 29.

the information age has arrived, it does not currently represent a radical, sudden shift in the way power, or at least military power, is employed. This suggests that the possibility for a peaceful transfer of power within the international system does not seem to be influenced or affected by the technological change associated with the arrival of the information age.

The international system does not, also, appear to be characterized by vast political change throughout the international landscape. The wave of democratization that was instrumental in bringing down the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc has not largely affected the major powers who were already democratic powers. In contrast to the conclusions of Francis Fukuyama, the inevitable transformation of all polities to political systems similar to western liberal democracies has not happened.[29] Samuel Huntington's observation that the West's institutions and political beliefs are still not shared by numerous civilizations across the globe is more accurate.[30] Although democracy has taken hold in Russia, the movement toward democracy has slowed to a crawl in China, and is nowhere to be seen in most of the countries of the Middle East. In short, the international system does not seem to be marked by the kind of revolutionary political change that causes all the countries of the international system to recalculate their positions relative to one another.

One type of change that *is* taking place is rapid economic change. China's emergence as a power, capable of challenging western interests has come as somewhat of a shock to western statesmen. Even more disruptive perhaps to the international system, depending on Chinese reactions, might be the *sudden* falling off of Chinese growth. China has enjoyed high levels of growth since 1979. If by 2005 China finds its relative

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[28] Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare" in *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1996

[29] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, The Free Press, New York, NY, 1992, pp. xii-xiii.

growth falling off compared to Japan or a unified Korea or to the United States, China is more likely to act belligerently, to lash out at the major powers and to attempt to settle unresolved territorial disputes (e.g., Taiwan or the Spratlys) while it still can. This belligerency is even more likely if China's current perception of the West attempting to "keep China down" and depriving China of the status, the roles and responsibilities of an emerging major power, continues.

The slow down of Japanese and German economic power has also been somewhat of an abrupt change in the international landscape. These sudden changes in the direction of the growth of major powers amounts to the type of change Professor Doran's Power Cycle theory defines as *arrival at critical points*. In his scholarly works Doran points out that Japan, and Germany may be reaching "critical points".[31] Doran has written that the arrival of Japan and Germany at "critical points" should probably not be seen as a major concern since the drop off of rising Japanese and German power can be managed within a European economic and military structure, and a solid U.S.-Japan relationship.[32]

Still, the flattening out of the rising power of these three successors, or their arrival at critical points, does not help the prospects for full peaceful transfers of power in the international system. I have argued that sudden changes (technological, political, or economic) might have a disruptive effect on international relations. These disruptions may have made peaceful transfers of foreign policy role difficult to undertake in the past. Japan's economic and political problems, for example, have caused real introspection in Japan, and a degree of self-doubt about Japan's ability to assist managing the international system. Japanese were questioning what kind of constructive world role Japan could

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[30] See Samuel Huntington, "The West, Unique not Universal" in *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 1996.

[31] Charles Doran *Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century's End*,Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 1991, p. 238, 245-52.

play when Japanese authorities could not even help Japanese citizens in a timely manner after the Kobe earthquake. The economic problems confronting Germany after unification have led to nation-wide calls to review the "German model" and revamp the entire German economic system. I have argued above that a sudden drop off of Chinese growth would probably make China less cooperative and less inclined to be assimilated into the western world order. In short, Doran's projection that the countries of Japan, Germany, and China may soon experience a falling off of rapid rise of power, or their arrival at critical points, reduces the likelihood that a peaceful transfer of foreign policy role, between the United States and any of these countries, can take place.

Is a peaceful transfer of major foreign policy roles possible?

Germany and Japan

From the description of the international system, it doesn't appear likely that a peaceful transfer of foreign policy role within the international system is possible for the foreseeable future. Nor, is such a transfer necessary, since the United States appears to be handling its role as predominant power quite effectively. Two of the major powers sharing in the management of the system—Japan and Germany—appear to have economies that are slowing down in relation to the United States and the other major powers. There is evidence that China's economy will not experience the kind of sustained growth necessary to consider China a candidate for succession to the American world order. Thus, criteria one for transferring power to a rising challenger is that that political entity have the economic power to assume the dominant power's roles and responsibilities. This does not appear to be case for Germany, Japan and possibly China.

Even if it were the case that Germany and Japan's economies were projected to bypass American economic power, it is unlikely that Germany or Japan could alone or

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[32] Ibid, p. 247-8.

together fill in America's political role of managing the international system. At present the countries of Southeast Asia, China and Korea voice complaints of gradual American expansion of Japanese military responsibilities. If there was even a small hint of Japan assuming the role of Asia-Pacific "manager" in lieu of the United States, there would probably be an immediate realignment of the forces in Asia against Japanese leadership. In short, one of the conditions that makes a peaceful transfer of power difficult—the emergence of a balance of power whose aim it is to counter the rise of a powerful state—would emerge in Asia.

Similarly, if German economic power were to grow to such a point that it bypassed American economic power, and if Germany took it upon itself to match its military capabilities to this economic power we would witness next a fundamental transformation of international politics in Europe. German power capable enough of doing what American power does today would definitely alarm the Russians and the French, and possibly worry the British. As we describe this situation, we appear to be discussing an international environment conducive to European insecurity and war described by John Mearsheimer some years back.[33] The situation that I am describing here would also be a situation that throughout this dissertation I have argued would make a transfer of power difficult—a balance of power whose aim it is to counter the rise of a powerful state—would emerge in the heart of Europe. The short of this, then, is that a transfer of foreign policy leadership role to the two major powers of Germany and Japan, does not appear to be likely. A similar argument, that China lacks the characteristics cited in chapter seven to succeed the United States can and will be made later on in this dissertation. For now it would be useful to return to the idea of a united Europe as a possible successor to the United States.

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[33] John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War" in *International Security*, Summer 1990, pp. 5-56.

The European Union Revisited

Previously I dismissed the probability of the European Union succeeding the United States as the dominant world power on the grounds that the countries making up the EU remained too disparate to consider the EU as a powerful unified entity. Putting aside this assertion, the EU enjoys a number of characteristics favoring a peaceful transfer of roles and functions from the United States to the EU. I argued in chapter seven that a number of conditions appeared necessary to make a successful transfer likely. To repeat, these were: (1) early cooperation; (2) the absence of a balance of power in the international system; (3) the perception of joint management of the international system; (4) a history of integrative bargaining between the two powers; and (5) a history of the gradual expansion of the rising power's role and responsibilities in the international system.

Taken as a whole the EU has enjoyed most of these conditions. The majority of the nations making up the EU have been members of an alliance with the United States that is a half century old—NATO. The record of cooperation, then, with the current dominant superpower dates back to the earliest years of Pax Americana. While members of this alliance, the EU nations had to work out through negotiations a number of thorny political and military problems such as the re-arming of Germany, the stationing of intermediate nuclear weapons in Europe, the development and deployment of the neutron bomb, out of area operations, French and British nuclear weapons operations, and the stationing of hundreds of thousands of American troops on European soil. In addition, some of the senior members of the EU are already members of international organizations that the United States set up to help it manage the international system. The French, Germans, and British are all members of the G-7. The French and the British enjoy permanent seats in the United Nations Security Council. Most of the members of the EU

are signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and are members in good standing.

The roles and responsibilities of the individual nations of the EU have also been gradually expanded over the last fifty years to the point that the members of the EU feel that their international roles are commensurate with their capabilities. For example, the French decision to formally withdraw from NATO and develop its own independent nuclear deterrence, although at first was greeted with alarm in the rest of NATO, was eventually permitted and led to the French finding their appropriate role in the post-World War II world order. Germany's military capabilities were allowed to gradually increase over the decades to the point that Germany provides much of its own conventional defense, and Germany was able to send peacekeepers to Bosnia. The United States looking to many of these EU countries to assist it during Operation Desert Storm is perhaps the best illustration of the gradual expansion of the roles of many of these EU states, from the defense of the European heartland to out of area operations which affect the international order.

Finally, the conditions appear ripe for increased U.S.-EU cooperation, and a gradual transfer of roles from the United States to the Union, because there appears to be an absence of a balance of power there. As a major player in Europe, Russia has temporarily fallen off the map. It would be difficult, therefore, to describe the dynamics of European politics and strategy in balance of power terms. It is more common to see headlines covering the specific disagreements of the different members of the EU in arriving at a common currency, than on military balances and strategic alignments developing in Europe.

A good candidate, then, for peaceful transfers of foreign policy role is the European Union. It seems to enjoy most of the characteristics that this dissertation has argued is necessary to bring about major changes of roles in international relations. As

mentioned previously, however, it is far from a certain thing that the European Union can centralize its most important functions (currency management and defense). The divergence in the quality of military personnel, and the sharp differences in strategic perspective of the various members impedes the ability of the EU architects to construct a political entity effective enough to be considered a major or super power. A good example of the limitations of a trans-European body in dealing effectively with international security issues—a necessary quality if the EU can be considered a successor to the U.S.—is the hesitancy and inability of the European states to arrive at a coordinated security policy dealing with Bosnia. The bottom line, then, is that if the EU can centralize its functions and become an effective transnational entity, then it has a chance of succeeding the United States as the international system's dominant political and military power. The author remains skeptical on this point, however.

China

A classical transfer of control over the international system does not appear to be likely between the United States and China either. Unlike the two other major powers of Japan and Germany, it remains a debatable point that China has the economic and military capacity to assume American roles and responsibilities globally. However, the relationship between China and the United States suggests that Chinese succession to a Pax Americana would lack the conditions that I have argued in this thesis need to be present for a successful transfer. Recalling the conditions laid down in chapter seven and mentioned again earlier this chapter, an examination of the Sino-US relationship over the last quarter of a century, illustrates that these previously mentioned conditions just don't exist in the relationship.

Early Cooperation

America's cooperation with China has had mixed results. The cooperation between the PRC and the United States was initiated in the early 1970s when President Nixon established normal relations with the People's Republic of China. This was followed up by President Carter's recognition of the PRC as the legitimate government of China in 1978. This suggests that cooperation between the two countries has thrived for over twenty years. However, the Sino-US relationship is characterized by its narrow strategic focus. The two sides initiated contact and normalized relations in both the early and late 1970s for the purpose of containing the Soviet Union.[34] Leaders on both sides have acknowledged as much. Problems between the two countries became apparent after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the threat from the Warsaw Pact. These problems have ranged from China's insistence that America cease interfering in China's internal affairs (Taiwan, human rights, international property rights) to America's problems with Chinese weapon sales to third parties and China's apparent willingness to bully the countries of Southeast Asia on territorial disputes.[35]

The Sino-US relationship, then, has been akin to the Anglo-Japanese alliance (discussed in chapter 3) which was characterized as narrowly focused on strategic issues and which turned sour as the strategic environment prompted the two countries to view each other as threats. Some American scholars suggest that as China's economy grows and its military strength increases, the U.S. should (as the British had done in the early part of the twentieth century) begin formulating plans to contain China or to form a balance of power in Asia to keep China restrained.[36] I will touch on this specific issue later on in the chapter. The point from this particular discussion is that China and the

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[34] Joseph Camilleri, *Chinese Foreign Policy*, Martin Robertson & Co., published in Great Britain, 1980, pp. 189-90.
[35] Michael Oksenberg, "The Dynamics of the Sino-American Relationship" in Solomon, ed., *The China Factor*, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1981, pp. 48-80.

United States have not appeared to have established an early record of cooperation, and what cooperation did exist was primarily to contain or balance a common adversary.

Cooperation between China and the other major powers has also been mixed. Japan's relationship with China warmed almost immediately after President Nixon's historic visit to the PRC, but Sino-Japanese relations have been marked by alternating periods of ardor and cooperation (resulting from increased Japanese investment in China), and periods of bitter discord (resulting from continued different Sino-Japanese perspectives on Japan's behavior during World War II).[37] Japan's efforts to curb Chinese arms exports to Third World countries through cut backs in economic aid received a particularly bitter response from Chinese leaders and citizens alike.

Similarly, the countries of Europe have early on enjoyed relatively good relations with the People's Republic of China. France formally recognized the PRC as early as 1964 and it began advocating the PRC's entry thereafter.[38] In 1966, seven of China's top trading partners were second world states, most of whom were West European. [39] But like the U.S. and Japan, the record of PRC-West European cooperation has been mixed. The British successfully negotiated the turn over of Hong Kong to the Chinese but the reversion of Hong Kong has, since 1984 when the treaty was signed, been marked by bitter exchanges between Whitehall, Beijing and the governor's mansion in Hong Kong involving accusations of one side or the other reneging on the agreement.[40] France's early recognition of Beijing has been offset by its willingness to sell Taiwan sophisticated military weapons and platforms such as the LaFayette Class destroyer or the Mirage 2000 Aircraft.

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[36] Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China" in *International Security*, Spring 1996.
[37] Joseph Camilleri, *Chinese Foreign Policy*, Martin Robinson & Co.,Oxford, UK, 1980, pp. 211-4; Alan Whiting, *China Eyes Japan*, University of California Press, Berkeley, Ca., 1989.
[38] Donald Klein, "China and the Second World" in Samuel Kim, ed., *China and the World*, p. 164.
[39] Ibid.

The balance of power in Asia

While no formal structure like NATO exists in the Far East, an implicit balance of power already does exist in Asia. The balance exists between the United States and Japan. While American military might in Asia is substantial and represents overwhelming force against any adversary there, the United States relies almost wholly on Japan for almost all of its naval bases in Asia. Without formal Japanese approval to use bases on Japanese soil, the American military presence in Asia would be almost non-existent. There is a minor American presence in Singapore. The American ground force presence in the Republic of Korea, though substantial, is completely oriented toward defending the South against the North Koreans and is not geared toward projecting power and influence throughout the Asia-Pacific. Furthermore, this presence in Korea is likely soon to go away as the Korean crisis is resolved. The United States also relies on Japan to cover a huge proportion of its costs to operate in the Asia-Pacific region and outside as well (e.g., the Persian Gulf area). The U.S. also relies on Japan to pay for peacekeeping operations world wide, to contribute Japanese Self-Defense forces (SDF) for operations in Asia (e.g., Cambodia) and to patrol a significant portion of the maritime theater surrounding the Japanese islands.[41]

Throughout the Cold War, the U.S.-Japan Alliance has been used as an instrument of containment. It was first used to contain the Soviet expansion in the Far East, Yasuhiro Nakasone referred to Japan as "an unsinkable aircraft carrier" to contain

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[40] Bruce Gillery, "Nothing Major: British Premier Slips Through Town" in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, march 14, 1996, p. 17.

[41] For a summary of Japan's contributions to U.S. operations in Asia, see the East Asian Strategic Review , 1992, 1994, and 1996 put out by the Office of Secretary of Defense and the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command. See also Defense of Japan (1996), published by Defense Agency of Japan, printed in Japan, 1995.

Russian submarines coming out of Vladivostok.[42] The U.S.-Japan Alliance has also been used as an explicit instrument to deter North Korean aggression. U.S and Japanese officials have long agreed to use bases on Japan to respond to a crisis arising from a second Korean War. In the aftermath of the March Crisis around Taiwan, the Chinese have accused the United States and Japan of colluding to contain or constrain China. The routine renegotiation of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty was treated by Chinese officials, Chinese academia[43], and the Chinese press as a new alliance directed against China.[44] Finally, the Chinese have in recent years begun criticizing the American military presence in Japan as unhelpful to stability in Asia, and probably perceived as a means to containing China.[45]

In short, then, a balance of power already appears to exist in Asia between the United States and Japan, and it appears that as China rises as a new power in the Far East, the U.S. and Japan will find it difficult to find room to accommodate the new power. Whether this is true depends on how successful the United States and Japan are in expanding the role of China, developing interests similar enough to create the impression of joint global management among the three powers, coming up with innovative integrative bargaining techniques to resolve issues between the three, and if no technological, social or political upheavals exist on the horizon which would unsettle the strategic plans of the states involved.

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[42] Edward Olsen, *U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, Ca., 1985, p. 35.
[43] On a recent visit to Chinese think tanks in Beijing and Shanghai, the author was repeatedly confronted with the argument that the United States and Japan had just recently (April 1996) signed a "new" treaty forming an alliance against China.
[44] Zhou Jihua, " A New Starting Point of Japan-U.S. Military Alliance", in *Intenational Strategic Studies*, published in Beijing, # 2, 1996, p. 28.
[45] Ibid.

Expanding the roles and responsibilities of China

An argument can be made that China's prestige and status in the post-Cold War world order is already assured. It enjoys a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council along with that position's veto. It is consistently referred to as a "Great Power" or an emerging great power[46] and in some major areas of military security (e.g., nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula), the other major powers consult the People's Republic of China.[47] This is only a surface impression, however, and if one looks more closely at China's place in international affairs one would probably come to the conclusion that China is a dissatisfied power with a yearning for more respect and greater responsibilities and roles.

Evidence of this assertion lies in the organizations that China is not part of. All of the major powers of the post-Cold War world order are members of the Group of Seven (G-7). G-7 membership connotes economic power and regime legitimacy. All of the G-7 members are major economic powers and have democratic governments. The latter point explains why China has probably not been invited to join in the G-7,[48] but the exclusion may still sting the Chinese none the same. The Chinese may share a similar sentiment from their continued exclusion from the World Trade Organization. Despite China's massive trading power (it is the tenth largest trading country in the world) China has not been granted membership in the trading organization because of its involvement in prison labor, international property rights disputes with the U.S., and its continued status as a

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[46] One such example is the speech by Clinton Administration's coordinator for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum just prior to the APEC summit in Manila. See John S. Wolf, "U.S. Policy in the Asia-Pacific", *U.S. State Department Dispatch*, October 7, 1996, p. 499.

[47] In 1994 during the U.S. confrontation with North Korea over suspicions that North Korea was secretly processing the nuclear material for a nuclear weapon, the United States sought to get China to influence North Korea, and to act as a go-between. Some scholars attribute the successful 1994 Nuclear Accord with North Kora at least partially to China's influence. See the views expressed by American Asian scholars in Christopher Yung, Sung Hwan Wie, Chang Su Kim, *Prospects for U.S.-Korean naval Relations in the Twenty First Century*, Center for Naval Analyses-Korea Institute for Defense Analyses Joint report, 1995, p. 5.

controlled economy (despite the strides China has made over the last twenty years to open up its economy).[49] Finally, although China is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, China has long complained that its participation in that organization has been more the result of a "forced marriage" than its active consent and consultation by the major nuclear powers.

As mentioned above, the major powers do consult and cooperate with China over significant security issues such as nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula and managing North Korea; however, as far as the Chinese perception of that cooperation is concerned, it tends to involve the Western powers attempting to use China to do their bidding. The Chinese have repeatedly stated that they want North Korea and South Korea to work out amongst themselves their problems.[50] The Chinese have since recognizing Seoul in 1992, taken a neutral stance.[51] The United States on the other hand has repeatedly requested that China use whatever influence it has over Pyongyang to get North Korea to behave in a certain fashion. This is understandable from the U.S. perspective, however, it drives home the point that the U.S. and the major powers do not seem to be consulting the Chinese so much as using China as its "watch dog" to help manage the trouble spots of Asia.

Finally, it is difficult for the United States and the other major powers to expand the roles and responsibilities of China in the post-Cold War world order, because the Chinese have made it difficult to discern what China's ultimate motives and international objectives are. It is difficult for the U.S. and Japan, for instance, to place China in charge

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[48] W.R. Smyser, "Goodbye G-7" in *Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1993, p. 27.
[49] For a description of these changes in China's internal economic system see "The Titan Stirs" in *The Economist*, May 1992.
[50] Luo Renshi, "Progress and Further Efforts to be made in Establishing Confidence Building" in *International Strategic Studies*, #2, Beijing, PRC, 1995, p. 18.
[51] This perspective was repeated to the author by several Chinese defense and international relations scholars on a visit to Beijing in December 1996. The Chinese academicians stated that it was Chinese

of managing the various conflicting claims to the South China Sea because China is a party to some of those conflicts, and China has made claims in contravention to international law. Despite its signing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), China is making claim to parts of the South China Sea based on uninhabitable islets (in contradiction to the agreement in UNCLOS which requires maritime claims be based on the waters associated with habitable land).[52]

The perception of joint global management

China's perception of its relationship with the other major powers, and its role in the current international order probably cannot be characterized as joint cooperation with the major powers to manage the international system. While China describes itself as a peace loving, developing country with no pretensions of hegemony, it has voiced a number of objections to the rules of the current international order. As mentioned above, China has voiced its objections to the regimes and international treaties restricting the development of nuclear weapons.[53] For years, Chinese diplomats dragged their feet over signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Finally, in 1995 China signed the treaty along with 178 other countries to indefinitely extend the NPT[54].

On the related issue of weapons proliferation, Beijing and the West have some serious differences. The United States and the other major powers accuse China of

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policy to try to get the two Koreas to work things out and they were curious why Americans were always trying to get the Chinese to take sides one way or the other.

[52] Henry J. Kenny, "The South China Sea: A Dangerous Ground" in *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1996, vol. XLIX, no. 3, p. 106; also see Lyall Breckon, *The Security Environment in Southeast Asia and Australia*, 1995-2010, in CNA Research Memorandum 95-212, pp. 47-50.

[53] See Xinbo Wu, "China as a Cooperative Power" *in Blue Horizon:United States-Japan-PRC tripartite Relations, 1996 Pacific Symposium*, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 1997, pp. 121-6.

[54] Thomas Bernauer, "Cooperative Denuclearization and the Global Non-Proliferation Regime" in Graham Allison, ed. ,*Cooperative Denuclearation*, p. 256, 267 #9n.

selling weapon technology to such "pariah states" as Iran and Iraq[55]. Such actions strike the major powers as behavior antithetical to the management of the international system. The sale of weapons to some of the "pariah states" of the Middle East convinces some policy makers in the West that the Chinese are not helping to curb the proliferation of weapons world wide. China's selling "Silkworm" missiles to an Iran that could use these weapons to close down or threaten shipping in the Persian is often cited as an example[56].

Integrative bargaining to resolve disputes

The best known example of integrative bargaining between modern China and the West was the eventual agreement reached between the two countries that normalized relations. The Shanghai Communiqué signed by President Nixon and Chairman of the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong, agreed that the People's Republic of China was the legitimate government of the Chinese people.[57] What the two sides eventually disagreed on, and this disagreement is laid out on paper in the "Joint Communiqué on Relations with Taiwan, August 1982", were the actions both sides were free to pursue given that agreement. The Chinese asserted and continue to do so, that since Beijing is the legitimate government of all of China's territories it has the right to use force to resolve disputes within Chinese territory. It therefore has a right to invade Taiwan and to forcefully reunify the island with the mainland if it so chooses. The United States felt that while the U.S. recognized that Taiwan was legitimately part of China, the United States would not permit the PRC to invade Taiwan, and it reserved the right to help Taiwan defend itself by selling weapons to Taiwan. The two sides then engaged in a bit of integrative negotiation by "delinking" the issue of sovereignty from the issue of

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[55] Karl W. Eikenberry, *Explaining and Influencing Chinese Arms Transfers*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., 1995, pp. 1-2.
[56] Ibid.

"legitimate use of force". Both the PRC and the U.S. agreed that Beijing was the legitimate government, and both countries agreed to disagree over the issue of Beijing's right to use force to deal with Taiwan. Furthermore, so long as Taiwan did not declare independence and the Chinese did not use force to reunify the island, the United States had no problem acting as if Beijing did indeed enjoy sovereignty over Taiwan. In the literature of negotiation and bargaining, this has been referred to as "contingent sequence" whereby one party agrees to abide by a set of conditions given that certain other conditions apply.[58]

For over twenty years this formula has generally kept the peace between the two countries. Recently, however, the tenuous nature of the agreement has been strained to the breaking point with the growing popularity of a democratic movement in Taiwan, and an independence minded Taiwanese president whose diplomatic efforts to gain recognition for Taipei have angered and embarrassed the government in Beijing. As Taiwan's independence movement gains in strength, furthermore, both the United States and China are finding it difficult to look the other way. If Taiwan declares independence, China has consistently declared that it will invade Taiwan or use appropriate levels of force against the island, thereby forcing the contradictory nature of the agreement to a head. The contingent conditions under which the U.S. recognized Beijing's full sovereignty over Taiwan would disappear if the PRC openly used force against the island. This dynamic is best illustrated by the recent events leading up to March 1996. The possibility existed that Taiwan would declare independence following the elections of March 1996. To forestall this possibility, the Chinese launched missile attacks in the vicinity of Taiwan, and threatened to invade the island.[59] As Chinese missile firings

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[57] Richard Solomon, ed., *The China Factor*, Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1981, pp. 296-302.
[58] Dean Pruitt, *Negotiation Behavior*, Academic Press, New York, NY, 1981, p. 156.
[59] V.G. Kulkarni, "Biting the Ballot" in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 21, 1996, pp. 18-9.

continued and the possibility remained that the People's Liberation Army might indeed invade Taiwan regardless of the cost in lives to the Chinese, the United States was forced into responding to prevent such an outcome.[60] As a consequence, two carrier battle groups were dispatched to deter the Chinese from possibly invading Taiwan.[61] The United States and China's ability to resolve this issue through integrative bargaining techniques is now at risk due to factors beyond the control of Beijing and Washington—the growing affluence of the Taiwan populace, the increasing number and political clout of native Taiwanese over Chinese born Taiwanese, and the growing independence movement in Taiwan.

The importance of values and political culture

One last factor argues against America's ability to oversee a peaceful transfer of power in the current international order: the importance of similar political systems, cultures, and definitions of justice. From the case studies that I have examined extensively throughout this dissertation one of the points that appears to stand out is that similar political institutions, values, and interests appeared to facilitate a full transfer of foreign policy role from the dominant power to a rising challenger. We saw this in both chapters five and six in which Chinese traditions and notions of sovereignty helped the Chou dynasty share power and responsibilities with vassal states, and similar definitions of political legitimacy between Great Britain and the United States helped the two countries arrive at a division of labor for international systems management. These similarities helped foster a sense of trust and the perception that both the dominant power and the rising challenger were jointly managing the international order.

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[60] Matt Forney, "Man in the Middle", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 28, 1996, p. 14.
[61] Ibid.

Such a situation does not appear to exist between the United States and some of its potential successors. While it is debatable that the United States and Germany have similar or dissimilar political cultures, it is certainly the case that the United States has very different political cultures from China. China is not a democratic power, and as we have discussed above the absence of this credential has contributed to China's exclusion from a number of important international organizations. A number of noted China scholars argue that in a country of over one billion people, it is close to impossible to administer China as a democracy. This may be true; however, as long as China remains a dictatorship whose hold on power depends on the Communist leadership's monopoly on the use of violence, the major powers of the West (who see their own legitimacy and foreign policies as grounded in the principles of democracy) would never agree to a transfer of foreign policy role to such a nation.

The dissimilarity in Western and Chinese definitions of adequate human rights policies would also argue against a full transfer of power in the international system to China. In principle, the major Western Powers are supposed to value the rights of the individual, and the policies of the Western governments are supposed to reflect this fact. Thus, the Western Powers have in place constitutions that are designed to protect the rights of the individual against excessive or tyrannical government or against other individuals abusing power or wealth. This is not the case in the People's Republic of China. China's problems over human rights in Tibet, over suppression of religious freedom, over appropriately managing the democracy movement in China, or in its labor camps known as Lao Gais, are well known, so I need not elaborate. It is enough to say that the Western Powers would find it extremely difficult to share management of the international order with a country that has so many outstanding human rights problems within its own borders.

The difficulty in transferring major power leadership roles as a consequence of diverse political cultures also applies to Japan. Japan is a democratic power; however, democracy is a relatively new political phenomenon in Japan. There is even a body of scholarly work that argues that Japanese democracy is unlike democracy as it is practiced in the West. Such scholars as Karel Van Wolferen argue that while in the West, elected politicians are directly answerable to the electorate, this is not the case in Japanese democracy.[62] In Japan, the Prime Minister is not elected directly by the people. He is chosen in a back room by the party that has received the most votes in a general election.[63] The political leader of the Japanese people, then, is chosen in a process resembling closer the selection of the Pope than one characterized by the election of an American president. Van Wolferen also points out that policy direction and decisions do not appear to originate from the so-called elected officials as they do with the Western Powers, but from such bureaucracies as the Ministry of International Trade and Investment (MITI) or the Ministry of Finance (MoF) who have close relations with the giant Japanese corporations. This difference in "direct democracy" and "representational democracy" has often led to the perception of Japanese democracy as underdeveloped compared with the democracy of the West.[64] This perception cannot be helpful for making the case that Japan deserves to assume American responsibilities in spreading democracy and the principles of human rights to other parts of the world.

The Western Powers would, furthermore, find it difficult to transfer greater leadership of the international system to a country that many of the major powers, including the United States, have problems with over the issue of free trade. Despite decades of disagreement and negotiations over opening Japan's economic system to

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[62] Karel Van Wolferen, *The Enigma of Japanese Power.*, Alfred A. Knopf, NewYork, NY, 1989.
[63] Ibid.
[64] "A Survey of Tomorrow's Japan" in *Economist* July 13, 1996.

foreign competition, Japan's economy is still protected by an elaborate system of tariffs, fees, inspections and other protective barriers. Unless these issues are resolved, the Western Powers would certainly not hand leadership of the free trade system to a country that is perceived to be an obstacle to freer trade.

Of the potential successors mentioned above, only Germany appears to have a recent political tradition somewhat similar to that of the United States. Some observers of Germany point out that because Germany did not go through an Énlightenment, its political traditions differ greatly from Great Britain and the United States, and consequently this may explain some of the tensions leading to the world wars.[65] Such an argument is beyond the scope of this dissertation, and is the subject of another study entirely. To the contrary, since Germany's defeat in World War II, Germany has managed to assimilate itself to the current international order and to adopt the values of the other western powers. There is no perception that Germany is an anti-democratic state, nor that Germany's immigration policies are more racist or xenophobic than those of the other European states, nor that Germany has not appropriately atoned for its actions in the Second World War. Germany is not seen as a "protectionist state" and its economic policies are seen as constructive by its European Economic Community partners. Germany is seen as a country that is ruled by law and legal traditions. In short, Germany appears to share many of the political traditions and interests of the other western powers. In so far as shared political traditions and cultures are a determinant of candidates for peaceful transfers of foreign policy role, Germany appears to fit the bill; however, for the reasons mentioned above (in particular the reaction of such states as Russia and France) Germany is not likely to be handed control over the international order.

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[65] Raymond Sontag, *Germany and England: Background of Conflict, 1848-1894*, D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, NY, 1938.

American foreign policy of the 21st Century and an emerging international order

If a classical transfer of role or leadership responsibilities regarding the international system is not likely for the foreseeable future, what is it that American statesmen and policy makers should be focusing on to ensure the continuation of peace and stability and effective international order management? In other words, if the transfer of control over Pax Americana to some other state cannot be the focus or end of American foreign policy, what should be? It is clear from the discussion of the previous pages that the international system is gradually being transformed from a unipolar system dominated by the United States to a multipolar system comprised of four roughly equal power centers (the United States, Japan, China, and the EU/Germany). It is possible that each of these power centers may prove to be dominant within their own region (although how both China and Japan can be dominant within Asia would be a significant problem). Finally, this emerging multipolar system may feature the United States as the only major power with "global reach". The most important question for late twentieth century and early twenty first century American statesmen, then, should be: how can the United States facilitate the emergence of stable a multipolar system in which the balance of power might be a principle operating mechanism?

A Concert of Powers versus the Balance of Power

Notwithstanding the multitudes of scholarly research addressing polarity and stability in international systems[66], by simply pointing out that the current international system appears to be evolving toward a multipolar system tells us very little about what American statesmen need to do now and in the near future to help facilitate the emergence

[66] Rosecrance, Singer, Deutsch, and Waltz and many others have commented on the topic of polarity and the stability of international systems. For a summary of various views see Manus I. Midlarsky, "Hierarchical Equilibria and the Long-Run Instability of Multipolar Systems" in Manus Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies*, Unwin-Hyman Press, 1989, pp. 56-81.

of a stable international order. As mentioned in chapter one an international system is characterized not just by the degree of polarization but also by a number of other factors including the number of actors within the system, the relative power of the central actors, the roles assumed by the central actors, the nature of alliances in the system, and the nature of norms and codes of the international system. We therefore need to refer to multipolar systems in the past that have been universally considered stable, and examine their defining characteristics as possible models for U.S. twenty first century foreign policy.

Before doing so, however, it might be useful to reexamine what a multipolar system which was conducive to instability and tension looks like. One of the arguments presented throughout this dissertation has been that the existence of the balance of power made it difficult for the central actors to welcome in a new, rising power into the ranks of the mighty. By extension it seems logical that it would be difficult to welcome in, or adjust the roles of several rising central actors (e.g., China, EU/Germany, and Japan), if a multipolar system is characterized significantly by a balance of power system. In chapter four, we saw that it was difficult for Great Britain to manage Germany, Austria, Russia, and France by counterbalancing one off the other. We have also seen in chapter three that Great Britain's use of a balance of power to manage Japan, Russia, France and Germany in early twentieth century East Asia did not lead to a stable, peaceful situation. An international system strictly characterized by great powers seeking to restrain or prevent any of the other powers from pursuing individual interests (either peacefully or forcefully) appears to be a system best avoided if the United States wants to facilitate the emergence of a stable, multipolar international order.

A better example of a stable, peaceful multipolar system perhaps is the Concert of Europe that was formed after Napoleon's defeat at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Eugene Rostow has described the Concert of Europe in the following fashion:

> The nations of Europe accepted the principle of collective responsibility for the effective functioning of the state system and for its relatively peaceful adaptation to great tides of change...[T]he men who dominated the Congress of Vienna...realized that the state system was not and could never be a self-regulating mechanism like the solar system. The magnetic attraction and repulsion of states and the ambitions of rulers could not always be relied upon to maintain a balance of power and to resolve embittered and highly emotional disputes. The system of world public order could preserve or restore the peace only if the leading powers, or a decisive number of them, cooperated actively with each other to that overriding end.[67]

Rostow makes one other revealing point about the Concert of Europe. He points to yet another reason for the success of the Concert of Europe in providing for a long period of international system stability:

> For the most part, the great powers respected each others' status: they were accustomed to a great power system, and strove to maintain it. There was a constant and conscious fear that its demise would bring untold disasters to them all. This was perhaps the most permanent consequence of Napoleon's bid for the mastery of Europe.[68]

In sum, a stable, peaceful multipolar system can be arrived at through: (1) the development of a collective sense of responsibility for international system management; (2) a healthy respect by the major powers of the other major powers' status and roles; (3) active, vibrant cooperation with one another to regulate difficult and emotional problems that might exist between central powers; and (4) not relying on the pursuit of a balance of power or counter-balancing policies to bring about peace and stability. Interestingly, this list resembles *quite closely* the conditions or factors that this dissertation cited as necessary for laying the groundwork for a peaceful transfer of roles and responsibilities within an international system. With that in mind, American statesmen at

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[67] Eugene Rostow, *A Breakfast for Bonaparte*, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., 1993, pp. 54-5.
[68] Ibid, p. 56.

the end of this century and in the beginning of the next need to do the following to bring about such a stable international order: (a) emphasize the joint or collective management of the international system; (b) begin the process of adjusting the central actors' systemic roles with their power; (c) encourage the vigorous resolution of major conflicts through integrative negotiations; (d) do not view the balance of power as the primary means for providing stability in the international system, but rather view it more as a short term means of maintaining deterrence or preventing overt aggression; and (e) start the process now during a period of U.S. strength and in the absence of 'critical points'.

Adjusting the role and power of central actors

The focus or objective of American statesmen going into the next century should be the effective management of the international system through a division of labor involving all of the major or important powers. A cooperative international system between the United States, Germany, Japan, Great Britain and France is not hard to imagine—this has essentially been the case for most of the Cold War. A significant challenge, however, will be to substantially increase the roles and responsibilities of both Japan and Germany. Granting Germany and Japan permanent membership on the Security Council with that membership's right to a veto is one possible policy innovation that increases these two countries' international roles. The other is granting both countries membership to the proposed United Nations' Economic Security Council, and proposing increased direct Japanese and German participation in peacekeeping operations. Another policy innovation might be to increase both countries' military roles within existing security structures. The gradual expansion of Japanese security responsibilities in cooperation with the U.S. Seventh Fleet is one such example. Another example may be to give some of the coveted NATO commands (usually granted to an American flag officer) to a German military officer.

The changes mentioned above may sound somewhat revolutionary, but in actuality, they are piecemeal. The real challenge involves integrating China into the "major powers' club". This isn't to say that China is to be seen as the successor to the United States, this is not the case, as I have argued above. What needs to be considered carefully, going into the next century, is the expansion of China's roles and responsibilities within an international order dominated and managed by the current major powers. The Great Powers must, at this juncture, consider expanding the roles and responsibilities of China. At present, China is not a member of the G-7. Even Russia with a crippled economy is given honorary membership. In light of past Chinese irritation with the Great Powers' exclusionary policies to China, the current G-7 members should seriously consider granting China at least honorary membership in this organization. Related to this point, American objections to China's membership (a China that is the 10th largest trader in the world) in the World Trade Organization (WTO) seems out of place or misguided.

Emphasize the collective or joint management of the system

Many a government official and international relations scholar have sounded the point that the United States needs to be less domineering or 'super power like' and more like a leader of powers of equal stature.[69] Regardless of their efforts, the United States has not taken up this call. American problems over payment of its dues to the United Nations is a reflection of superpower arrogance, but so too is America's readiness to take unilateral action often without the consultation or consent of its major power allies. In addition, the United States demands that other nations comply with U.S. labor and environment standards before engaging in free trade. The U.S. attempts to impose what

[69] See Pat M. Holt, "Telling the World What to Do: Is U.S. a Model or a Busy Body?" in *Christian Science Monitor*, November 6, 1997, p. 19.

it considers appropriate family planning programs on other countries. The United States even applies sanctions against other nations (some of whom are other major powers) which trade with pariah nations (e.g., Cuba, Iran, and Libya). These actions need to change if the United States is to be perceived as a leader instead of as a hegemon.

Despite the unpopularity of the policy, an American re-emphasis on the importance of the U.N. toward management of international problems would also be wise. American efforts to solve international problems and disputes through the U.N. would illustrate that the United States was willing to bear the burdens of likely inefficiency resulting from working through yet another bureaucracy, and the possibility of U.N. actions countering immediate American interests, for the sake of collective responsibility and decision making.

The United States sometimes needs to play less the role of roving police officer whose role it is to occasionally come into a dispute ready to use deadly force and more the role of coalition builder. Instead of "laying down the law" by the threatened and actual use of military force, sometimes the United States needs to work with the major powers of the region to resolve a conflict or dispute. Sometimes the conflict requires the use of deadly force anyway; however, the fact that the United States took great pains to get approval and consent from major friends and allies would probably earn the U.S. kudos, as well as good will. America's behavior during Operation Desert Storm is a good example of this. The American leadership got U.N. approval to respond with military force to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and it conferred with all the major powers (including Russia) over the appropriate action to be taken.

Actively pursue integrative negotiation to resolve major disputes

At the time of this writing, a number of major disputes remain between some of the major powers. For example, China and Japan have long standing territorial disputes

over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands as well as historic tensions over Japan's behavior during World War II. The United States and China could still become embroiled in a conflict over Taiwan, over Chinese sales of advanced weaponry thereby contributing to an arms proliferation problem, and possibly over a Korean crisis. Japan and the U.S. still occasionally wrangle over trade frictions. These disputes need to be resolved through the active pursuit of integrative solutions mentioned throughout this dissertation. For example, the recent U.S. decision to sell China nuclear reactors in exchange for China's agreement to curb its arms sales abroad is one such approach. The result is that the U.S. gets assistance in its efforts to curb the proliferation problem, while China gets improved technology for its energy and development needs.

The appropriate use of balance of power

The major powers should endeavor to change or reconsider policies that appear to be meant to contain or balance China. Thus, the American mutual security treaty with Japan needs to be reexamined with this in mind. Although American security policy in Asia is anchored on its defense relationship with Japan, the Chinese continue to see the alliance as a means to contain China. It will become increasingly difficult for the United States to recognize legitimate Chinese interests and enhanced roles and responsibilities, as long as the mutual security treaty with Japan drags the U.S. into a possible China-Japan conflict or the Chinese continue to perceive the U.S.-Japan alliance as a means to deny China an appropriate role in international affairs. The American foreign policy maker of the next century needs to seriously consider the possibility of integrating both China and Japan into a tripartite coalition or security organization with the United States. China will find it difficult to accuse the U.S. or Japan of containing China, if it is part of the containment or balancing apparatus.

Quite a different approach should be taken in dealing with Russia. Until evidence emerges that Russia will once again become a great power with the capability of helping the other great powers with systems management, the United States and the other NATO countries are correct in maintaining a constant vigil against renewed Russian aggression. It is thus correct to preserve NATO as a hedge against a possible Russian attack against the Baltic states or former allies. On the other hand, it is possible to maintain vigilance against Russia without insulting Russian sensibilities or trampling on the cherished Russian self-image of Russia as a great power. The proposal to quickly invite former Russian allies and Soviet states in to NATO may have been excessive, unnecessarily hurting the pride of common Russian citizens over countries that the United States and the other major powers have no vital interests in protecting.

The recommendation that the major powers use the balance of power "appropriately" also does not suggest that the great powers should be reluctant to use force to maintain stability in the international order. Overwhelming and devastating force at times needs to be threatened against such mid-sized powers as Iraq, in order to enforce international order. The balance of power or policies meant to constrain may also have to be applied to an emerging major power. It is possible, however unfortunate, that one of the emerging major powers may seek to directly challenge the international order. This challenge is not necessarily manifest in a growing economic power and the improvement of military capabilities. Nor is it even manifest by that power's inevitable demand for greater say in international affairs or that its interests be taken into account. This challenge to the international order would come from a major power that: (1) consistently violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring states; (2) openly and consistently called for a re-evaluation and reformulation of the norms governing the behavior of states in the international order; and (3) directly challenged the authority of the other major powers by military, economic and diplomatic means. Given these

conditions, it is not only appropriate, but absolutely necessary, that the major powers make it clear that they are willing to use force or whatever means necessary to constrain or balance that threat. This is an appropriate use of the balance of power.

The major powers need to act now

A final point is that the United States and the other emerging major powers need to act now to bring about this stable multipolar structure. At present the United States is the only superpower in existence with no real peer competitors on the horizon. It can afford to take risks for the sake of future stability of the international order. For example, the U.S. needs to act to integrate China into the international system while the relationship clearly involves a U.S. dominant and more powerful than China. To wait decades before making efforts at getting China to be an equal partner in the international system would lead to a situation in which China—having seen itself as excluded and pushed aside, and by then possibly possessing the military and economic capability to unilaterally change its situation— acting aggressively to alter the international order. Similarly, the major powers need to act now to bring about a peaceful, stable, multipolar system during a time of relative technological, political and societal calm.

Conclusion: Bound to Lead

To paraphrase from Joseph Nye's well known analytical work on America's role in the post-Cold War world, the United States is simply "bound to lead".[70] At present, there is no country capable of maintaining peace and stability with its overwhelming military force. At present no other country has the trust of so many other countries to be the honest broker or regional policeman, if necessary. There is no other country with a competing vision that is compelling enough to bring about an international call to drop American leadership. That being said, the United States must lead a group of major powers whose capabilities are slowly beginning to match or catch up with America's over the long-term. This requires that the other major powers take up burdens that they had not assumed during the Cold War, while the United States releases itself from other burdens. This requires that the United States begin to consult with its allies and share command decisions with them to an extent that it has not done in the past. Finally, this requires creative policies as the United States and the major powers seek to negotiate the terms of shifting roles and responsibilities for all the dominant powers.

[70] Joseph Nye, *Bound to Lead*, Basic Books, New York, NY, 1990.

Vita

Christopher Yung was born on the 16th of February, 1964, in Trinidad & Tobago, West Indies. He emigrated to the United States with his family two years later and grew up in New York State. In 1986, he received a Bachelor of Arts degree (with honors) in Political Science from Haverford College. He then traveled extensively in Asia, particularly throughout the People's Republic of China in the 1986-7 timeframe.

Between 1988 and 1990 he was enrolled in the Master's Program of the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the Johns Hopkins University. There, he studied International Relations theory under the tutelage of Professors Charles Doran, I. William Zartman, and the late Roger D. Hansen, and he specialized in East Asian Studies, under the tutelage of professor A. Doak Barnett and H. Lyman Miller. While at SAIS he also developed an interest in Strategic Studies and National Security Affairs. He had the opportunity to study under Professors Eliot Cohen, Director of the Strategic Studies Department, and Kenneth Adelman, former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He received his M.A. in 1990 and was accepted to the Ph.D. program that same year.

While a doctoral candidate at SAIS, he worked at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) in the Policy, Strategy and Forces Division. His primary role involved assisting the United States Navy to arrive at sound strategies and defense policies for the Asia-Pacific Region. He served as Scientific Analyst to the Navy Staff's Director of Political-Military Affairs (N52), researched and published on a number of Asia-Pacific Defense issues, and had opportunities to brief his research to the Undersecretary of the Navy, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and various high ranking members of the Navy Staff. He completed his Ph.D. class work and comprehensive exams in the Spring of 1994, completed his dissertation in early 1998, and defended the dissertation in April of 1998.

Chris Yung lives with his wife, Teresa, his son, Alexander, and their two cats, Auggie and Isabella in Alexandria, Virginia.

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











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